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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL BOARD GOVERNANCE ON ACADEMIC 
ACHIEVEMENT IN DIVERSE STATES 
 
by 
 
Michael Ford 
 
 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Douglas Ihrke 
 
 
 
 
 
The overwhelming majority of students receiving a publicly funded education in the 
United States attend a public school in a district overseen by a democratically elected 
school board.  Despite the dominant market share of democratically elected school boards, 
academic scholarship is increasingly focused on alternative governance structures such as 
mayoral control, charter schools, and school vouchers.  Much research on traditional 
school boards is in fact skeptical of the capacity for such boards to positively impact 
academic performance.  This dissertation shifts focus back to the almost 14,000 elected 
school boards in the United States, using original survey data from six strategically 
chosen states to connect school board governance with district level academic outcomes. 
The dissertation examines the connections between school board member backgrounds, 
adherence to a set of best practices created by the National School Boards Association, 
small group dynamics, and district graduation and dropout rates.  The study finds that the 
way in which school boards govern does affect district level performance.  Specifically, 
school boards that engage in strategic planning, view their superintendent as a 
collaborator, and mitigate conflict, perform better on academic outcome indicators.  The 
  
 iii 
study also presents limited data on non-profit charter school boards, proposes a 
theoretical model of school board governance, and reviews prior research on school 
boards and performance.  The overall conclusion is that traditional school boards can and 
do influence academic outcomes, meaning, improving school board governance is a 
legitimate approach to improving academic achievement. 
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Chapter I. 
The Problem of the American School Board 
 
Are school boards needed?  What do they do?  How do they do it?  More 
importantly, does what they do affect student outcomes?  If so, how can they do what 
they do better?  The goal of this dissertation is to better understand the relationship 
between school board governance and academic achievement.   
 Specifically, quantitative methods are used to connect soft measures of the 
governance behavior perceptions of public school board members with hard data on 
district academic outcomes.  The amorphous concept of governance is defined as the 
process by which board members make a series of situation dependent decisions that 
chart the trajectory of an organization.   
Even more specifically this study seeks to better understand what makes the 
decisions board members make the right ones.  Is it who board members are?  Is it the 
concepts on which board members focus?  Is it the way in which they make decisions?  Is 
it the environment in which those decisions are made?  Or, is it come combination of all 
of the above?  Answering these questions will not only clarify the place of the school 
board in an education reform environment increasingly hostile to traditional school 
boards, but also give insight into how other types of boards, non-profit and government in 
particular, might go about improving their effectiveness.     
This dissertation seeks to answer the research question: How does school board 
governance impact academic outcomes?  That school board governance can impact 
academic outcomes is supported.  A major research study conducted by the Iowa School 
Boards Foundation called the Lighthouse Inquiry established that boards overseeing high 
achieving school districts demonstrate different sets of characteristics than those 
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overseeing low-achieving districts (Delagardelle, 2008; Rice et. al., 2000).  In addition, 
the literature on board governance generally shows a connection between governance 
behaviors and organizational performance in the non-profit and government sectors 
(Carver, 2006; Ihrke & Niederjohn, 2005; Gabris & Davis, 2006).   
It is less clear exactly how school board governance impacts academic outcomes.  
This study looks in-depth at the role of school board governance by utilizing originally 
collected survey results of school board members serving in six states in order to: 
1) Establish a modern working definition of the role of school boards: To 
improve academic outcomes. 
2) Propose an original theoretical model of governance explaining how 
governance connects to outcomes.  
3) Test the relationship between the demographics and backgrounds of board 
members and outcomes. 
4) Test the relationship between widely used school board governance best 
practices and outcomes. 
5) Test the relationship between group dynamics and outcomes. 
6) Discuss the alternative governance structure of non-profit charter school 
boards. 
A Brief Introduction to the School Board       
The basic purpose of public education is relatively simple:  Provide students an 
education that prepares them to be productive adults, and do so in an efficient manner.  
Given this simple purpose the two groups most directly impacted by education policy are 
public school pupils and taxpayers.  These groups overlap and combine to include just 
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about every citizen of the United States.  The wide reach of public education makes it a 
policy area that is well measured, subject to political experiment, and frequently debated 
among experts and novices alike. 
 Despite the high-visibility of education policy there remains no consensus on how 
K-12 education should be delivered.  The sheer diversity of student and community 
populations and needs makes the existence of a single best method of delivering 
education implausible; though this has not stopped well-meaning scholars and policy-
makers from looking.  Classroom reforms like small-class sizes and the use of 
technology, governance reforms such as mayoral control, and attempts to reform public 
education from outside of the system such as school vouchers all have one thing in 
common: Mixed results that are dependent on any number of variables.   
 Thus elected school boards, which oversee the education of the vast majority of 
American students, face a basic problem: How do they go about maximizing the 
academic success of the districts they represent?  Is it by establishing the right district 
culture?  Education professors Kent Peterson and Terrence E. Deal summarize the 
importance of school culture thusly: “[A] positive school culture improves school 
effectiveness and productivity” (Peterson & Deal, 2009, p. II).   In other words, things 
like mission, management, and clarity of purpose in a school or district impact whether 
that school or district can achieve its aims.  The strength of a concept like culture is that 
every organization has one that is, presumably, influenced by its governing board.   
 But boards are much more than elected bodies that set the tone of an organization.  
They also make personnel decisions, serve as the microphone for an organization, 
authorize charter schools, lobby for more resources, advocate for their students, and do 
 4 
 
any number of other things that vary depending on the board members themselves and 
the districts they represent.   
 There is, however, one place where all governance boards are alike.  They are all 
small groups of people.  Previous work has focused on who serves on schools boards and 
what they do (Hess & Weeks, 2011).  However very little attention has been paid to the 
way in which board members go about their work.  Governance in this study is defined as 
the process by which a small group of people collectively makes a series of situation 
dependent decisions.   It follows that it matters not only who board members are and the 
issues upon which they focus, but also the way in which they go about making decisions.  
The following chapters consider the role of demographics and best practices in 
governance success, but adds the key missing component of small group dynamics.  The 
results show that who board members are matters only in the context of how it relates to 
what they do and how they do it.  
 In other words, there is evidence that school district outcomes can be improved 
through improved governance, but it is more complicated than getting better people to 
serve on boards.  Maximizing the potential of school boards requires making the right 
decisions in the right way.  It requires improved governance.   
History of the School Board and Literature Review 
The origins of the traditional American school board can be traced back to 1789, 
when the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed a state law that required every 
Massachusetts town to open and support a local public school.  The law also authorized 
towns to employ a board to oversee the school (Callahan, 1975).  The statute would 
eventually be amended to make the board mandatory, and the City of Boston in particular 
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decided that the board be a democratically elected body insulated from “elitist 
tendencies,” (Callahan, 1975 p. 19).  What began in Massachusetts spread throughout the 
republic, and a locally elected public school board became the norm throughout the 
United States.        
 Notably, student academic outcomes have traditionally not been seen as a priority 
of local school boards.  In 1959 political scientist Thomas Eliot described the duties of 
the American School board as “to hire and support a competent professional as 
superintendent, defend the schools against public criticism, and persuade the people to 
open their pocketbooks,” (Eliot, 1959, p. 1033).   Eliot’s description accurately describes 
the role of a school board for much of the institution’s history. 
 The roles and responsibilities of public school boards have however, evolved in 
important ways in the 20th century.  According to the National Center for Education 
Statistics the number of American school districts declined dramatically from over 
117,000 in 1940 to about 18,000 in 1971.  Since then the number of districts has declined 
slowly, today there are fewer than 14,000 school districts in the United States.  As 
previously mentioned, those districts almost universally have democratically elected 
boards, something indicative of the long history of local control of education in the 
United States (Peterson, 1981).     
 The governance of public schools changed dramatically in the 1990s as non-
district charter schools began to proliferate (Wong & Langevin, 2007).  Charter schools 
are technically public schools, but they operate outside the traditional public school 
regulatory framework.  Non-district charter schools are a focus of this study because they 
are authorized by an entity other than a school district (such as a University) and 
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correspondingly have independent governing boards.  Today a majority of U.S. states 
have laws authorizing charter schools, but the laws vary widely (Wong & Langevin, 
2007).  
 The early literature on the American school board is remarkably sparse and 
focused on the demographics of board members.  Lloyd Ashby’s 1968 work, The 
Effective School Board Member best represents the scholarship on school boards up to 
that point.  Ashby advocates judging the effectiveness of a school board almost entirely 
by inputs: Are schools fully staffed? Are classes provided for below average, average, 
and above average students?  Are staff qualified? etc. (Ashby, 1968, pp. 142-143).  
Ashby suggests that business acumen is the ideal quality for a board member.  However, 
Ashby’s work uses limited empirical data in favor of theory and anecdotes.   
 The first wide-scope study of the American school board was commissioned by 
the National School Boards Association and released as an edited volume in 1975 by 
Peter J. Cistone.  The volume, Understanding School Boards, focuses on the rapidly 
changing environment school boards were facing as school segregation came to an end.  
L. Harmon Zeigler (1975), in the volume, concludes that school boards administer a 
service to a specific subset of urban society and do not serve the public at-large.  He 
questions the usefulness of elected boards given their high rate of specialization.  
Zeigler’s conclusions are antiquated in the face of high profile fiscal crises and the 
growing politicization of education reform; the actions of school boards are no longer 
detached from urban political debate.  The simple existence of taxing authority has 
ensured that school boards remain political bodies exposed to special interest pressures. 
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  Raymond Callahan (1975), also as part of the same National School Boards 
Association project, concludes that there are three major roles and responsibilities for 
school boards.  First is the power to hire and fire superintendents and teachers, second is 
the power to implement a curriculum, and third is the power to make budget decisions. 
Mosher (1975) goes further than Callahan and states that finance and budget decisions 
are the most prominent school board responsibility.  However, both Callahan and Mosher 
fail to consider the restrictions boards face as they make finance decisions.  Overall, the 
Cistone volume serves as a call for scholars to take seriously the role of American school 
boards as a political institution. 
   Paul Peterson (1981) examined school boards from a federalism perspective, 
concluding that boards are often in conflict with state government as they attempt to 
maximize shared revenue while minimizing mandates.  Murphy (1991) similarly 
examines how districts seek to implement the mandates included in the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act in a way that maximizes positive impacts on student 
achievement. Spillane (1996) offers a spirited defense of the school board, concluding 
that local expertise is necessary for implementing state instructional programs.  Peterson, 
Murphy, and Spillane are typical of much of the research in the 1980s and 1990s; all 
three sought to describe how school boards balance spending with mandates from higher 
levels of government.   
 The turn of the century changed the tone of board scholarship, William G. 
Howell’s 2005 edited volume, Besieged, describes the typical American school board as 
under attack from school choice programs and mayoral governance reforms.  Wong and 
Shen (2005) in particular argue that mayoral control of school systems, under the right 
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circumstances, can increase levels of achievement.  Viteritti (2005) went as far as to 
declare local education politics obsolete.  He cites low voter turnout in board elections as 
evidence of school boards’ non-democratic tendencies.  
 Moe (2005), in Howell’s volume, conducts the first major study of special interest 
politics in school board elections, finding that teacher unions are the most dominant force 
in board elections.  Wong and Shen (2005) draw broadly on Moe’s conclusion as 
evidence that school board elections are dominated by special interests, plagued by low-
voter turnout, and can be impediments to increasing levels of academic achievement.  
Policy debates in large cities across the country have been informed by Wong and Shen’s 
conclusions that boards can be a hindrance to learning. 
 However, there is a significant research gap that leave Wong and Shen’s 
conclusions unsatisfying.  Hochschild (2005) points out that scholars do not have a full 
understanding of what school boards can or cannot do.  Is the perceived problem the 
institution, or its actions?   If special interest participation and low-voter turnout de-
legitimize school boards, why are other local and state governments whose elections have 
low-turnouts and strong interest group participation not deemed illegitimate as well?   
Economist Jason Grissom (2012) begins to fill in a research gap on school boards 
by linking the level of conflict on California school boards to growth in district 
performance.  He finds that school board member conflict (as determined by surveys of 
board members and superintendents) is generally negatively associated with student 
achievement.  Grissom concludes there is a need to better understand the pathways 
connecting board governance and student achievement.  My dissertation will better 
conceptualize these pathways and look at aspects of governance beyond conflict. 
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 A parallel track of scholarship has focused on the impact of racial and gender 
representation on school boards.  Melissa Deckman (2007), for example, finds basic 
differences in the reasons men and women run for school board.  Men are more likely to 
say they want to impact government policy, and more likely to cite religious motivations 
than women.  These differing motivations provide reasons to suspect that the gender of 
school board members relates to district performance.  A preliminary study by this author 
testing the relationship between board member gender and academic outcomes in 
Wisconsin, for example, found that female majority boards generally govern over 
comparably higher achieving school districts (Ford, 2012).  
   Melissa Marschall (2005) finds that minority parents in school districts with 
minority school board members have higher levels of satisfaction with their schools than 
minority parents in districts without minority board members.  Given the significant role 
that non-school home-life factors have in predicting academic outcomes, Marschall’s 
findings are substantively significant.   
 Kenneth Meier has done significant work on the role of racial representation and 
diversity on school boards.  Meier & Stewart (1991) examine over 100 diverse school 
districts and find that board members will often respond to board conflict by forming 
race-based coalitions and/or multi-racial coalitions based on predictable patterns.  Luis 
Fraga, Meier, & Robert England (1986) use data from about three dozen school districts 
to identify a link between Hispanic school board representation and Hispanic 
employment levels in school districts.  Meier & England (1984) also look at urban 
districts specifically and find that African-American representation on school boards is 
linked with more equitable district policies.   
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 The body of research on gender and racial representation solidifies the need to 
consider the demographics of board members in attempts to explain their behavior.  
Though much emphasis in this study is on how school board members go about making 
decisions, it is crucial to understand that demographics play a substantial part in forming 
individual board members’ decision premises (Simon, 1972). 
Comparative Case Study Approach 
This study takes a comparative case study approach to answer the question of how 
school board governance impacts student achievement.  Specifically, survey results from 
school board members from Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Utah, Florida, and Nevada 
are pooled with archival data from the National Center for Education Statistic’s Common 
Core Data Set and from individual state education agencies to identity and explain 
meaningful commonalities and differences between states.    
The logic of using a case study approach, as well as the logic of the chosen cases 
is grounded in the nature of school boards.  School boards are a creation of state 
government and operate under unique laws that make an overall generalizable study more 
difficult and likely less informative than comparative case studies.  While there are 
certainly commonalities among all school boards in the United States, there are vast state-
to-state differences that need to be considered to make valid conclusions about the 
institution.  
  The relative strength of teacher unions is different in Nevada, Florida and Utah 
compared to Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin (where recent events have made the 
continued strength of unions unclear).  The task of a school board member that must deal 
heavily with unions is appreciably different than a school board member that does not 
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deal with organized labor and collective bargaining.  School board members in the 
included states also operate in very different accountability climates.  A 2007 analysis of 
standards used by states to measure their progress under No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 
shows Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan all have lax standards compared to Nevada, 
Utah, and Florida (Carey, 2007).  However, the recent granting of NCLB accountability 
waivers in several states as well as the well-documented flaws of the NCLB 
accountability framework make this too, an evolving issue. 
 A multi-state case study approach will allow for conclusions across groups of 
similar and dissimilar states, as well as specific insights resulting from state-to-state 
comparisons.  According to Boston University Political Scientist John Gerring (2007) a 
case study is appropriate when an intensive study of one or more cases can yield valuable 
information about all cases.  In this study, there is a potential for fifty different cases due 
to the fact that state governments authorize school boards and all operate in a constricted 
environment determined by the unique legal and demographic make-up of their 
respective states.  Conducting fifty different case studies is ideal, but logistically 
prohibitive and unnecessary to answer the presented research question.  Instead, two 
dissimilar groups of three similar cases will be used.  Two approaches to case study 
research will be deployed: 1) The use of most-similar cases, and 2) The use of most-
different cases (Gerring, 2007, p. 88).  The hybrid approach will allow for conclusions 
through the study of commonalities between all cases, and the specific differences 
between the dissimilar groupings.   
 As mentioned two groups of three states have been selected based on their 
characteristics.  Group one consists of less unionized states with a small number of large 
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school districts and significantly lower levels of per-pupil spending and employee benefit 
costs (see Tables 1.2 and 1.2).  Group Two consists of heavily unionized states in the 
Great Lakes region that contain large numbers of small school districts and high levels of 
per-pupil spending and employee benefit costs (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2).  Their 
geographic proximity is also relevant as specific education policies that impact school 
boards, such as the use of charter schools, have diffused between these states (Wong & 
Langevin, 2007).  
Table 1.1: Characteristics of School Districts in Selected States 
State Districts 
Average  
Schools 
Per-District 
Average  
Students 
Per-District 
Average 
Teachers  
Per-District 
Group 1     
Nevada  17   36   25,352   1,289  
Utah   41   28   13,311   560  
Florida  67   67   39,150   2,762  
Group 2 
    Wisconsin  424   5   2,035   138  
Michigan  552   7   2,790   155  
Minnesota  340   6   2,360   146  
  
Table 1.2: Average Per-Pupil Costs in Selected States 
State 
Total Per-
Pupil Cost 
Per-Pupil Fringe 
Benefit Cost 
Group 1   
Nevada $8,442 $1,917 
Utah  $6,356 $1,594 
Florida $8,769 $1,649 
Group 2     
Wisconsin $11,078 $2,807 
Michigan $11,098 $2,713 
Minnesota $11,098 $3,140 
 
 13 
 
 In addition to the public school boards in the selected states, surveys were sent to 
school board members governing charter schools operating in Wisconsin and Michigan.  
Charter school boards differ from district school boards in several substantive ways.  
Most important, board members are appointed and not elected.  Second, charter school 
boards usually oversee a single school rather than a system of schools.  Third, charter 
schools receive less state and local aids than traditional public schools.  
 Modeling School Board Governance 
Figure 1.1 is an overly simplified model of the two basic relationships guiding 
this dissertation.   First, the skills and backgrounds of board members are assumed to 
impact the manner in which board members govern.  Second, the action of governance is 
hypothesized to impact the academic performance of districts and schools.  Crucial to 
understanding these relationships is an examination of the activities that are decided upon 
during the governance process.  Clearly, Figure 1.1 fails to satisfy as an explanatory 
model, it does however provide a starting point from which to discuss the subjects of the 
situation dependent decisions made during the governance process. 
Figure 1.1: Model Connecting School Board Governance to District Performance 
Board Member Backgrounds  Governance   Performance 
 
 The aforementioned Lighthouse inquiry speculates that there are seven 
characteristics of effective school board governance (Delagardelle, 2008): 
1. Connections across the system 
2. Knowing what it takes to change achievement 
3. Workplace support 
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4. Professional development 
5. A balance between direction and building-level autonomy 
6. A strong community connection 
7. Distributed leadership 
Delagardelle’s list contains several important inputs (a basic knowledge of 
education, connections to the community, etc) that might be theorized to predict the 
performance of a board, as well as several structural conditions (distributed leadership, 
workplace support, etc.) that bear further study.  While the survey used for this 
dissertation was designed to gather data that can be used to better understand the value of 
the Lighthouse model, emphasis will also be placed on measuring the role of governance 
beyond the inputs and conditions in which a board operates.   
Hypotheses and Descriptions of Data  
 Guiding this project is the broad, informed, but preliminary assumption that 
school board governance behavior relates to district performance in quantitatively 
measurable ways.  Three specific hypotheses will be the focus of the project.   
Hypothesis 1: Greater adherence to the eight components of the National School Board 
Association’s (NSBA) Key Work of School Boards positively impacts district level 
academic outcomes.   
The NSBA describes in detail the eight components it believes are essential to 
using governance to raise academic achievement (Gemberling et. al., 2000).  The 
components on the list are: 
• Vision 
• Standards 
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• Assessment 
• Accountability 
• Alignment 
• Climate 
• Collaboration 
• Community Engagement 
• Continuous Improvement 
The list, however, is the product of consensus, not research.  Surveying board 
members on the extent to which their board is adhering to the NSBA’s key components 
provides data that can be connected to district outcomes; thereby verifying or calling into 
question their use as best practices.   
Hypothesis 2: The presence of dynamics typical to a high-functioning small group on a 
school board positively impacts district level academic success.  
 As mentioned, small groups in government and non-profit agencies have been 
shown to demonstrate predictable characteristics that can be measured via survey and 
shown to affect group outcomes (Ihrke & Niederjohn, 2005; Gabris & Davis, 2006).  
Theoretically, school boards should operate like other small groups and the presence or 
lack of presence of factors typical of a high functioning group should be related to 
organizational outcomes.  Specific sub-hypotheses grounded in the following three 
aspects of board governance will be tested: 1. Conflict 2. Board design, and 3. 
Governance model.   
Conflict 
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The impact of conflict within small groups differs depending on the type of 
conflict and the way in which it manifests.  Morton Deutsch (1973) for example theorizes 
that the likelihood of conflict within a group is dependent on the timing of the 
consequences of adopting a specific position.  Deutsch also discusses the characteristics 
of destructive and constructive conflict, arguing that the measurement of results is the 
best way to determine the nature of conflict.  Lewis Coser (1956) helpfully hypothesizes 
on the determinants of destructive and constructive conflict, concluding that ideologically 
tinged conflict is the most entrenched and destructive.  However, he also concludes that 
conflict can serve a positive social function by creating a mechanism to relieve tension 
that enables better decision-making within groups.   
Qualitative work by Karen Jehn (1997) furthers the understanding of small-group 
conflict by dividing it into three types.  The first, relationship conflict, appears as 
personal animosity and/or frustration between board members.  Such conflict could bog 
down the governance process and negatively impact student achievement by preventing 
timely policy-making.   In other words, an unresponsive board may be unlikely to react 
quickly to district and school challenges. 
The second type of conflict is task conflict.  Task conflict is when board members 
have legitimate differences over the vision and policies of the board.  Such conflict is 
substantive, not personal.  The presence of task conflict may be an indicator of an 
engaged board and should be expected to increase school and district performance.  
Conversely, the absence of task conflict likely means a board is disengaged, or bogged 
down in relationship conflict.  Either way, performance should be expected to suffer. 
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The third type of conflict is process conflict.   Process conflict is disagreement 
between board members on the way in which certain tasks should be done; for example 
which committee should take up a specific policy proposal, how long a topic should be 
debated, etc.  There is reason to suspect the presence of process conflict on a board 
negatively impacts school and district performance.  Specifically, focus on process may 
be a safe harbor for boards that are unable or unwilling to address education policy.   
Board Design 
The second relevant aspect of board governance is board design.  Design matters 
because board attributes such as stability, shared politics, and the nature by which board 
members begin their service likely affects what board members care about and how they 
interact (Renz, 2004).  For example, a long serving board might be expected to make 
policy in a more efficient (and responsive) manner due to familiarity.  Also important is 
the manner in which a board member is elected (or for charter school boards, appointed).  
A board member that won a contested election is likely more sensitive to political 
concerns than a board member that won an uncontested election.  
Governance Model 
The third aspect of board governance theorized to impact performance is the 
governance model deployed by the board.   Many boards likely use the traditional model, 
which stresses top-down governance and process (Bradshaw et. al, 2007).   Others likely 
use the policy governance model, where a formal policy is created to deal with specific 
governance questions  (Carver, 2006).  Still others likely use the corporate model of 
governance.  
Hypothesis 3: Boards with larger zones of discretion have better academic outcomes. 
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 As discussed earlier, school boards face limits on their ability to make policy 
(Kirst, 2008). Limiting factors includes state and federal mandates, teacher unions, 
constituents, and spending caps (Howell, 2005).  Surveying board members on their 
proclivity to make policy decisions beyond what is required under state law will allow for 
a quantitative analysis of whether enacting policies that go beyond what is required by 
law is connected to better student outcomes.   
 Three types of data will be used to test the listed hypotheses.  The first is archival 
data on school districts from the Common Core of Data from the National Center for 
Education Statistics.  Several variables for all school districts in the country, and hence 
the eventual sample, are available.  The first set of variables is descriptive:  
• Address; 
• Phone numbers; 
• Numbers of schools in the district; 
• Numbers of students in the district; 
• Number of teachers in the district; 
• Teacher/student ratio in the district; 
• Number of English Language Learners in the district; 
• Numbers of students with IEPS in the district; 
• Census classification of districts; 
• Breakdown of total district staff including guidance counselors, librarians, district 
and school administrators; 
• District revenue by source; 
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• District expenditures broken down by category including instructional, students 
and staff support, administration, operations, capital spending, interest on debt; 
and 
• District census data on the population served by the district; age race, etc.   
 The variables listed above are used to build a statistical portrait of school districts 
and charter schools in my selected states, and then linked with original survey data 
collected from public school board members.   
 The second major data source is the survey results from traditional and charter 
school board members.  A similar survey was used by Ihrke & Niederjohn (2006) to 
measure the presence of conflict on Wisconsin city councils.  The authors sent surveys to 
617 board members on 57 councils, and achieved an overall response rate of 23.8%.  A 
similar response rate was obtained for this study.  
The third data source consists of variables that indicate the level of academic 
performance in school districts.  NCES data on high school graduation and dropout rates, 
as well as limited in-state test score data are used as indicators of attainment and 
performance at the school district level.  
Across state comparable standardized test score data is impossible to obtain 
because of the widespread use of criterion reference tests developed by individual states.  
The six states in my study all use different tests: The Wisconsin Knowledge and 
Concepts Exam, Michigan Educational Assessment Program, Minnesota Comprehensive 
Assessments, the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (used in Utah), the Nevada Proficiency 
Examination Program, and the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test.  However, all 
tests do have specific cut-off points that indicate proficiency; meaning the percentage of 
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students in each school district scoring proficient on the state test is sparsely used as a 
common, though imperfect indicator of district achievement levels.   
 Another potential problem with connecting board governance with academic 
outputs is the lag time between a governance decision and the time its impact (or lack of 
impact) on district performance is felt.  A multitude of methods, including the use of 
statistical models restricted by a board stability variable, are used to mitigate the 
possibility of a governance time lag.   
Methodology  
 Quantitative methods are deployed to analyze the collected data.  The specific 
methodologies used include: 
• Simple means comparisons tests to establish the demographic differences of 
schools and districts, school and district performance, school board member 
demographics, and school board member attitudes; 
• Linear regression analyses explaining the relationship between school 
demographics and resources, school demographics and performance, school 
resources and performance, school board governance behavior and outcomes, and 
various other relationships between board member behaviors and school and 
district outcomes; and 
• A logistic regression analysis predicting reading test score gains across states. 
A study of school board governance in California by Jason Grissom (2012) 
demonstrates how school board member survey response variables can be modeled with 
academic outcome variables.  Grissom surveyed 1,111 school board members and 
obtained responses from 63 percent.   He averaged out responses at the board level when 
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multiple members from a single board responded.  Using district level testing results from 
the California Department of Education as his dependent variable and survey responses 
as independent variables Grissom conducted several multi-variate regression analyses.  
The methodology deployed by Grissom informs some of the methodology used in this 
analysis.   
Conclusion and Next Steps 
The preceding chapter included a literature review of school board governance, a 
description of the research question, a brief overview of the data used in this study, and 
the three hypotheses that are tested.  But the title of this introductory chapter is The 
Problem of the American School Board.  So, what is the problem?  Simply, there is no 
consensus about what school boards should be doing, what they have the power to do, 
what they actually do, or how they do it.  The lack of consensus has led scholars to too 
often dismiss or ignore the institution of the school board.   Studies of alternative forms 
of school district governance proliferate while the dominant structure governing the 
delivery of public education in the United States is attacked as irrelevant. 
The following chapters will show that school boards are not irrelevant by first 
defining their role, tasks and limitations, second proposing an explanatory model linking 
school board governance to academic outcomes, third establishing the variables which 
affect academic outcomes in the six states of interest, fourth testing hypotheses linking 
board governance to academic outcomes, and fifth exploring the alternative non-profit 
charter school board.  The overall approach is perhaps out-of-step with the title of this 
chapter, as it is built on the premise that the American school board is not a problem, but 
rather akin to a jigsaw puzzle - a very old jigsaw puzzle.  Like an old jigsaw puzzle I 
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fully expect to end up with some missing pieces, some weathered pieces, and perhaps 
even a final picture that is laughably out-of-date.  Regardless, the following eight 
chapters will provide an in depth understanding of how and why school board 
governance affects student outcomes.           
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Chapter II. 
An Alternative View of the School Board: Role, Tasks, and Discretionary Zones 
  
 Why do school boards exist? It is a simple question on the surface, but one that 
gets more complicated the deeper one digs.  This chapter of the study argues that the 
absence of widespread agreement on the proper role of school boards is due to confusion 
between the tasks executed by school boards, and the role of school boards.  Both are 
important concepts, but both are fundamentally different.  Going further, I argue that the 
role of school boards, if they are to survive, must be universally understood as 
maximizing the student achievement levels in their district.  It is the tasks and ways in 
which they engage in them that determine whether their role is met.  Necessary in 
understanding the tasks of school boards is recognizing the discretionary zones in which 
they operate.   
The Role of School Boards 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Political Scientist Thomas Eliot opined in 1959 
that the role of the school board is “to hire and support a competent professional as 
superintendent, defend the schools against public criticism, and persuade the people to 
open their pocketbooks,” (Eliot, 1959, p. 1033).  Perhaps in 1959, when there were no 
popular alternative structures to perform the basic tasks of school boards, this was an 
adequate description.  Plainly, in 1959 the tasks of school boards were the same as their 
role because no alternative vision existed. 
 But things changed mightily after 1959.  In particular, two occurrences in the 
mid-1960s fundamentally altered the way in which local education was delivered in the 
United States.  First, the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
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(ESEA) in 1965 dramatically increased the role of state and federal government in local 
education. Second, the rising influence of two national teachers unions, the American 
Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association, brought collective 
bargaining rights to most districts, permanently changing the nature of school board 
politics.   Simply, the quaint idea of an apolitical board that solely performs an 
administrative function ceased to exist (Epstein, 2004).  Both the money flowing to and 
mandates hoisted upon school districts increasingly originated from factors beyond the 
control of local school boards.  Yet, the academic literature on school boards for the most 
part continued (and continues) to define the role of the school board as a series of tasks.  
Deborah Land (2002) reviews existing literature on school board governance and 
concludes the popularly understood function of the school board is to make policies.  
Again, this may be what boards do, but is it their function? 
 Norman Kerr (1964) argues that the school board exists simply to legitimize the 
actions of the district by showing that initiatives are vetted and approved by accountable 
and democratically elected officials.  The dissatisfaction theory of local governance 
posits something similar, that school board members are voted out of office when the 
public becomes dissatisfied with their policies (Lutz & Iannaccone, 2008).  William 
Howell and Christopher Berry (2005) find evidence of this in South Carolina, concluding 
school board elections do serve a public accountability function.  Jon Pierre (1999) 
argues that local government boards, including school boards, exist to maximize state aid 
to the community.   
 All of these explanations provide some idea of why school boards exist, but fail to 
get at defining their core role.  Accountability for academic performance, for example, is 
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increasingly a core function of state government.  For example, the No Child Left Behind 
Waiver approved in Wisconsin in 2012 allows the state to directly intervene in the 
operations of low-performing schools.  In Michigan, a special purpose government called 
the Education Achievement System exists specifically to run low-performing schools.  
Perhaps there is potential for school boards to serve a democratic accountability function, 
but the continued widespread development of accountability systems that act more 
swiftly than democracy suggest that this should not and cannot be the institution’s core 
role if it is to survive.   
 Maximizing state aid also appears on the surface a logical role for school boards.  
However the universal use of equalization and/or minimum foundation programs by 
states to fund schools makes this role obsolete.  In most states, state aid to school districts 
is mostly determined by the number of students enrolled in district schools and some type 
of formula that determines how much state aid is needed given the district’s local revenue 
generating capacity.  Sure, districts can seek to maximize enrollment, but that is hardly a 
core governance function.                         
 A tempting landing spot is to conclude that school boards exist to serve the 
essential function of running schools.  Or, school boards exist because of a lack of other 
options.  The proliferation of education vouchers for private schools, independent charter 
schools that operate outside of traditional school districts, the emergence of special 
purpose governments to run schools in Louisiana, Michigan and Tennessee, and the 
elimination of traditional school boards in several large American cities show that school 
boards are not in fact needed to deliver public education (Howell, 2005; Viteritti, 2005).  
The emergence of public education options outside of school board authority, though still 
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the exception and not the rule, provides urgency to the task of defining the proper role of 
the school board (Levin, 2002).   
So what is the proper role of school boards?  Ideally, to maximize the academic 
output of the school districts they oversee.   The rest of this chapter and the rest of this 
dissertation will explore how school boards go about, and should go about, executing this 
role.  This defined role satisfies for many reasons.  First, it is simple and vague enough 
that it can apply to the over 14,000 school boards operating in diverse policy and 
interpersonal environments.  Second, it presumes that school boards are the school 
governance agent most capable of ensuring American students are well educated.  The 
continued failure of alternative governance structures to deliver outcomes substantially 
better than traditional school districts, as well as the overwhelming market share of 
traditional school districts, makes this presumption logical (Wong et. al., 2007; Levin, 
2004).  Third, it is a role that is measurable, though imperfectly, using widely available 
student performance data.   
The Tasks of School Boards       
Having defined the role of school boards the next logical questions to consider 
are, what do school boards do?  And what tasks do boards engage in?  Here too the 
answer is surprisingly complex and requires a discussion of the types of tasks school 
boards generally execute, as well the development of a continuum of tasks from broad to 
specific that together comprise the action of governance.  First, however, it is necessary 
to differentiate between the things that individual board members do in their official 
capacities, and the things that boards do.  In this study both the board and the board 
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member are relevant units of analysis, but it is impossible to understand one without 
understanding the other.   
According to a national survey of American school board members the average 
board member is likely to be white, have a bachelor’s degree or higher, most likely 
moderate and more likely conservative than liberal in their political views, slightly more 
likely to be male than female, and likely be receiving a relatively little or no salary for 
their service (Hess & Meeks, 2011).  Boards members in general also are most likely to 
have been elected to their position with relative ease in a campaign that spent less than 
$1,000 (Hess & Meeks, 2011).     
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, there are various board member tasks that sit on 
different ends of a specific to broad continuum.  For example, school board members, as 
democratically elected officials, broadly represent the views of their constituents.  
Though the task of representation may be markedly different for members representing 
at-large positions on boards than district seats, and will likely manifest in different ways, 
the overall concept of representation is consistent.  Running for reelection is another 
broad school board member task; all must do it but the specifics of how will vary.  The 
adoptions of formal and informal roles on the board are two more broad tasks (Smoley, 
1999).  Formal roles may include committee memberships and officer positions like 
treasurer and board president.  The formal roles taken and the ways in which they are 
fulfilled will vary by member, but all will serve some formal role.   The informal roles of 
individual board member will also vary and be dependent on the way in which the group 
interacts, but positions as peacemaker, listener, etc. are likely to develop within a board 
and manifest in different ways (Smoley, 1999).    
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 The more specific tasks of board members relate to the day-to-day work of 
serving on a local government board.  This includes meeting with constituents, attending 
board meetings and committee meetings, and voting on district policies.  The tasks 
included in Figure 2.1 are not meant to be an exhaustive list, individual board members 
engage in any number of activities that range from very specific to very broad.  
Importantly, these individual board member tasks are not board governance tasks.  They 
may impact the governance process, they may be signs of an effective or ineffective 
board member, but they are individual tasks.          
Figure 2.1 – The Continuum of School Board Member Tasks 
 
Specific                       Broad 
<-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->  
Vote on district policies             Represent constituents 
Meet with constituents             Run for election                 
Attend board member training            Adopt formal board roles   
Attend board meetings                        Adopt informal board roles  
        
 A school board, which in its most simple form is merely a group of school board 
members engaging in formal duties, also performs collective tasks that can be placed on a 
specific to broad continuum.  Existing academic literature gives a general overview of 
what school boards do.  Paul Hill (2004) lists a multitude of oversight tasks school boards 
engage in; specifically boards manage: 
• Facilities; 
• Professional staff and support staff; 
• School and pupil funding; 
• Curriculum; 
• Transportation of pupils; 
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• School attendance; 
• Dispute resolution; 
• Implementation of state and federal categorical aid programs;  
• Federal civil rights laws; and 
• Vendor contracts. 
Collectively Hill’s list comprises the specifics that go into the day-to-day 
management of district operations.  In other words, school boards work collectively to 
make the trains run on time.  Mary Delagardelle (2008) takes an alternative approach and 
describes the tasks of school boards primarily through the broad lens of guiding student 
learning.  The specific tasks include creating a board “vision and direction for student 
learning,” creating district policies, allocating resources, and monitoring academic 
achievement initiatives (Delagardelle, 2008, p. 191).   
Figure 2.2  – The Continuum of School Board Tasks 
 
Specific                       Broad 
<-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->  
Budgeting      Management of district operations 
Creating a formal board vision   Guiding student learning 
Monitoring student achievement   Aligning resources with mission 
Hiring the superintendent    Keeping the public informed 
Negotiating contracts with teachers   Managing human capital 
 
Raymond Callahan (1975) argues that school boards perform just three major 
tasks: 1). Hiring and firing the superintendents and teachers 2) Implementing a 
curriculum, and 3) Making budget decisions.  Mosher (1975) argues that boards have 
only one task – making finance and budget decisions.  Deborah Land (2002), in a meta-
analysis of existing literature describes the tasks of school boards parenthetically, writing 
that boards: 
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…appropriate overarching concerns, namely students’ academic 
achievement and policy, not administration; good relations with the 
superintendent, other agencies, local and state government, and the public, 
as well as between board members; effective performance in the areas of 
policy-making, leadership, and budgeting; and adequate evaluation and 
training/development. 
 
Two themes emerge from this discussion of school board tasks.  First, the tasks of 
school boards, as illustrated by Figure 2.2, range from very specific (i.e. voting on a 
district budget) to very vague (i.e. monitoring district finances).  Second, there is no clear 
consensus of the tasks of school boards.  Asking multiple people what a school board 
does will likely yield many often-conflicting answers.    
The lack of a unified consensus on what school boards actually do presents both a 
practical and theoretical problem when attempting to research the institution.  How can 
the performance of school boards on whole be measured without first having standards 
on which to gauge performance?  If a clear list of what boards ought to be doing existed 
measuring if they are doing it, and if they are doing it well, would be fairly 
straightforward.  If there was universal agreement with Mosher (1975) that financial 
oversight is the sole task of school boards, a board with a clear and balanced budget 
could be deemed successful, and a board without one unsuccessful.  But alas, no 
consensus exists. 
Thus comes the second and more interesting theoretical problem: If no agreement 
on what boards do exists, how can their existence ever be validated?  This theoretical 
problem lies at the heart of the growing strain of literature declaring that school boards 
are an obstacle to learning and an obsolete relic of a bygone era (Viteritti, 2009).  The 
line of reasoning is that local control of education had its place in American history, but it 
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no longer reflects reality, and alternative structures for overseeing the delivery of K-12 
education are necessary.   
Both the described practical and theoretical problems provide an opportunity to 
recast the tasks of school boards in the United States.  Both the practitioner and academic 
literature is too focused on solving the problem of how 14,000 complex local 
governments should go about overseeing the education of American elementary and 
secondary students.  That problem is too large, too local, and too complex be solved with 
a list of specific tasks, best practices, or model policies.  Understanding the place of 
school boards requires a much simpler and broader starting point. 
As mentioned, the role of school boards is presumed to be maximizing the 
academic performance of district students.  Given that role, the universal task for all 
school boards should be simply defined as overseeing the production of academic output.  
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, school districts can be viewed as organizations that take raw 
materials and turn them into profit.       
Figure 2.3 – An Organizational Model for School Districts 
 
Raw Materials                       Organization                       Profit  
   (Students)                         (School District)             (Academic Outcomes) 
 
The raw materials are students, and all of the problems and attributes that come 
with them.  As will be demonstrated in future chapters, the quality of the students 
districts receive varies widely across school districts.  Many districts receive students 
from stable family homes and demographic groups that generally correlate with high 
academic achievement.  Other districts receive students mainly from disadvantaged 
backgrounds and demographic groups generally correlated with low levels of academic 
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achievement.  The optimal operations of a school district will necessarily depend on the 
type of raw materials that go into it.   
The organizations receiving the raw materials are school districts.  American 
school districts also vary widely in organization.   Some districts serve tens of thousands 
of students in hundreds of schools, while others serve less than 100 students in a single 
schoolhouse.  Some provide comprehensive services for special needs students; some 
send their most needy students to other districts.  Districts vary in the way they pay their 
staffs, the way they spend their limited monetary resources, and in a countless number of 
other observable and unobservable ways.  
 Profit in the organizational model for school districts is broadly described as 
academic output.  Though admittedly no perfect way to measure academic output exists, 
the widespread use of standardized tests within states and a common measurement of 
four-year high school graduation rates used by the National Center for Education 
Statistics across states provide rich data from which to gauge and compare the quality of 
academic output across school districts.   
Collectively, the three-step model can be described as an exercise in public 
administration.  After all, education is a public good funded by taxpayers, staffed by 
public employees, and available free of charge to all American children.  Historically 
scholars have often described the delivery of public education as a unique activity 
markedly different than the activities performed by other local governments (Mosher, 
1975; Land, 2002).  Not applying the scholarship and lessons from the operations of other 
local governments to school districts makes little sense given their significant shared 
charge and characteristics. 
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 So where do school boards fit into this process?  Simply, school boards govern.  
As previously mentioned school boards oversee the public administration task of 
producing academic output.  There is no single set of specific things they should be 
doing; theirs is a broad charge of making the best of the raw materials received by the 
school district.  For example, a school board that oversees a district populated by highly 
motivated students with engaged families might maximize student performance by 
governing with as light of a touch as possible, seeking only to not pollute quality raw 
materials.  Another district with very challenging students with disengaged families may 
need to design specific district policies to counteract the negative impact of a disengaged 
or dysfunctional home environment.  This may be something as simple as an extended 
school day that keeps students in the care of teachers and other school staff for longer 
parts of the day.   
 This hypothetical comparison suggests that knowing when to take or not take 
specific action can be as important a part of governance as the specific actions taken.  It 
follows that the way in which school boards govern, though perhaps less obvious to the 
naked eye, are more important than any specific set of board created district policies.  In 
the chapters that follow the connection between board governance characteristics and 
behaviors, like the presence of conflict, cooperation, situational awareness, and academic 
output, will be explored (Gabris & Davis, 2006; Svara, 1990).  The presumptions going 
into my quantitative analyses is that governance is a process conducted by school boards 
rather than a set of policies, and that that process impacts academic performance in 
school districts.  
School Boards and Zones of Discretion 
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The specific connections between school board governance and academic output 
will be probed in the following chapter.  But first, a significant complicating factor not 
limited to, but especially present in, school board governance must be discussed.  As 
described by Michal Kirst (2008), school boards operate in zones of discretion that 
constrict the school board governance process.   A review of state statutes informs Table 
2.1, which contains the author’s summary of the level of discretion present in school 
board’s operating in the six states of interest.  The areas were chosen based on their 
importance to the previously discussed organizational model of school districts.  Student 
quality refers to a school board’s ability to control who they educate, revenue and 
personnel refer to the control school boards have over the resources essential to school 
districts, and assessment refers to the level of control school districts have over the way 
in which the academic output of school districts is measured.  
Table 2.4 – Level of School Board Discretion by Area by State 
Area Wisconsin Michigan Minnesota Florida Utah Nevada 
Revenue  Low Low Low Medium Medium Low 
Personnel   High Low Low Low Medium Medium 
Assessment Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Student Quality Low Low Low Low Low Low 
 
Revenue 
 Revenue refers to the state, local, and federal funding used to finance public 
school district operations.  In all six states education funding is determined through an 
equalization formula designed to match state funding with an individual school district’s 
capacity to raise local revenue, or a minimum foundation program which provides 
individual school districts with an amount of funding dependent on the unique 
characteristics (i.e. level of poverty, number of special needs pupils) of that school 
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district.  The general goal of both minimum foundation and equalization aid formulas is 
to ensure that longstanding historical disparities in funding between low and high income 
school districts, famously profiled in Jonathan Kozol’s (2012) Savage Inequalities, are 
eliminated.   
 The elimination of inequitable funding was largely made possible by increases in 
state support of K-12 education.  As documented in Table 2.2, in four of the six states of 
focus the level of state financial support for K-12 education exceeds local support.  All 
six states have substantial levels of state support, as well as significant levels of federal 
support.  The increased investment by state and federal government coincided, and was 
often tied to, increased regulation by state and federal governments (Spillane, 1998; 
Howell, 2005).  The result is a smaller discretionary box in which school boards can 
make decisions regarding revenue generation.   
Table 2.5 – Percentage of K-12 Education Revenue by Source, 2008-2009. 
Total K-12 
Revenue Wisconsin Michigan Minnesota Florida Utah Nevada 
State 44.4% 55.7% 65.6% 34.4% 52.6% 30.6% 
Local 41.3% 31.2% 25.2% 51.7% 30.8% 56.7% 
Federal 12.0% 11.5% 6.0% 10.2% 12.4% 9.8% 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics 
  In Wisconsin, every fall the newspapers are peppered with stories about where 
school boards set their tax levy.  The level of attention placed on the school board’s 
action is out of whack with their input in the actual action.   In Wisconsin, for example, 
the setting of the tax levy is, for most districts, an administrative task, not a discretionary 
one.  Since 1992 Wisconsin has had strict local government revenue limits in place that 
limit the amount of revenue school boards can raise from state and local sources (Kava & 
Olin, 2013).  Every year the state of Wisconsin informs every school district of how 
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much money they are able to raise (the number is based on enrollment), and how much 
state aid the state will be sending to the district.  The school board is then allowed to set a 
tax levy that fills the gap between allowable revenue and state aid.  A school board can 
vote to levy less than allowed (which happens roughly 20% of the time), levy the 
maximum allowable amount (which happens roughly 70% of the time), or vote to go to 
referendum to exceed their revenue limit (which happens roughly 10% of the time).   In 
other words, Wisconsin school boards more often than not have zero control of their local 
property tax levy.  The other states of interest have somewhat similar systems in place. 
 Since 1994, Michigan schools have had no control over their local education 
revenue; the amount of local and state aid to Michigan school districts is determined 
entirely by state government (CRC, 2010).   Minnesota school boards operate under a 
system similar to Wisconsin, where the legislature set taxing limits in various areas and 
gives boards the options of levying less than the limit, or going directly to the voters via 
referendum for permission to exceed the limits.  
 Florida school boards have slightly more power.  The state sets the local 
education levy but does allow boards to levy additional taxes for operations and capital 
expenses, but those two levies are also capped.  In Nevada, about 80% of total education 
funding comes from local and state sales tax.  There is also a property tax levied for 
education, but school boards have no control over either, the amounts are set by the state.  
Finally, Utah, like Florida, allows school boards to levy for specific purposes but places 
strict caps on the levies.   
In general, school boards in my six states of interest are boxed in when it comes 
to revenue decisions.  Florida and Utah do have some controlled discretion to fund 
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specific programming, but the rest of the states are totally at the mercy of state 
legislatures and referendum voters. 
Personnel 
 Since the mid 1960s school boards across the country have ceded substantial 
personnel authority via collectively bargained contracts with labor unions (Fuller & 
Mitchell, 2006).  In each of the six states over 3/4ths of teachers are members of labor 
unions that collectively bargain with school boards. A review of the 2009-2013 Labor 
Agreement between Wisconsin’s Racine Unified School District and the Racine 
Education Association provides specific examples of the issues collectively bargained by 
teachers unions and school boards (RUSD, 2009). 
• Teachers rights to academic freedom; 
• Teachers rights to participate in political activity; 
• The right to be suspended with pay if accused of child abuse; 
• Tenure; 
• Grievance procedures; 
• Class size; 
• Preparation time; 
• Class load; 
• Use of Educational Assistants; 
• Daily start and end times; 
• Chaperoning compensation; 
• Student discipline; 
• Teacher contracts; 
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• Teacher pay; 
• Teacher benefits; 
• Procedures for teacher lay-offs; 
• Teacher evaluations; 
• School calendar; 
• Length of school year; 
• Parent teacher conferences; 
• Lunchroom supervision responsibility; 
• Packing days; 
• Early retirement provisions; 
• Sick leave; 
• Leaves of absence; 
• Teacher role in developing curriculum; and 
• The existence of union bulletin boards. 
All of these topics impact the specific manner in which children receive an 
education, mainly because they all deal with public education’s most important 
employees: Teachers, the front-line bureaucrats that actually teach kids (Lipsky, 2010). 
Accordingly, policies and decisions related to teachers are the most important tool that 
school boards have to influence student outcomes.  The ability for school boards to hire, 
strategically place, motivate, reward, and replace teachers is the most important and 
obvious school board governance function affected by collective bargaining agreements.   
Indeed, a national survey of school board members shows that a majority of 
American school board members think the provisions in collectively bargained contracts 
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prevent them from dismissing ineffective teachers (Hess & Meeks, 2011).  Significant 
numbers of board members also point to contracts as an obstacle to proper teacher 
placement and hiring.  
The specific states of interest all face some type of general limits on personnel 
policies.  However, there is some variation.  In Utah and Nevada, for example, unions are 
required to be district level entities, and in Utah, cannot be favored above other teacher 
organizations.  In other words, school boards theoretically have more leverage over 
unions in these states.  In Michigan and Minnesota, teachers unions are strongly 
organized at the state level and not limited in law in the same manner as those in Nevada 
and Utah.  
Wisconsin’s collective bargaining landscape looked much like Michigan and 
Minnesota prior to the passage of Wisconsin 2011 Act 10, which limited collective 
bargaining for most public employees, including teachers, to base wages (strictly defined 
as the total pooled amount spent on teacher compensation).  Issues like tenure, pay scales, 
benefit contributions, and the other subjects listed from the teachers contract example can 
be unilaterally manipulated by school boards in Wisconsin.  Meaning, Wisconsin school 
boards are unique in regards to personnel policies; they have an incredibly high level of 
discretion.   
Evaluation  
 Perhaps nowhere have school boards ceded more local control than the ways in 
which they measure student performance.  Prior to 1985, the assessment decisions of 
school districts were almost universally decided by school boards (Archibald & Ford, 
2012).  Many school boards in Wisconsin, for example, chose not to administer any 
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standardized tests to their students (Archibald & Ford, 2012).  However, the publishing of 
A Nation at Risk is generally agreed to have spurred interest in quantitatively measuring 
the academic performance of American pupils (Garnder, 1983).   
 However, it was not until the passage of the 2001 renewal of the Education and 
Secondary Education Act, popularly known as No Child Left Behind, that federally 
mandated testing began dictating school board assessment policies.  Under No Child Left 
Behind every student must be tested in reading and math in grades three through eight, 
and once in high school.  Students must also be tested in science at least three times over 
their K-12 careers.  The act did not mandate a specific test, meaning states were able to 
design or adopt tests at their discretion.  However, it did remove any power school boards 
had over the most visible way in which they evaluate their students. 
 More recently all six states of interest have been granted No Child Left Behind 
waivers, which shift many of the federal mandates of No Child Left Behind to the states.  
However, from the school board’s point-of-view districts still have little power over their 
official student evaluation system.  But boards are not completely powerless.  None of the 
six states prohibit the use of additional assessment techniques by school districts.  There 
are examples of boards in all six states using formative assessments that measure student 
achievement several times throughout a school year, test score growth measures, and 
alternative assessment indicators like portfolios and graduation rates to measure student 
outcomes.   So, while school boards may have no flexibility regarding their official state 
tests, they do have discretion to use alternative measures of academic output.        
Student Quality 
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 As will be demonstrated by a series of multi-variate regression analyses in chapter 
four, the strongest predictors of K-12 standardized tests scores in all six states are socio-
economic and demographic factors beyond the control of schools.  Turning back to the 
organizational school district model, the lower the quality of the raw materials the lower 
the likely level of profit.  If public school boards could choose the students that they 
educate, they would logically be expected to obtain higher district level academic 
outcomes.  In theory, all public school boards have no discretion over who attends their 
school.  In practice, some have a greater lack of discretion than others. 
 In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for example, the local public school district enrolls a 
significantly higher percentage of special needs pupils than schools participating in that 
city’s fairly large private school voucher and charter programs (Wolf et. al., 2012).   The 
discrepancy is primarily due to the requirement that the Milwaukee Public Schools must 
provide special needs services to pupils.  Other school types do not face the same 
requirement (Wolf et. al., 2012).  Naturally, this causes high-needs students to be 
overrepresented in the traditional public school system.  Both Florida and Wisconsin 
have significant private school voucher programs, and all six states have fairly strong 
charter school laws, making it more likely that specific sub-groups of students are 
relegated to traditional public schools that can cavalierly be called schools of last resort. 
 It also must be noted that many school boards oversee selective admission magnet 
schools within their districts that offset some of the impact of the sorting that occurs 
when non-district schooling options exists.  However, these specific cases are less 
important for explaining student performance than demonstrating that public school 
boards have very little control over the quality of students that attend their district. 
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 Assigning a number of one to three to each entry in  Table 2.1 (one representing a 
low level of discretion, two a medium, and three a high) enables a state-level ranking of 
the zones of discretion in which school boards operate.  Wisconsin and Utah boards have 
the most discretion, followed by Florida and Nevada, with Michigan and Minnesota 
facing the most constraints.  Another less quantitative way of approaching the issue of 
discretionary zones is to divide more specific school board activities into three categories: 
1) Things they directly control; 
2) Things they indirectly control; and  
3) Things they do not control. 
What school boards can directly control 
 Arguably the most important thing school boards can control is the hiring and firing 
of a superintendent (Callahan, 1975). A superintendent is the Chief Executive Officer of 
a school district and sets the tone of daily operations within the organization (Svara, 
1990). Elected school boards approve the search process, the interview process, and 
ultimately the contract for a superintendent.  Boards also have the power to terminate or 
non-renew a superintendent’s contract, making the board relationship with the 
superintendent its most prominent way of controlling daily district operations. 
 School boards also have direct power over the nature of state-level required 
policies. The states of interest, for example, require that districts have a policy to deal 
with bullying and harassment of students, but it is the board that actually determines the 
content of the policy. 
 In addition school boards in Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Utah, and Florida 
have the power to authorize charter schools.  Boards in all six states are able to 
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unilaterally set budget priorities, contract for services, and do an infinite number of 
activities not specifically banned or required under state and federal law. This includes 
conducting research on the performance of pupils, administering standardized tests that 
go beyond what is required in state and federal law, and increasing graduation and/or 
promotion requirements.   
What boards can indirectly control 
 The things school boards can control only indirectly include those tied to 
enrollment, and those tied to collective bargaining.  As described, if school boards want 
to spend more, their districts generally need more pupils.  Districts obviously can and do 
take action to maximize their student enrollment.   An example might be the creation of 
specialty offerings such as Montessori schools.  More broadly, districts may simply try 
their best to respond to parental demands to keep enrollment numbers strong.  
What Boards Cannot Control 
 
American school boards generally must comply with a long list of state and 
federal mandates over which they have no control.  Not the least of which is the 
aforementioned accountability system mandated by the federal No Child Left Behind 
Law.  However accountability mandates only scratch the surface.  School districts must 
follow state guidelines regarding their minimal instruction time, the way in which 
medication is administered at the school level, the standards that must be met by subject 
area, and any number of specific curricular content requirements.      
The discussion of discretionary zones is not meant to give school boards excuses 
for poor district performance, but rather to provide context for the chapters that follow.  
Jennifer Hochschild (2005) discusses the topic of school board expectations and 
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concludes that no real understanding of what boards can or cannot do exists, making 
critiques of the institution misguided, or, at the very least pre-mature.  As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, school boards do have immense power to influence 
academic achievement in their district.  But, as illustrated above, the context in which 
they operate must be taken into account when evaluating their performance. 
More important for the validity of this study, the differences between the 
discretionary zones of school boards in different states provide the framework for fruitful 
comparative analyses.  Consider, for example, the differences between personnel polices 
in Wisconsin and Minnesota.  If Minnesota and Wisconsin board members generally feel 
they have similar levels of control over their staffing policies, the upheaval caused by 
Wisconsin’s collective bargaining reforms should be seriously questioned.  Similarly, if 
the slightly more permissive revenue generating capacity of school boards in Utah and 
Nevada can be linked to better overall board governance, it may mean loosening revenue 
caps in other states is wise policy.  At the very least, this exercise establishes that school 
boards operate in a constricted, but not uniformly so, environment.  Given this, future 
chapters must account for different discretionary zones when making general 
conclusions.     
Conclusions  
 The preceding chapter proposes a new way of understanding the roles, tasks, and 
capabilities of American school boards.  Specifically, I argue that existing analyses of 
school board performance focus on minute non-transferable details rather than the 
commonalities that exist between all school boards.  Most importantly, this chapter 
defines the role of the American school board as maximizing student achievement 
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outcomes.  This role is defined as such out of necessity.  Consider, other administrative 
arrangements including mayoral control, decentralized voucher and charters systems, and 
state takeovers of school districts adequately demonstrate that other non-democratic 
intuitions are capable of executing the administrative task of delivering a publicly funded 
education.  In fact, many have argued that these alternative structures have done more 
than simply demonstrate they can deliver public education, but that they can deliver it 
more efficiently than school boards (Viteritti, 2009; Wong et. al., 2007; Wong & Shen, 
2003).  If this is true, why must school boards survive?   
 Well, for one, to serve the nearly 50 million students attending district run schools.  
Changing the administrative structure by which the vast majority of American students 
receive an education might make sense if improved outcomes were promised, but the 
existing research on alternative structures like mayoral control, vouchers, and charter 
schools is underwhelming.  Under very specific circumstances all three alternative have 
shown the ability to create marginal improvements in outcomes, but nothing nearly 
substantial enough to offset the upheaval caused by eliminating 14,000 bastions of local 
democracy. 
 Most importantly, there is convincing evidence that school boards can better fulfill 
the role of maximizing student performance through improved governance (Delagardelle, 
2008).  This chapter argues part of fulfilling the potential of school board governance is 
understanding that the tasks of school boards sit on a specific to broad continuum, and 
will and should vary across different school boards.  Together, the tasks performed by 
boards can be described as a single task of governance; or, the public administration of a 
school district. 
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 This chapter also establishes a simple organizational school district model which 
explains the process which school boards oversee; that of taking raw materials (students) 
and turning them into measurable profit (academic output).  Finally, I establish that 
school districts operate within different discretionary zones based on the state and federal 
policy environments in which they operate, thus creating a framework for comparative 
analyses.    
 The next chapter will go into the black box of school board governance in order to 
demystify the link between school board governance and academic outcomes.  Chapters 
four through seven are data driven, giving a deep understanding of the states of interest, 
and testing of the formal hypotheses listed in chapter one.  Chapter eight looks at the 
special case of public charter schools, providing greater understanding of one of the 
alternative structures discussed in this chapter.    
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Chapter III. 
How School Board Governance Impacts District Performance: A Theoretical Model 
 
The connection between governance and organizational performance is not a 
common sense  connection.  Boards in the for-profit, non-profit, and government sectors 
can all have varying degrees of engagement with the organization they are charged with 
overseeing.  The connection between school board governance and school district 
outcomes is arguably even less inherent given the limitations on school board action, and 
the lack of a clear set of specific tasks, as explained in the preceding chapter.  But even 
with the discussed limitations there is good reason to think school boards can and do 
impact student outcomes.  No, school board members do not directly educate students, 
but they do govern the entire process, and do influence the results of this process.  The 
following chapter will explain exactly how. 
 Specifically, this chapter will argue that school board governance activities can be 
split up in to two different groups.  One, the things school boards must do to create the 
necessary pre-conditions for their districts to deliver a quality education; or to borrow 
from Frederick Herzberg, hygiene factors (Herzberg et. al., 1993).  And two, the 
activities within the black box of governance that actually determine the quality of 
education provided by a school district.   The hygiene factors generally can be directly 
manipulated by school board action.  The inside the black box activities often cannot, 
and, as important, the actions necessary to manipulate them indirectly are situation 
dependent. 
 This chapter will be organized as follows: 
• First, a discussion of what is meant by the term governance; 
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• Second, a review of the limited scholarship demonstrating the linkages connecting 
school board governance and academic output; 
• Three, a review and discussion of hygiene factors in school districts; 
• Fourth, a look at situation dependent black box factors in school districts; and 
• Fifth, a review of how small group dynamics can influence the black box factors. 
By the end of the chapter the reader should have a clear understanding of why 
school board governance can be expected to impact academic achievement, and how the 
forthcoming quantitative models will allow for an evaluation of how school boards are in 
fact, influencing academic outcomes.   
What is Governance? 
The role of governance in any organization can easily be taken for granted.  After 
all, employees are the ones doing the daily business of an organization, and managers are 
the ones directly responsible for overseeing employees.  When an organization fails to 
produce results it is the employees or management that most often face the blame.  
Boards of directors usually only receive attention in cases of malfeasance, not cases of 
underperformance.   
Implicit in this reality is the idea that boards of directors serve a guarantor 
function.  Increasingly, however, the historic role of governance is being challenged. 
John Carver, for example, argues in Boards that Make a Difference that governing boards 
can increase organizational performance by focusing on setting broad policy goals, 
creating and adhering to strict policies on how the board operates, placing clear limits on 
executive authority, not communicating directly with staff, establishing clear 
expectations for staff, and holding staff accountable for performance (Carver, 2006). 
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Though Carver’s ideas have had mixed results when actually implemented, his policy 
governance model did increase mainstream acceptance of the idea that governing boards 
can increase organizational performance.   
But what exactly is governance?  How does a board go about improving the 
performance of an organization?  Political Scientist James Svara offers a model for 
understanding governance by defining a process consisting of four dimensions (Svara, 
1990). The first three dimensions; mission, policy, and administration, are the 
responsibility of a governing board.  The fourth dimension, management, is influenced by 
the governing board but is not their direct responsibility.  Accordingly, governance can 
be described as the process by which a governing board determines an organization’s 
mission, policies, and administration activities.   
Mission 
Mission is the reason an organization exists.  The model presented in chapter two 
suggests the role of school boards, the primary reason they exist, is to maximize 
academic output.  Governing boards in general determine their organization’s mission by 
outlining its primary goals.  Failing to do so is a primary reason that boards fail (Smoley 
Jr, 1999).  
Policy 
Broadly, policy is the tools and methods a board uses to execute its mission.  A 
major example of a policy initiative in the Svara framework is the budgeting process.  
The way a board allocates limited funds can advance or inhibit the district’s mission.  
Another example is the creation of specific programming such as professional 
 50 
 
development for employees.  An obvious wat that boards can fail in executing their 
mission is by making policy decisions that do not align with their primary goals. 
Administration       
Administration is the way boards go about implementing their policies.  For 
example, say a school board decides to create a new classroom for disruptive students.  
The policy idea is in place and budgeted, but someone needs to decide where the 
classroom is placed, what constitutes a disruptive student, and the process by which a 
student is actually moved into the classroom.  All of these tasks are part of 
administration.   
Management 
Management is the fourth element of the governmental process and the only one 
beyond the direct control of a governing board.  Once a board creates and implements a 
program aligned to its mission someone needs to oversee the day-to-day execution of the 
program, and give feedback to the board as to its success.  Management in a school 
district is the job of superintendents, principals, teachers, and other administrative staff. 
 Drawing from Svara, a simple satisfying definition of governance is:  
The ways in which a board collectively determines, and oversees the 
execution of, an organization’s mission.   
 
A less satisfying, circular, but perhaps more realistic definition of governance is: 
The things boards do.  The former definition assumes a certain level of board 
competence, the latter definition encompasses everything a board does or does not do.  In 
other words, a derelict board, under the first definition, might be described as one that is 
not governing at all.  Under the second definition, a derelict boards would be one that is 
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governing poorly.  For the purposes of this study the latter definition of governance will 
be used. 
 Why?  Under the organizational school district model presented in chapter two 
school boards seek to maximize the academic output of the raw materials, or students, 
their organization receives.  If a school district receives high quality students, maximizing 
their output may be as simple as staying out of the way.  In other words, a board may 
seek to do very little in order to maintain a quality status quo.  This absence of action, if 
academic output is maximized, is effective school board governance.   
The preceding discussion of governance was necessarily abstract.  It provides a 
general idea of what governance is, and how it interacts with the employees actually 
executing the mission of an organization.  The next section will specifically explain why 
school board governance can impact school district academic outcomes.    
The Importance of School Board Governance 
 The practitioner literature on school board governance offers no small number of 
prescriptions for improved governance, taking for granted that governance is important.  
The National School Boards Association (NSBA), for example, publishes a framework 
consisting of eight different areas where boards are advised to focus their work.  The Key 
Work of School Boards, as the NSBA dubs them, are not research based, but do offer 
board members an overview of how successful school boards should be approaching their 
task (Gemberling et. al., 2000). The eight keys along with descriptive questions are: 
1. Vision – Where does the board want the district to go? 
2. Standards – Against what should student performance be measured? 
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3. Assessment – How should performance against agreed upon standards be 
measured? 
4. Accountability – Who does the board hold responsible for student outcomes, and 
how?  
5. Alignment – Are limited resources allocated in ways that aid achievement? 
6. Climate and Culture – Is everything the district does focused on meeting its 
vision? 
7. Collaboration and Community Engagement – Who are the outside stakeholders 
and how does the district interact with them?   
8. Continuous Improvement – Does the board make informed decisions to keep 
outcomes moving in the right direction. 
A hypothetical exercise that digs deeper into these eight areas provides some insight 
into how addressing them might impact academic achievement.   
Vision 
 A passive board may point to a vague long-standing strategic plan as evidence 
that they are executing a clear vision.  However, board turnover and changing academic 
realities demand continuous attention be paid to the district’s vision.  An active board 
may engage in formal strategic planning after each election, work with an outside 
consultant to aid in determining vision, and work to obtain community buy-in of their 
stated vision. 
Standards    
         A passive board will merely use state and federal standards without discussion.  An 
active board will determine how existing standards align with their long-term vision, and 
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consider academic standards that go beyond existing standards and/or are more 
specifically tailored to the needs of their students. 
Assessment  
        Assessment is another area boards can choose to ignore by assuming state and 
federal testing mandates are serving their students well.  Many districts across the 
country, however, have adopted value-added assessment models and mid-year 
benchmark testing to use assessment as a tool for informing classroom instruction.  An 
action-oriented board will at the very least explore a variety of assessment strategies that 
serve their ultimate aims. 
Accountability   
        Again, a passive board may accept that state and federal accountability policy is 
sufficient for their students’ needs.  The wide range of performance in districts, as will be 
illustrated in the next chapter, however, demonstrates that the state and federal 
accountability framework does not guarantee positive outcomes.  An active board will 
fully engage the issue of accountability by setting clear goals for students, schools, 
principals, and teachers, and take appropriate actions when goals are not realized.   
Alignment 
        A passive board will take any additional revenue and simply fund every school 
district department at a slightly higher rate than the previous year.  An active board will 
understand exactly where each dollar is going, evaluate both the usefulness and 
efficiency of each department as it relates to executing its vision, and annually realign 
resources based its evaluations.   
Climate and Culture 
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        A school board could easily examine quantitative data on police calls to schools, or 
expulsions and suspensions and conclude that their schools are safe and orderly.  An 
active board would go deeper and engage parents, students, and staff to determine how 
welcoming their schools actually are.  The Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 
for example, creates model school climate surveys to aid districts interested in 
understanding how stakeholders view their schools.  A high-functioning board would go 
even further and work to build and improve school cultures through formal engagement 
with teachers and principals.   
Collaboration and Community Engagement 
           A passive school board may view school board elections and/or annual meetings 
as the sole necessary forms of community engagement.  An active board would offer 
open houses for parents and non-parents alike, have a presence at community events, and 
seek partners in the business and non-profit communities with a shared interest in K-12 
education.   
Continuous Improvement 
          A passive board finds the most recent piece of positive achievement data and uses 
it to argue that its schools are moving in the right direction.  An active board would call 
attention to indicators that show the district could further improve student outcomes.  
More importantly, an engaged board would use information not to defend or criticize the 
district, but to inform personnel and policy decisions.   
The preceding discussion is merely hypothetical and of little import absent 
evidence that school boards can influence academic achievement.   But, such evidence 
has relatively recently come to light.  The Iowa School Board Foundation’s Lighthouse 
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Inquiry was the first major study showing that school board governance in particular has 
the capacity to influence student outcomes (Rice, et al., 2000; Delagardelle, 2008). The 
inquiry began in 1998 with ethnographic case studies of school districts in southern states 
with similar demographics but vastly different levels of student performance.  The case 
studies revealed that higher-achieving districts demonstrated common governance 
behaviors that contrasted with governance behavior in low-achieving districts.   For 
example, board members in generally high achieving districts did not make excuses for 
low achieving students.  Board members in generally low-achieving districts consistently 
blamed outside forces such as poverty and the poaching of good students by private 
schools.  In high achieving districts both school leaders and school board members 
expressed common goals and unity of purpose.  Low achieving districts did not.  
Overall, high achieving districts were also more likely to have in place what the 
project researchers called conditions for productive change: 
1. Connections across the system; 
2. Knowing what it takes to change achievement; 
3. Workplace support; 
4. Professional development; 
5. A balance between district wide direction and building-level autonomy; 
6. A strong community connection; and 
7. Distributed leadership. 
The Lighthouse Inquiry concluded that boards can help in establishing the 
processes that create conditions for productive change, which in turn impact the teaching 
and learning environment throughout the school district, and, in turn, impact the learning 
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of students in schools.  In other words, the way in which school boards govern can impact 
student outcomes.   
The finding of the Lighthouse Inquiry represent a significant pivot point in school 
board governance research; as mentioned it was the first direct evidence presented that 
school boards influence academic achievement.  The Inquiry’s explanation for exactly 
why boards influence achievement however, remains problematic for two reasons.  The 
first is practical; the existence of so many linkages between governance and outcomes, as 
illustrated in figure 3.1, makes the process of measuring or manipulating the effectiveness 
of school board governance all but impossible.    
Figure 3.1 – Key Linkages between School Boards and Students Learning 
(Delagardelle, 2008) 
 
Knowledge, Skills, Beliefs of Board Members  Governance Policies, Priorities, 
Decisions, & Actions  District & School Culture (Conditions of practice that enable 
continuous improvement and organizational success)  Classroom Instruction and 
Student Engagement in the Learning Process  Student Learning Outcomes 
 
 The second problem with the Lighthouse linkages is more substantive.  The linear 
linkages illogically detach school board governance from the activities that actually occur 
in the classroom, and problematically suggest that all school boards go about governing 
in roughly the same way.  The multitude of governance models used in non-profit and 
corporate boards, the many examples of different governing approaches producing 
similar positive outcomes, and the different discretionary zones in which school boards 
operate give cause to question the model in figure 3.1.   
 Figure 3.2 illustrates a simpler, more vague, yet more accurate, inclusive and 
substantively satisfying model of the linkages between school board governance and 
academic performance.  Like the Lighthouse model, the black box model begins with the 
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background characteristics of school board members.  There is good reason to suspect 
that school board members do not enter the action of governance with a blank slate.  
Deckman (2007), for example, finds basic differences in the reasons men and women run 
for school board.  Melissa Marschall (2005) finds that minority representation on school 
boards influence the level of satisfaction minority parents have with their schools.  Hess 
& Meeks (2010) find broad ideological diversity across American school boards, and 
Flinchbaugh (1993) finds that the operations of a school board reflect the qualities of 
their members.  Clearly, what board members believe and what they have a proclivity to 
do influence what they actually do.  Similarly, the policy environment in which they 
operate logically influences their governance behavior.  For example, a school board 
member in Michigan, where the board has no say in setting their local tax levy, cannot 
work to change their local tax levy.       
Figure 3.2 – Black Box Model of School Board Governance 
 
 
  
 Briefly establishing that the backgrounds of school board members is relevant 
leads first to the relatively simple discussion of hygiene factors, and then to the far more 
difficult and important question: What is in the black box? 
School District Hygiene Factors 
Background	  of	  Board	  Members 
Zones	  of	  Discretion 
Black	  Box	  of	  Governance 
Hygiene	  Factors  
Academic	  Outcomes  
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 The concept of hygiene factors is borrowed from Frederick Herzberg.  Herzberg 
was a member of the human relations school of organizational theory.  Members of the 
school, among other things, believe worker satisfaction is a key component in increased 
job performance (Herzberg, et. al., 1993).  In his book, The Motivation to Work, Herzberg 
concludes that workplace satisfaction and dissatisfaction are two distinct concepts.  In 
other words, the opposite of satisfaction is not dissatisfaction, but rather a lack of 
satisfaction.   Motivation-Hygiene theory, as Herzberg deemed it, explains hygiene 
factors, including things like work conditions and employee supervision polices, as those 
factors that when properly manipulated by management at best eliminate dissatisfaction. 
 I adapt this basic concept to school board governance by arguing that there exists 
a set of basic school board responsibilities that are necessary functions of boards, but do 
not actually directly influence the academic outcomes of children.  Examples of this 
include facilities, social services such as providing meals for low-income pupils, and 
even total levels of spending.  All of these things are tasks school boards must do, but no 
matter how well they execute them the maximum impact will not increase student 
performance.  
A quantitative illustration using pooled data from the six states of interest helps 
illustrate the lack of connection between a prominent hygiene factor - per-pupil revenue - 
and performance.   
Hypothesis 
Districts with higher levels of total revenue have higher graduation rates 
Data 
 59 
 
 Descriptive data for the variables in Figure 3.3 are from a pooled data set 
consisting of information from the National Center for Education Statistics.  The 
independent variable, revenue per-student, is the total amount of state, local, and federal 
funding per-pupil school districts received in 2008-09.  The dependent variable, 
graduation rates, is a common indicator of the percentage of freshmen entering a high 
school that graduated four years later in 2008-09.   
The other variables listed in table 3.1 are control variables generally agreed to be 
non-school influences on academic performance (Hanushek, 1997).  This includes the 
percentage of total district enrollment that is a member of a minority group, the 
percentage of total district enrollment that is eligible for the federal free and reduced 
lunch price program (a means-tested program that indicates the percentage of a district 
with household incomes at or below 185% of the federal poverty level), the percentage of 
students eligible for special needs services by virtue of having an individual education 
plan, the district-wide student to teacher ratio, and the amount of funding spent on district 
employee salaries per-pupil.  
Table 3.1 – Education Variables for All School Districts in 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Utah, Florida, and Nevada - 2009 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Graduation Rate 1312 85.3 12.5 
Total Revenue Per-Student 1435 11836.2 3653.3 
Percent Minority 1432 16.9 18.7 
Percent Low-Income 1432 41.5 17.5 
Percent Special Needs 1432 14.1 4.0 
Student-Teacher Ratio 1432 15.9 3.17 
Salary Per-Student 1435 5642 1221.1 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics 
Results and Discussion 
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 The results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model are presented in 
table 3.2.  Basic regression diagnostics including tests for multi-colinearity and 
heteroskedasticity were conducted.   A Breusch-Pagan did find significant evidence of 
heteroskedasticity, however a robust regression model with the same variables did not 
yield substantively different findings.  As can been seen the predictive model is fairly 
strong with an adjusted R-square statistic of .432, and the focal variable, revenue per-
student, is not statistically significant.  The hypothesis can be rejected.   
Meaning, the amount of revenue received per-pupil by a school board is not 
related to a district’s graduation rate.  In other words, though school boards do serve the 
necessary function of receiving revenue from state and federal governments as well as 
local taxpayers, it is not a function that relates directly to academic performance as 
measured by four-year graduation rates.  Even if school boards had the power to 
manipulate revenue streams (as they do somewhat in Utah and Florida), it should not be 
expected that that manipulation would materially impact academic outcomes.  
 Hence, the collection and distribution of revenue is a hygiene factor for which 
school boards are responsible.  The background characteristics of board members will 
certainly influence how school boards deal with these factors (for example a fiscal 
conservative may seek to minimize spending), but these factors only influence outcomes 
in that they must be addressed.  
Table 3.2 – OLS Regression Results for the Dependent Variable 
Graduation Rates 
 
Graduation Rates 
 VARIABLES Coefficient SE 
Total Revenue Per-Student .000 .000 
Percent Minority -14.280*** 1.729 
Percent Low-Income -34.364*** 1.813 
Percent Special Needs -18.788* 8.636 
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Student-Teacher Ratio -.400** .118 
Salary Per-Student .000 .000 
   Constant 107.569 3.797 
Adjusted R2 .432 
 Observations 1308 
 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Inside the Black Box of Governance 
 The simplest explanation of what goes on inside the black box of governance is 
the setting of school and district culture.  The culture of an organization in general has 
been described as the values and norms that guide its operations.  School districts and the 
individual schools within it specifically have been described as reflections of the policies 
enacted by the school board (Flinchbaugh, 1993; Schein, 1987).  More directly, the 
setting of district policies that build high achieving school cultures should result in high 
academic success.  It is a straightforward concept that is beset by a major problem.  There 
is no single way to set a successful district culture, the steps for doing so are situation 
dependent and only become clear when academic output is measured.  Broadly, what 
goes on inside the black box of governance can be described as the setting of 
expectations, and the manipulation of factors to meet those expectations. 
 Though the broad concept is vague, the actual processes that occur within the 
black box of governance are specific.  The first major process is the setting of 
expectations and the means by which to measure them.  As clearly demonstrated in the 
practitioner and academic school board literature, a board most have a vision for where it 
wants its district to go before it can go about the task of moving it there (Flinchbaugh, 
1993; Smoley, 1999; Gemberling et. al., 2000; Hochschild, 2005; Callahan, 1975; 
Delagardelle, 2008).   
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Second, a district must have a clear way to measure progress towards its vision.  
For example, if a board seeks to increase the number of its pupils that are college ready, it 
would likely use ACT or SAT scores as indicators of progress towards that mission.  In 
contrast, if a board seeks to bring struggling students up to grade level, student growth 
scores would be one way to measure progress.   
 It is important to differentiate between the role of a school board, previously 
defined as maximizing student outcomes, and the vision of an organization, which is a 
situation dependent goal or expectation of where a district is going.  The vision of a board 
is an operational concept, or, a way to go about maximizing student academic output.  
Measuring progress towards a vision is a tool deployed by districts to better realize and 
tweak approaches to better work towards realization of that vision.  Measuring whether 
and explaining why a board is fulfilling its role is not an operational concept, it is an 
outside evaluation process reliant on student test scores and other academic indicators 
such as graduation rates. 
 The second major action inside the black box is the setting of situation dependent 
district-wide policies in the topic areas known to impact academic achievement.  Though 
not an exhaustive list, there are numerous areas where scholarly research shows district 
wide policies can impact overall academic output. 
Teacher Quality 
 Perhaps the most obvious factor influencing student learning in a classroom is the 
quality of the teacher.  Chetty et. al. (2011) reviewed two decades worth of data linking 
outcomes to teacher quality in an urban school district and found that a highly qualified 
teacher can lead to significant test score gains, as well as significantly better lifetime 
 63 
 
earnings for students.  The challenge a school district faces is how to go about 
maximizing teacher quality.  Research included in the National Center for Education 
Statistics Institute of Education Sciences’ What Works Clearinghouse provides many 
examples of how a school board might go about this, from introducing incentive plans, to 
improved mentoring (Winters et. al., 2012; Glazerman & Seifullah, 2012).   However, 
both the policy environments of school boards as well as the current level of teacher 
quality will dictate what a school board should do.   Actually improving teacher quality in 
a specific district requires a school board policy that fits with the unique needs of that 
district. 
Curriculum and Subject Time 
 What is taught obviously matters as well.  School boards, though checked by state 
requirements, do have plenty of leeway in deciding what textbooks and curricula are used 
in their district.  School boards also have the power to emphasize, above the amounts 
required by state laws, instruction in specific subject areas of need.  There exists no 
shortage of academic research on the best way to teach core subjects like math and 
reading to specific groups and sub-groups of pupils.  School boards have great power to 
influence academic outcomes simply be choosing what, how long, and in what manner 
specific subjects are taught. 
Discipline 
 How should a school district deal with behavior problems?  Fabiano et. al. (2010) 
find that the use of a daily behavior report card for problem elementary pupils 
significantly improved behavior.  Still other studies show that zero tolerance policies that 
remove troubled students from the classroom are favored by many school districts (Skiba 
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& Peterson, 2000).  The approach a board takes will likely be guided by the extent of its 
discipline issues, and the community’s values.  What is clear is that school boards face a 
situation dependent choice. 
Student Specific Interventions 
 What should a school district do with individual students who are not responding 
to the regular curriculum?  Some school boards create alternative schools, other turn to 
hybrid education approaches that allow self-guided online learning, still others use 
federal funds to pay for one-on-one instruction for certain pupils (Christensen et. al., 
2008).  Whether a school district uses one or more of these approaches, whether they 
delegate the decisions to principals, or whether it forgoes individual interventions are all 
board level decisions that will impact the educational quality of the school district. 
  The preceding exercise was meant to show that school boards must make a 
multitude of choices in order to answer the many questions that relate directly to 
classroom instruction, yet have no single best answer.  There are countless other 
governance decisions that school boards must make inside that black box that are 
situation dependent; what will work and/or be accepted by staff and students in one 
school district may be rejected and not work in another district.  It follows that the 
decisions made inside the black box of governance need not just be made.  They must be 
made correctly (Or, at least as correctly as possible). 
 How can a board ensure the correct governance decisions are made?  This 
question sets up the final section of this chapter, which focuses on how school boards go 
about making governance decisions, and how they can go about maximizing the positive 
academic impact of those governance decisions.     
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The Role of Small Group Dynamics In School Board Governance 
 In its simplest form a school board is nothing more than a group people that 
regularly gather to make decisions.  The process by which they make decisions is dictated 
in part by parliamentary rules and the structure of their boards, but much of the way in 
which a school board makes decisions is dependent on the different personalities, formal 
and informal roles, goals, biases, ambitions, conflicts and other attributes present in board 
members’ group interactions.  Given the discussion in the previous section of the 
situation dependent nature of school board governance decisions that affect academic 
outcomes, the small group dynamics present in a school board should be expected to 
dictate the quality of key governance decision.  Simply, a high functioning group is more 
likely to make good constructive decisions, and a low-functioning group is more likely to 
make poor destructive decisions.  Accordingly, understanding the way in which school 
board members make decisions is as important as the specific decisions they make.  Later 
chapters of this study present detailed data culled from surveys of school board members 
in the six states of interest, but first a basic understanding of school group dynamics is 
necessary.    
John Carver (1997) demonstrates that there are key recognizable differences 
between high-functioning and low-functioning small groups serving on boards.  Carver 
identifies over-dependence on organizational staff, unclear executive authority, the 
failure to respond appropriately to problems, and the overuse of committees as clear 
signals that a board is dysfunctional.  Public Administration professor and local 
government consultant Gerald T. Gabris (2006) sheds greater light into how the 
interactions of government board members can inhibit or enhance organizational 
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performance.  Gabris developed a diagnostic chart used to evaluate the level of 
dysfunction on a local government board.  He finds that dysfunctional boards are not 
driven by consensus, have a short term planning horizon, lack shared values, conflict with 
staff, hold stressful meetings, lack trust, and pursue vague goals.  High functioning 
boards exhibit exactly the opposite traits, they: 
• Think long term; 
• Share common goals and values; 
• Get along with staff and the CEO; 
• Have collegial relations with other board members; 
• Trust other board members; and 
• Engage in planning. 
Other scholars identify many of the counter-productive traps that small-groups 
fall into when interacting.  Paul ’t Hart (1994), for example, argues that the positive 
attribute of cohesiveness among a small government group can degrade into a destructive 
state of groupthink, leading to policy failure.  The typical signs of groupthink in 
government are a sense of moral superiority, a devaluing of the seriousness or legitimacy 
of opposing views, creation and demonization of an identifiable out-group, and a closed 
circle of communication.  A possible consequence of groupthink on a school board would 
be a lack of situational awareness leading to the adoption of favored policies that are in 
fact a poor fit with the needs of a school district. 
  Less specific than groupthink but just as important a concept in small group 
dynamics is conflict.  Conflict in any small group is natural and can actually be a 
constructive way for a group to relieve tension (Coser, 1956).  However, conflict can also 
 67 
 
manifest in destructive ways, becoming so entrenched that it prevents basic board 
activities (Deutsch, 1973).  Karen Jehn (1997) provides a helpful framework in which to 
study small group conflict.  Her qualitative work identifies three specific types of conflict 
in small groups. 
The first, relationship conflict, refers to conflict that occurs because individual 
board members simply do not get along.  An expected consequence of relationship 
conflict is a lack of productivity caused by time and energy wasted on issues irrelevant to 
board business.  In addition, personal conflict between board members is likely to raise 
the stress level in a board meeting, an indicator of a low-functioning group. 
The second type of conflict identified by Jehn is task conflict.  A hypothetical 
example of task conflict on a school board is disagreement over the proper way to assess 
teacher quality.  Unlike relationship conflict, task conflict can theoretically be productive 
as it presumably leads to an eventual resolution.  However, the resolution of task conflict 
without board unity could in fact be a sign of a dysfunctional board (Smoley Jr, 1999).   
The third type of conflict identified by Jehn is process conflict.  This is conflict 
regarding the way in which a small group conducts its business.  On a school board, 
process conflict might surface as a disagreement over which committee is to first evaluate 
a potential policy change, or whether a public hearing is necessary prior to passage of a 
major policy change.     
Another dynamic present in small groups is cooperation.  Kimberly Nelson and 
Karl Nollenberger (2011) find that the structure of local government boards, including 
the presence of citywide seats, can actually increase the level of cooperation on a board.  
Many of the attributes of a high functioning board relate directly to the presence of a 
 68 
 
high-level of cooperation, meaning the ability for the structure of boards to increase this 
positive attribute is a significant finding. 
 The survey developed and deployed for this study focuses on the concepts of 
small group dynamics in order to test the connection between the way in which a 
governing board goes about its activities, and the overall performance of the organization. 
It also asks specific questions regarding the NSBA’s eight key works of school board 
governance to determine if these are the factors that boards should in fact be focusing on 
to improve student achievement.  There is substantial overlap between the qualities of 
high-functioning small groups, listed previously in this section, and the NSBA’s keys, 
giving reasons to think that school boards adhering to the eight keys are also seeing 
academic benefit in their districts.   
Conclusion 
 The preceding chapter establishes a basis for the testing of specific hypotheses on 
the relationship between school board governance and academic outcomes in school 
districts in Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, Utah, and Nevada.  First, I 
reviewed existing scholarly research on public-sector governance to come up with a 
simple working definition of governance: The things boards do.  The discussion is critical 
in that it establishes a basic all-encompassing starting point from which to approach more 
specific study of school boards.     
 Second, the chapter reviewed the Lighthouse Inquiry, the first academic study to 
provide direct evidence that school board governance can and does impact the academic 
outcomes of a school district.  I also reviewed the dominant best practice 
recommendations used by American school boards, and critiqued the Lighthouse Inquiry 
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model identifying the linkages between school board governance and academic output as 
too specific and narrow to explain the diversity of ways in which school boards can 
govern successfully.  I propose an alternative model that considers the backgrounds of 
board members, but divides the actual governance activities into two categories, hygiene 
factors, and black box factors. 
 Third, I explain what is meant by hygiene factors, as well as the origins of the 
concept within the human relations school of Public Administration.  Hygiene factors in 
the proposed model are those that are necessary for the operations of school districts, but 
cannot be manipulated in order to improve academic outcomes.  School boards are 
necessarily responsible for these factors.  As an example I presented the results of a 
multi-variate regression analysis testing the hypothesis that per-pupil revenue positively 
impacts graduation rates in the six states of interest.  The lack of a relationship confirms 
that funding activities, though a responsibility of school boards, should not be expected to 
improve graduation rates. 
 Fourth, I explain what is contained in the black box of school board governance.  
Plainly, the vast array of situation dependent decisions made by school boards that impact 
the academic outcomes of school districts fit into this category.  Reviewing research in 
the areas of teacher quality, discipline, curriculum, assessment, and student-level 
intervention reveals that many board actions can improve academic outcomes, however it 
is knowing when to make the right decision that ultimately leads to improved academic 
outcomes.   
 The final section of Chapter Three uses the discussion of black box governance 
factors as a foundation from which to propose that the dynamics of small groups plays a 
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role in whether school boards will make good decisions within the black box.  Research 
on small group dynamics in non-profit and other government boards is reviewed to 
demonstrate what exactly is meant by small group dynamics.   
 The following chapters will build off of the mostly theoretical construct presented 
thus far by first reviewing a large amount of academic performance and demographic 
data on school districts in the six states of interest, and then using survey responses of 
board members to test the specific hypotheses listed in Chapter one.  The review of 
existing school board research in Chapter one, the establishment of the existence of 
discretionary zones in which school boards operate in Chapter two, and the presenting of 
the theoretical justifications for testing the extent to which school board governance 
affects school district outcomes lead into the main topic of Chapter four: The data.    
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Chapter IV. 
Characteristics of and Comparisons Between Education Systems in Florida, 
Nevada, Utah, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin 
 
 The preceding chapter introduces a theoretical model that gives plausible reason 
to suspect that school board governance is a key determinant of school district academic 
outcomes.  This chapter will use archival data to strengthen the case for looking closer at 
school board member behavior by testing two hypotheses that justify the two-group 
comparative analyses method deployed in this study: 
Hypothesis 1: There are significant differences in the make-up of school districts in 
the two groups of states.   
Hypothesis 2: The major predictors of academic outcomes are similar across the six 
states of interest.   
Both of the hypotheses are tested using archival data, which are described in 
detail, thereby presenting a detailed portrait of the education systems in all six states. 
More important, establishing that school districts in the two groups of states are 
substantially different both in structure and student population, yet share common 
predictors of academic performance, supports the use of the situation dependent decision 
making model of school board governance described in Chapter three. Why?  Variations 
in achievement cannot plausibly be explained away by state-to-state differences, allowing 
the actions collectively known as governance to be tested as the source for variation in 
achievement. 
 The first hypothesis is tested using a series of difference of means tests that 
establish the various differences between the school districts in the two groups of states 
that serve as the basis for the comparative case-study analysis.  In total, there are 1,437 
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school districts in the six states of interest: 125 in Florida, Nevada, and Utah, and 1,312 
in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. 
Group-to-Group Differences 
 The following section is guided by the research question: Are there substantial 
differences in the district level education systems in the two groups of states?  I 
hypothesize that there are substantial differences.  All the data used in the following 
difference of means tests is archival, and publicly available from the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) common core database (USDOE, 2012).  The variables are 
divided into four categories, and explained in the subsections below.     
Structural Variables 
 The structural variables are those that deal with the size and scope of school 
districts. The variables are: 
• Enrollment – The number of students enrolled in the school district in the 2010-
2011 school year; 
• Number of schools – The number of schools serving students in each school 
district in the 2010-11 school year; 
• Percentage of charter schools – The number of schools authorized by and 
operating in the district divided by the total number of schools in the district in the 
2010-2011 school year; and 
• Student teacher ratio – Total district enrollment divided by the number of district 
teachers in the 2010-2011 school year. 
Demographic Variables 
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 The demographic variables consist of the student racial, socioeconomic, and 
gender make-up of students served by, and the community wealth of residents living in, a 
school district.  The variables are: 
• Percent male – The total percentage of district students that are male in the 2010-
2011 school year; 
• Percent Black – The total percentage of district students that are African-
American in the 2010-2011 school year; 
• Percent White – The total percentage of district students that are white in the 
2010-2011 school year; 
• Percent Hispanic – The total percentage of district students that are Hispanic in 
the 2010-2011 school year; 
• Percent non-White – The total percentage of district students that are minority in 
the 2010-2011 school year; 
• Percent eligible for federal free or reduced price lunch – The total percentage of 
district students that qualified for the federal free and reduced lunch program in 
the 2010-2011 school year.  Eligibility is a proxy for low-income because 
program eligibility is limited to students from families with incomes at or below 
185% of the federal poverty level; 
• Percent English Language Learners (ELL) - The total percentage of district 
students “who were not born in the United States or whose native languages are 
languages other than English” in the 2010-2011 school year (USDOE, 2012); 
• Percent with Individualized Education Plans (IEP) – The total percentage of 
district students with IEPs in the 2010-2011 school year.  Students with special 
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needs are given IEPs, hence the variables serves as a proxy for often higher cost 
special needs pupils; and 
• Per-capita community income – Data from the 2000 United States census on the 
average per-capita income of households served by the school district.   
Fiscal Variables 
 The fiscal variables all relate to the amount of public revenue received by the 
school district from various sources.  The variables are: 
• Revenue per-student – The total amount of public revenues received by the school 
district in 2008-2009 divided by the district’s student enrollment; 
• Local revenue per-student - The total amount of local public revenues received by 
the school district in 2008-2009 divided by the district’s student enrollment.  
Local revenues are generally from local property, sales, and excise taxes;  
• State revenue per-student - The total amount of state revenues received by the 
school district in 2008-2009 divided by the district’s student enrollment.  State 
revenues are generally those sent to the school district through the state’s 
education funding formula, and through program-specific categorical aid 
allocations; and 
• Federal revenue per-student - The total amount of public federal revenues 
received by the school district in 2008-2009 divided by the district’s student 
enrollment.  Federal revenues generally come to the district in the form of Title 
funds for low-income pupils, funding for special needs pupils through the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or general revenues sent through 
federal stimulus programs.   
 75 
 
Performance Variables 
 Though students in different state are not required to take the same standardized 
tests, they do report two common variables that relate to performance.   These variables 
give a common, albeit imperfect, indicator of district level performance.  These variables 
are: 
• Drop-out rate – Drop-out rate is defined by the NCES as: “the percentage of 
public school students who were enrolled in grades 9–12 at some point during the 
2008–09 school year, but were not enrolled in school in October 2009 and had not 
earned a high school diploma or completed a state- or district-approved education 
program” (Chapman et. al, 2011, p. 7); and 
• Graduation rate – The number of students who graduated high school in the 
district in 2008-2009 divided by the number of students who started their 
freshman year four years prior. 
The variables from the NCES have some obvious strengths, and one significant 
weakness.  The strengths are that the information is readily available, comparable across 
states and districts due to common reporting requirements, and incredibly rich and 
detailed.  The weakness is that fiscal, demographic, and performance data often come 
from different years.  Accordingly, a necessary assumption for the validity of this 
analysis is stability, meaning, there are not large year-to-year swings in the 
demographics, performance, and fiscal characteristics of school districts.  Such an 
assumption is reasonable.  A simple difference of mean-test, for example, finds that total 
student enrollment in school districts in the six states of interest did not significantly 
change from 2009-2010 to 2010-2011.  The finding is logical given the general stability 
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of U.S. housing patterns over time (Cashin, 2004).  In addition, the size of the dataset 
ensures that wild swings in any individual district level data will not significantly alter 
the overcall sample.  Nonetheless, the difference in years is a weakness and the following 
results should be interpreted knowing its existence.      
Results of Difference of Means Tests 
 The five tables below show the results of a series of two-group means tests 
between the two groups of states.  Group One is comprised of Florida, Nevada, and Utah, 
while Group Two is comprised of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  In all of the 
tables one to three stars are placed next to the mean of the variable in the group 
determined to be significantly larger than the mean of other group.  Before explaining the 
results, it is worth nothing that Group Two contains many more districts (N), than Group 
One.  As mentioned in Chapter One, this difference gives reason to suspect there are 
other differences between the school districts in the two groups of states, and was 
purposely built into the research design.  
Table 4.1 - Difference of Means Tests for Structural Variables 
  Group 1 Group 2 
  N 
Standard 
Error Mean N 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Enrollment 125 5017.38 28891.27*** 1309 127.9 2383.9 
Number of Schools 125 6.8 45.41*** 1312 0.27 5.7 
Percentage of 
Charter Schools 125 0.005 .037*** 1307 0.002 0.014 
Student Teacher 
Ratio 125 0.3122 16.75** 1307 0.086 15.78 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Table 4.1 shows several obvious differences between the two groups of states.  
Districts in Group One are larger, in both the number of students served and the number 
of schools operated, have fewer teachers per-students as indicated by a higher student 
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teacher ratio (though the difference is substantively small), and have a significantly larger 
share of charter schools than the districts in Group Two.  Substantively, the difference in 
the percentage of charter schools between states is particularly significant.   
Charter schools are public schools (in this case authorized by the district) that are 
managed at the school level and generally free from a variety of state regulations.  Most 
important for this study is the different role that school boards play in the governance of 
district-charter schools compared to traditional public schools (Teske et. al., 2005).  The 
budget, academic programming, and resource allocation for traditional public schools is 
generally done at the school board level.  In other words, elected school boards have 
broad influence and input into the day-to-day operations of traditional public schools.   In 
contrast, the day-to-day operations of district charter schools are generally handled at the 
school level.  The district board is simply responsible for monitoring the performance of 
the charter school and deciding whether to renew, revoke, or non-renew the school’s 
charter (Teske et. al., 2005).  It follows that boards in Group One might be expected to 
engage in different governance behaviors dependent on the number of charter schools 
they oversee.   
Table 4.2 - Difference of Means Tests for Demographic Variables 1 
  Group 1 Group 2 
  N 
Standard 
Error Mean N 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Percent Male 125 0.001 .518* 1307 0.001 0.512 
Percent Black 125 0.012 .107*** 1307 0.003 0.046 
Percent White 125 0.018 0.67 1307 0.005 .847*** 
Percent Hispanic 125 0.012 .164*** 1307 0.002 0.048 
Percent Non-White 125 0.018 .330*** 1307 0.005 0.153 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 The demographics of the students served in the two groups of school districts 
also, as shown in Table 4.2, vary significantly.  Though Group One does have a slightly 
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higher percentage of male students than group two, the difference is statistically 
significant but not substantively so (51.8% v. 51.2%).  However, the racial differences 
are particularly striking.  Group One serves significantly more Black and Hispanic 
students, and more minority students in general.  On average Group One serves 33.0% 
percent non-white students compared to 15.3% in Group Two.  Likely, the differences are 
attributable to the demographic make-up of the states.  Group Two consists entirely of 
northern states, while Group One is made up of southern and western states with higher 
minority populations.  Stubborn racial achievement gaps continue to plague the United 
States, meaning the task of school boards in Group One could be viewed as more difficult 
because they are enrolling more pupils from groups that on aggregate trail non-minority 
groups on achievement tests (Smith, 2005; Holzman, 2012). 
Table 4.3 -Difference of Means Tests for Demographic Variables 2 
  Group 1 Group 2 
  N 
Standard 
Error Mean N 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Percent 
Free/Reduced 
Lunch Eligible 125 0.013 .514*** 1307 0.005 0.406 
Percent ELL 125 0.005 .055*** 1307 0.001 0.02 
Percent IEP 125 0.003 0.144 1307 0.001 0.14 
Per-Capita Income 
of Community 124 421.302 18030.34 1306 153.5 20254.63*** 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Table 4.3 lists the differences in various non-racial demographic indicators 
between the two groups.  Most striking is the statistically significant difference between 
free/reduced price lunch eligibility, a proxy for socio-economic status.  Over half, 51.4%, 
of the students served by districts in Group One are low-income.  In comparison, only 
40.6% of students served by districts in Group Two are low-income.  Students from 
poverty often come with additional challenges such as hunger and familial instability that 
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manifest in poorer academic performance (Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997).  Meaning, the 
districts in Group One arguably have a tougher task (in terms of raising student 
achievement) than districts in Group Two. 
 Not surprising given the racial differences between the two groups, districts in 
Group One serve a statistically significant higher percentage of English language learners 
than districts in Group Two.  However, there is no significant difference in the percentage 
of special needs students served by the two groups of states.  Special needs students often 
generate more costs than other students, making the lack of a difference a rare place 
where both groups of states are likely affected similarly.   
 Table 4.3 also shows the per-capita income of communities served by districts in 
Group Two is significantly larger than the income level of communities served by 
districts in Group One.  Part of this difference may be a function of the overall wealth of 
the states.  Regardless, the differences reflect a difference in the strength of tax base in 
the two groups, which could serve as a proxy of community level educational attainment 
in the two groups, and perhaps an indicator of differences in the general fiscal health of 
the community.           
Table 4.4 - Difference of Means Tests for Fiscal Variables 
  Group 1 Group 2 
  N 
Standard 
Error Mean N 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Revenue Per-
Student 125 629.256 11211.54 1311 87.158 11895.25* 
Local 
Revenue Per-
Student 124 622.995 5179.758 1311 103.571 4641.32 
State Revenue 
Per-Student 124 196.12 4714.427 1311 55.89 6256.963*** 
Federal 
Revenue Per-
Student 124 79.758 1317.347*** 1311 21.494 996.976 
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*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 A closer looks specifically at revenue variables in Table 4.4 reveals two major 
differences between the two groups.  Group One receives significantly more federal 
revenue than Group Two, and Group Two receives significantly more state revenue than 
Group One.  The difference in federal revenue is a logical by-product of Group One’s 
significantly higher low-income population.  A major source of federal funds to local 
education is Title funds targeted toward schools serving low-income pupils.  In other 
words, more low-income pupils means more federal funding.   
More interesting is the difference in state revenue per-student.  In Group Two 
districts on average receive $6,356.96 per-pupil, while district in Group One receive only 
$4,714.43.  This large difference is in indicator that the state governments on which local 
school districts rely make a substantially smaller investment in education in Group One.  
Surprisingly, total revenue per-student, though statistically higher in Group Two, is not 
all that much higher (less than $1,000) than Group One; this is because federal revenues 
are offsetting some of the difference in state revenues.  Likely, the different governments 
on which school boards rely on for funding affects the priorities of the school boards in 
the different groups.     
Table 4.5 - Difference of Means Tests for Achievement Variables 
  Group 1 Group 2 
  N 
Standard 
Error Mean N 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Dropout Rate 102 0.187 2.817 859 0.126 2.441 
Graduation Rate 107 1.066 73.785 1205 0.349 86.292*** 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Finally, Table 4.5 lists the differences in achievement variables between the two 
groups of school districts.  It is important to note that the number of observations for both 
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groups is reduced in Table 4.5 because not all school districts operate a high school, 
precluding them from having a dropout or graduation rate.   Interestingly, there is no 
significant difference in dropout rates, but a very significant difference in graduation 
rates.  The seemingly illogical finding is partly due to the difference in measurement of 
the two variables.  Dropout rate is a one year variable measuring the percentage of all 
high school students that dropped out of high school in 2008-2009.  In contrast 
graduation rate is a cohort statistic based on four years of data.  In addition, it is possible 
for a pupil to not graduate in four years and also not be a dropout, meaning summing the 
dropout rate for four years and subtracting from 100 will not yield the graduation rate. 
   The difference in graduation rates could be a function of higher performance in 
Group Two.  It could also be a function of lower-standards for graduation in Group Two.  
Regardless, it is a clear indicator that districts in Group Two graduate a higher percentage 
of their pupils from high school than districts in Group One. 
 The result of the series of difference of means test presented in Tables 4.1 – 4.5 
demonstrate the significant, both substantively, and statistically, differences between the 
two groups of focus in this project.  School boards in in the states of Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin are overseeing students that are less likely to be members of a 
minority group, impoverished, and learning English as a second language.  School boards 
in Florida, Nevada, and Utah, are receiving less state revenue, serving a larger share of 
minority and low-income pupils, and graduating a smaller percentage of their students.   
Demonstrating these differences is crucial in justifying the need to explore the 
role of board governance in influencing academic outcomes.  Why?  The results of the 
hypotheses testing reliant on the results of the governance survey could otherwise be 
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discounted as spurious findings attributable to other school district characteristics.  
However, the significant differences in these non-governance variables across the two 
groups of districts make such a dismissal illogical.  More importantly, the model 
presented in Chapter Three is made more plausible if the role of governance is found to 
be similar in districts serving very different types of students.  If governance is about 
making a series of situation dependent decisions based on the quality of group-
interaction, effectiveness is dependent on a group’s recognition of and response to the 
situation, not the nature of the situation.   
Within State Predictors of Achievement 
 In addition to establishing group-to-group differences, establishing that predictors 
of academic achievement within states do not vary substantially adds support to the idea 
that school board governance, and not other fixed effects, is responsible for differences in 
academic outcomes at the school district level.  This is not to suggest that that race or 
socio-economic status do not predict academic outcomes, but rather that these factors 
predict outcomes similarly across states.   As mentioned in the introduction of this 
section, the working hypothesis is that significant predictors of school district academic 
outcomes do not vary substantially between states.   
Data and Approach  
A series of multi-variate regression analyses using the common measure of four-
year graduation rate as the dependent variable are conducted to test the hypothesis. 
Several independent variables common to education research and known or suspected to 
influence academic achievement at the district level are included in all five models 
(Hanushek, 1994; Hanushek, 1997; Hanushek et. al,, 1998).  Those variables are: 
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• Socioeconomic status as measured by free/reduced price lunch eligibility; 
• Special needs status as measured by the percentage of students with IEPs; 
• Student teacher ratio; 
• Race as measured my the percentage of minority pupils; 
• Total public revenue per-student; 
• Per-capita income of the community served by the school district; and 
• The percentage of schools in the district that are district-authorized charter 
schools.  
Table 4.6 – Summary Statistics 1 
  Florida Utah 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
Graduation Rate 67 68.87 8.77 40 82.01 9.46 
Percent 
Free/Reduced 
Lunch 67 0.58 0.12 41 0.45 0.14 
Percent with IEP 67 0.16 0.03 41 0.13 0.02 
Student Teacher 
Ratio 67 14.74 1.35 41 20.42 30.07 
Percent Minority 67 0.41 0.2 41 0.18 0.14 
Revenue Per-
Student 67 10255.46 1696.93 40 10103.83 3107.98 
Per-Capita 
Income 67 18640.79 4772.21 40 16283.25 4715.48 
Percent of 
Charters 67 0.07 0.07 41 0 0 
 
Table 4.7 – Summary Statistics 2 
  Michigan Minnesota 
Variables N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Graduation Rate 520 81.32 13.37 322 87.12 10.26 
Percent 
Free/Reduced 
Lunch 549 0.47 0.18 335 0.39 0.14 
Percent with 549 0.12 0.04 335 0.15 0.04 
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IEP 
Student Teacher 
Ratio 549 17.86 2.86 335 14.74 2.62 
Percent 
Minority 549 0.19 0.21 335 0.15 0.17 
Revenue Per-
Student 551 10975.31 3994.86 338 11836.37 1977.26 
Per-Capita 
Income 551 20444.55 5489.95 335 19383.16 4920.77 
Percent of 
Charters 549 0 0 335 0 0 
 
Table 4.8 – Summary Statistics 3 
  Wisconsin 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 
Graduation Rate 363 92.69 7.74 
Percent Free/Reduced Lunch 423 0.33 0.16 
Percent with IEP 423 0.14 0.04 
Student Teacher Ratio 423 13.91 2.04 
Percent Minority 423 0.11 0.12 
Revenue Per-Student 422 13151.56 2077.76 
Per-Capita Income 420 20780.33 5991.18 
Percent of Charters 423 0.04 0.1 
   
 Summary statistics for the independent and dependent variables are listed in 
Tables 4.6 – 4.8 for the states of Florida, Utah, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  
Note that Nevada is excluded from this particular analysis because off its small number 
(17) of school districts.   Though Utah, with only 41 districts, is included, its results 
should be taken with a grain of salt given the small sample size.   
Table 4.9 – Regression Results for Dependent Variable: Four Year Graduation Rate 
VARIABLES Florida Utah Michigan Minnesota Wisconsin 
      
      
Percent Free/Reduced 
Lunch 
-32.01*** -34.66* -40.27*** -18.78*** -18.12*** 
 
 
(11.38) (18.75) (4.781) (5.734) (4.554) 
Percent with IEP -17.81 103.5 -50.21*** -3.689 18.02 
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(27.90) (64.16) (16.02) (13.35) (15.64) 
Student Teacher Ratio 0.253 -0.409 -0.397 -0.992*** -0.264 
 
 
(0.617) (1.012) (0.269) (0.268) (0.280) 
Percent Minority -12.21** -11.82 -6.654** -22.25*** -8.404** 
 
 
(5.438) (15.07) (2.740) (4.179) (3.856) 
Revenue Per-Student -0.000634 0.000854 -2.09e-06 -
0.00114*** 
-0.000163 
 
 
(0.000516) (0.000851) (0.000264) (0.000386) (0.000288) 
Per-Capita Income 0.000404 -8.04e-05 -0.000139 0.000352** 0.000128 
 
 
(0.000279) (0.000384) (0.000137) (0.000139) (0.000144) 
Percent of Charters -3.134 0 0 0 0.565 
 
 
(13.86) (0) (0) (0) (3.667) 
Constant 90.67*** 87.22** 118.5*** 119.4*** 100.5*** 
 (13.47) (35.60) (8.034) (7.440) (7.089) 
      
Observations 67 40 519 316 363 
R-squared 0.526 0.403 0.344 0.357 0.162 
 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 The results of the five multi-variate regression analyses are presented in Table 
4.9.  One initial observation is that the R-squared statistic (which shows the percentage of 
the variation of the dependent variables explained by the model) for the Wisconsin model 
is comparatively low, just .162.  This is likely due in part to the relatively low standard 
deviation of graduation rates in Wisconsin.  In other words, less variation may be 
explained because there is less variation.   
 Overall, the five models support the hypothesis that predictors of achievement (as 
measured by four year graduation rates) are similar across states.  In all five states socio-
economic status as measured by the percentage of district pupils eligible for free or 
reduced price lunch is a statistically significant negative predictor of graduation rates.   In 
addition, in all states but Utah the percentage of minority pupils served by a school 
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district is a statistically significant negative predictor of graduation rates.   The lack of 
significance in Utah is likely due to both that state’s relatively homogenous population, 
and the small sample size used in this analysis.   
 Only in Minnesota are student-teacher ratio, revenue per-student, and per-capita 
community income significant predictors of graduation rates. While the size of the effects 
attributable to revenue-per student and per-capita income are very small, the student 
teacher ratio effects in Minnesota are both statistically and substantively significant.  The 
single anomaly should be kept in mind if the governance surveys of Minnesota school 
boards differ substantially from the other states.   
        Overall, the five models support the hypothesis that significant predictors of 
achievement as measured by graduation rates are similar in districts in the five states 
included in the analysis.  The strongest predictors of academic outcomes are socio-
economic status and membership in a racial minority group.  These findings are not 
surprising, and mirror the vast majority of research on academic achievement, and in 
particular graduation rates, in the United States (Swanson, 2003).  Thus, further credence 
is given to the concept that within state characteristics as they relate to academic 
achievement measured by graduation rates are similar enough to support a comparative 
analysis between states.        
Other Achievement Data       
 A problem with a district level analysis or academic achievement that looks 
across states is the use of non-comparable criterion referenced state-specific standardized 
tests.  Fortunately, in the near future most U.S. states will be using one of two common 
assessments; the results of which are comparable across states (Gewertz, 2012).  
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Unfortunately, those new tests have not yet been given, and their results are obviously not 
available for this study.  Nonetheless, standardized test data within states is available, and 
can be used to measure performance in comparison to other districts within the same 
state.  Though the effects of board governance on standardized test scores cannot be 
equally measured by different test data, the presence of a positive or negative effect on a 
single state standardized test is certainly of interest, and can be used to enrich comparable 
findings on the impact of governance on graduation rates.   
 Because of the non-comparable nature of state-specific standardized test, multi-
variate regression analysis, such as was used to predict graduation rates, is not used in 
this chapter to predict test scores.  However a description of each state test and summary 
statistics for available state performance indicators on each test, are presented to create a 
familiarity with the tests used in each state. 
Florida 
 Florida uses the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test, knows as the F-Cat, as 
its official state standardized assessment.  According to the Florida Department of 
Education the state began in 2010-2011 using its second iteration of the assessment, 
called the F-Cat 2.0.  The test is given to all public school pupils in grades 3-8 in reading, 
grades 3-10 in math, and grades 5 and 8 in science.  For this study I am focusing on 8th 
grade achievement on the F-Cat 2.0 in math and reading to serve as a satisfying 
complement measure of district achievement.  
 Table 4.10 shows the percentage of students in Florida districts scoring at 
achievement level 3 or above, which according to the Florida Department of Education, 
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indicates students are performing at a satisfactory level.1  As can be see in Table 4.10, 
there is wide variation in district performance in the state of Florida.       
Table 4.10 – Percentage of Florida Students in Achievement Levels 3 and 
Above in 8th Grade - 2011-2012 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Reading 67 54.22 9 27 71 
Math 67 54.31 10.41 20 77 
     
Nevada 
The official assessment in Nevada is the Nevada Proficiency Examination 
Program (NPEAP).  Tests to measure math and reading performance are given to students 
in Grades 3-12.  The summary statistics in Table 4.11 show the percentage of students in 
grades 3-8 deemed by the Nevada Department of Education standards to be meeting or 
exceeding expectations in 2011-2012.   Though less variation than Florida, there is 
substantial variation in performance between the small number of Nevada districts.   
Table 4.11 – Percentage of Nevada Students in Grades 3-8 Meeting or 
Exceeding Performance Expectations - 2011-2012 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Reading 17 69.82 10.11 48 83 
Math 17 61.47 8.67 44 75 
 
Utah 
 The performance measure available from the Utah Department of Public 
Education is the 3rd grade Dynamic Indicators of Basic Early Literacy Skills (DIBELS) 
benchmark reading test.  The summary statistics in Table 4.12 show the percentage of 
students in Utah districts meeting reading benchmarks in 3rd grade.   Like Florida and 
Utah, there is significant variation in the performance across school districts in Utah.   
                                                
1 See: http://fcat.fldoe.org/fcat2/pdf/achlevel.pdf 
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Table 4.12 – Percentage of Utah 3rd Graders Meeting Reading 
Benchmarks - 2011-2012 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Reading 40 73.23 11.83 44 93 
 
 An obvious shortcoming of the Utah test score data is that it is an indicator of 
performance early in the academic career of students.  Accordingly, in addition to the 
differences in tests between states the differences in what tests are designed to measure in 
individual states must be considered when interpreting the impact of governance on 
achievement indicators.  Nonetheless, the 3rd reading test does adequately serve the 
purpose of supplementing the uniform performance measure of graduation rates.   
Michigan   
Students in Michigan take the Michigan Educational Assessment Program 
(MEAP) assessments, known as the MEAP exams, in grades 3 – 9 in math and reading.  
The Michigan Department of Education reports the percentage of students deemed 
proficient by school district in each of these grades.  Note that the summary statistics in 
Table 4.13, which indicate wide variation, include non-district charter schools which, for 
purposes of state testing, are treated as if they are their own independent school district.   
Table 4.13 – Percentage of Michigan 8th Graders Deemed Proficient on 
the MEAP - 2011-2012 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Reading 684 57.45 14.88 0 94.7 
Math 684 23.96 15.41 0 89.5 
 
Minnesota  
The official state assessments in Minnesota are called the Minnesota 
Comprehensive Assessments (MCAs).  The MCAs are given in math in grades 3-8 and 
11, and in reading in grades 3-8 and 10.  The summary statistics below show the mean 
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and range percentage of students meeting or exceeding expectations set by the Minnesota 
Department of Education on the MCAs in 8th grade reading and 11th grade math.   
Table 4.14 – Percentage of Minnesota Students Meeting or 
Exceeding Expectations on the MCAs - 2011-2012 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Reading (Grade 
8) 341 67.72 19.26 0 95.8 
Math (Grade 11) 342 37.74 15.92 0 80 
 
Wisconsin  
  The official state assessment in Wisconsin is the Wisconsin Knowledge and 
Concepts Exam (WCKE).  The WKCE is given to public school pupils in grades 3-8 and 
10 in reading and math every fall.  Unlike other states, Wisconsin presents pooled test 
score information across grade levels, so the summary statistics in Table 4.15 show the 
average percentage of students scoring proficient or advanced, as deemed by the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI), across all tested grade levels in the 
district.  It is also necessary to note that cut-off points for what DPI considers proficient 
were changed in the 2012-2013 school year, meaning the results presented should not be 
compared with results in future years.   
Table 4.15 – Percentage of Students Scoring Proficient or Advanced on the 
WKCE in 2011-2012 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Reading 418 85.03 6.9 0 98.6 
Math 418 81.32 6.78 48.2 98.1 
 
 Of course, there are numerous limitations regarding the test score data presented.  
First, as mentioned, they are not comparable across states.  Second, because states set 
their own standards for proficiency or meeting expectations, what is deemed success in 
one state could be less or more difficult to achieve than what is deemed success in 
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another state.  Third, test scores do not show growth in achievement over-time, so a low-
achieving district could merely look low performing because of the difficult students 
served.  Fourth, no single test score can encompass the success or failure of a student; 
students may get test anxiety, may have areas of strength that do not show up in a 
standardized test score, etc.  However, the use of achievement scores in measuring school 
and district performance is common practice, and can yield useful information. 
 For example, though student growth is not included in any of the presented 
achievement scores the use of pooled-data, or 8th grade data when available, will ensure 
that district scores have time to grow (i.e. from when a student starts testing grade 3 to 
grade 8).  More importantly, the regression analyses used to draw conclusions about the 
impact of governance on outcomes controls for factors, such as socio-economic status, 
commonly known to negatively affect achievement on standardized tests.  Comparisons 
across grade levels, i.e grade three to eight, are particularly problematic due to factors 
such as the growth of racial gaps over time, and should be interpreted with caution.   
Conclusion  
 In this chapter two hypotheses are tested using archival data from the NCES, and 
from the Departments of Educations (or Public Instructions) in Florida, Nevada, Utah, 
Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  The first hypothesis, that their are significant 
differences in the make-up and structure of school districts in the two groups of states, is 
well supported.  The second hypothesis - that the major predictors of school district 
academic outcomes in the six states of interest do not vary significantly by state - is also 
well supported.  Finally, test score data for each state was presented demonstrating that 
there is significant variation in scores within states.   
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 As mentioned in the introduction to the chapter, the accepting of these hypotheses 
supports the methodology of a most-different case-study approach for understanding the 
link between school board governance and academic achievement using the black box 
model of school board governance.  Within the black box governance model it is 
theorized that school board members make a series of situation dependent decisions.  
Hence, the governance survey presented in later chapters seeks to measure the quality of 
group decision-making on school boards, rather than understand the specific policies 
pursued by boards.  Because the two groups of states are serving substantially different 
populations, it is expected that school boards in either group will be making decisions 
regarding significantly different situations.  For example, a school board in Nevada 
overseeing a district with a large ELL population will face a very different set of potential 
decisions than a board in Minnesota overseeing a homogeneous English speaking student 
body.  However, if board performance is dependent on the quality of decision-making as 
theorized, a high-functioning board should be expected to make a positive impact in both 
situations.  In other words, quality board governance affects outcomes across different 
types of governance situations.  If the two groups were homogenous, the lone conclusion 
might be that quality governance matters only for specific situations.   
 The confirmation of the second hypothesis also validates the research design by 
demonstrating that achievement as measured by graduation rates in all six states studied 
is predicted by common factors.  There are enough similarities to make a group-to-group 
comparison that is valid.  So, for example, while the extent of poverty might differ by 
state, the effect of poverty in all six states is comparable.  Knowing this enables a 
common set of control variables to be used in the state groupings when attempting to 
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isolate the impact of school board governance on variations in academic achievement 
variables.  
In addition to testing these two hypotheses, this chapter presented and explained 
the summary statistics for the numerous archival variables used in quantitative models in 
the next chapter.   As discussed there are notable limitations in the presented data that 
must be considered when interpreting the results of the regression analyses presented thus 
far, and those to follow.  However, these limitations are noted and not serious enough to 
undermine the overall conclusions, or contributions made by this study. 
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Chapter V. 
Survey Design and Summary Results 
 
 The previous sections of this dissertation establish why school boards can be 
theorized to impact school district performance, describe ways in which this relationship 
might work, and justify the comparative case study design focus on school boards in the 
states of Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Utah, and Wisconsin.  This section 
describes the process by which the original survey data to test the three major hypotheses 
were collected.  In addition to describing the process, a summary of survey data, 
including an analysis of the characteristics of school board members in the six states of 
interest, is presented.        
Survey Design 
 The survey instrument used to collect data was developed by the author in 
collaboration with Douglas Ihrke and Barbara Duffy of the Helen Bader Institute at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.  The instrument was developed and fine-tuned over 
the course of approximately nine months, from April 2012 to February 2013.  The 
original draft survey contained over 130 questions, and was gradually reduced to 39 
questions.  The survey questions were adapted from a previous survey conducted by the 
National School Boards Association (Meeks & Hess, 2011), from a municipal 
government survey in Michigan (Irhke et. al., 2003), and drafted by the author.  The 
survey instrument in full can be viewed in Appendix A.     
Units of Analyses 
 The units of analyses targeted by the survey were individual school boards, and 
the school board as a unit.  Some survey questions were worded to provide basic 
information about board members (i.e. sex, ideological leanings, years of service), while 
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others were worded to obtain information from individual school board members on their 
perceptions of the board as a whole.  A similar strategy was used in previous school 
board surveys by Grissom (2012) and Hess & Meeks (2011).   
Given these units of analyses, the goal of the survey is to maximize both the 
number of individual school board member respondents, and the number of school boards 
from which at least one response was obtained.  This strategy does introduce a 
measurement problem for districts where multiple school board members respond.  The 
previous surveys by Grissom (2012) and Hess & Meeks (2011) countered this by 
averaging out the responses for all responding school board members for every relevant 
question.  This does introduce the possible risk that a minority viewpoint on the board is 
the only represented view, distorting the way in which the board actually functions.  
Though there is no practical way to counter this problem, data on the number of 
responses per-board is reported. 
Sampling strategy 
 The goal of the survey design was to sample the universe of school boards in 
Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Utah, and Wisconsin, as well as non-profit 
independent charter school boards in Michigan and Wisconsin.   As can be seen in table 
5.1, there are 1,655 boards in the sampling frame.  Between August, 2012 and December, 
2012 a total of 5,175 e-mail addresses for board members were mined from school 
district websites, the directory of the Florida School Boards Association, and charter 
school directories publicly available from the Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction and the Florida Department of Education.  In total, contact information was 
obtained for at least one board member or board secretary in 83% of the sampling frame.  
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In total, 4,775 e-mails for traditional school boards and 400 for non-profit charter school 
boards were obtained.   
Table 5.1 – E-mail Addresses Mined by State 
  
 
Districts  
Valid E-Mail 
Addresses Mined  
 Wisconsin  424 1,379 
 Michigan  552 1,568 
 Minnesota  340 1,238 
 Nevada  17 62 
 Utah   41 163 
 Florida  67 365 
 Michigan 
Charter  206 331 
 Wisconsin 
Charter  18 69 
 Total  1,665 5,175 
  
Survey Logistics 
The author obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the IRB 
board at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee on February 19, 2013.  The study was 
ruled expedited, and assigned IRB# 13.275.  After approval the survey was sent to all e-
mail addresses along with a solicitation letter, and notice of informed consent on 
February 25, 2013 (A copy of the letter can be viewed in Appendix B).  A follow-up 
solicitation was sent to non-responding board members two weeks later, and the survey 
was closed for good on April 15, 2013.    
 The initial overall school board member response rate was 27.35%.  In 
comparison the response rate of the national school board member survey conducted by 
Hess & Meeks (2011) was 23.6%.  However, as shown in Table 5.2, after data cleanup 
the usable board member response rate was 23.9%.  In addition, the overall number of 
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actual usable response was 1,143, slightly larger than the Hess & Meeks (2011) response 
number of 1,020.    
Table 5.2 - Individual Response Rates for Public School Board 
Members 
  Valid E-Mail Addresses 
Mined  
Responses Response 
Rate 
 Wisconsin  1,379 321 23.3% 
 Michigan  1,568 345 22.0% 
 Minnesota  1,238 248 20.0% 
 Nevada  62 15 24.2% 
 Utah   163 33 20.2% 
 Florida  365 73 20.0% 
Anonymous n/a 108 n/a 
 Total  4,775 1,143 23.9% 
 
 Table 5.3 reports the total and state-by-state board level response rates.  In total at 
least one response was received from 44.2% of school boards in the six states of interest.  
Figure 5.1 graphs the distribution of the frequency of responses.  The majority of boards 
had one or two board member responses, while very few boards had 5 or more 
individuals respond. 
Table 5.3 – Board-Level Response Rate  
   Districts  Responses 
Response 
Rate 
 Wisconsin  424 201 47.4% 
 Michigan  552 210 38.0% 
 Minnesota  340 156 45.9% 
 Nevada  17 9 52.9% 
 Utah   41 20 48.8% 
 Florida  67 41 61.2% 
 Total  1,441 637 44.2% 
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Unfortunately the response rate for independent non-profit charter board members 
was much lower, just 7.75%.  Though the number of initial responses, 31, allows for 
some descriptive data analysis, (presented in Chapter Eight), they must be taken with a 
grain of salt.  Accordingly, unless otherwise identified, all presented data refers only to 
responses from public school boards.  
Aggregate Survey Results 
 A full listing of aggregate survey results for all 89-survey fields is available in 
Appendix A.  However, in the remainder of this chapter survey results will be presented 
that shows the basic characteristics of school board members in Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Utah, Nevada, and Florida, and identifies key differences in school board 
membership in the two groups of states.   
Who serves on boards? 
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 Hess & Meeks’ (2011) national survey on school board members finds the group 
to be largely white, middle-aged, highly educated, and conservative leaning.   The results 
of my survey yield very similar findings.  Table 5.4 lists the total racial make-up of all 
school board members in the sample, as well as the make-up of members in Group One 
(Florida, Utah, Nevada) and in Group Two (Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.)  The 
overwhelming majority of board members serving identify as White.  Though the 
possibility of response bias must be considered (i.e. Whites were more likely to fill out an 
online survey than other racial groups), the 2012 membership survey of the Wisconsin 
Association of School Boards provides evidence, at least in Wisconsin, that the 
overwhelming majority of school board members are indeed White  (WASB, 2012).  In 
addition, the underrepresentation of minorities on school boards has been identified in 
existing school board literature (Banks, 2000).    
Table 5.4 - Race of School Board Members 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
White 91.80% 94.06% 93.47% 
African-
American 3.28% 1.68% 1.79% 
Hispanic 1.64% 0.22% 0.45% 
Asian 0.00% 0.22% 0.18% 
Native 
American 0.00% 0.90% 0.72% 
Other 1.64% 1.23% 1.43% 
Prefer Not to 
Say 1.64% 1.68% 1.97% 
N 122.00 893 1,118 
 
Table 5.5 shows that a majority of school board members in the sample are male.  
However, there is a substantive difference between responses by groups, with Group One 
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consisting of more females than males.  However, a test comparing the group responses 
does fall just short of statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence. 
Table 5.5 - Sex of School Board Members 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
Male 46.28% 55.49% 53.38% 
Female 52.72% 44.51% 46.62% 
N 121 901 1,124 
 
 The average age of board members, shown in Table 5.6, is 53.25.  However there 
is a large range of board member ages, with members ranging from the ages of 19 to 80.  
Members in Group One are slightly older than members in Group Two.  Difference of 
means test reveals that within the sample board members in Group One are significantly 
older than members in Group Two at the 99% level of confidence.  However, the average 
board member in both of the groups can safely be described as middle-aged.  
Table 5.6 - Mean Age of School Board Members 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
  57.33 52.72 53.25 
N 111 841 1,042 
 
 In terms of ideology the average board member in the sample identifies himself or 
herself as conservative or moderate more often than liberal or non-partisan (see Table 
5.7).  This basic difference holds true across groups, however in Group One very few 
board members identify themselves as liberal, while almost half (45%) identify 
themselves as conservative.  Meaning, the average board member (in the sample) serving 
in Florida, Utah, and Nevada is more likely to be conservative than the average board 
member serving in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota.  Given the overall ideological 
representation of the population in these states, the difference is not surprising.  In the 
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area of educational attainment, shown in Table 5.8, the board members in both group of 
states are similar to the previously mentioned national survey; on whole they are highly 
educated.      
Table 5.7 - Ideology of School Board Members 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
Liberal 7.50% 19.71% 18.11% 
Conservative 45.00% 31.19% 32.61% 
Moderate 33.33% 37.16% 37.12% 
Non-Partisan 14.17% 11.94% 12.16% 
N 120 888 1,110 
 
Table 5.8 - Education Levels of School Board Members 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
Did not finish high school 0.00% 0.15% 0.12% 
High school graduate or GED 1.09% 4.16% 3.92% 
Some college 29.35% 24.19% 24.46% 
Bachelor's Degree 30.43% 34.21% 34.19% 
Advanced Degree 39.13% 37.29% 37.50% 
N 92 649 741 
 
 The demographics of school board members in the sample are similar to the 
demographics of board members found in previous works.  Though there are small 
differences between the two groups of states, the average board member is White, in his 
or her 50s, highly educated, and moderate to conservative in his of her political beliefs. 
How did they come to serve? 
 Perhaps more interesting than board member demographics are the responses to a 
series of questions on how individual board members came to serve.  For example (see 
Table 5.9) school board service for a large majority of respondents in both groups is an 
individual’s first experience holding elected office.  And, as listed in Table 5.10, most 
school board members are fairly stable in their positions, having served for five or more 
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years.  This finding is important given this project’s attempt to link board governance 
with performance; if any connection between governance and success indicators is 
identified a level of board member longevity must be assumed to exist so as to support 
the idea that the governance behaviors of current board members have had some time to 
affect performance.    
Table 5.9 - Have You Held Elected Office Before? 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
Yes 6.56% 13.80% 13.31% 
No 93.44% 86.20% 86.69% 
N 122 891 1,112 
 
Table 5.10 - Board Member Length of Service 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
0-2 years 15.57% 20.27% 19.79% 
3-4 years 13.93% 20.16% 19.07% 
5-6 years 13.93% 14.37% 14.35% 
More than 6 years 56.56% 45.21% 46.79% 
N 122 898 1,122 
 
 In recent scholarship on school board performance it is assumed that school board 
elections are generally not contested affairs; meaning a position on a school board is 
essentially a position for life if desired (Hess & Meeks, 2013; Finn & Keegan, 2004).  
The results presented in Table 5.1l refute this notion.  A majority of board members 
report that they did in fact have an opponent in their most recent election.  Interestingly 
there is a large difference in answers between groups, with Group Two having 
substantially more contested elections.  A chi-squared test confirms the difference is 
statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence.   However, these differences do 
not change the overall finding that school board members in the sample are at least as 
likely to have an opponent in their most recent election as not, providing reason to 
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question the growing acceptance that school board members in general do not face 
significant electoral accountability.  Even with evidence that elections are often low-
turnout affairs, there is little reason to suspect an opposed election even without high-
turnout to be inherently non-competitive (Berry & Howell, 2005). 
Table 5.11 - Was Your Last Election Opposed? 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
Yes 50.41% 65.40% 63.80% 
No 49.59% 34.60% 36.20% 
N 121 896 1,116 
 
 Another interesting question is whether the professional background of board 
members could theoretically influence their decision to serve on a school board.  For 
example, are substantial numbers of board members former teachers?  The answer, seen 
in Table 5.12, is yes.  Though board members are much more likely to not be former 
teachers, over one in ten are.  In Florida, Utah, and Nevada, the number is particularly 
high, almost one in three.  Another survey question asking about members’ current 
occupations found that the majority of employed board members work in business, 
education, law or medicine, or sales.   
Table 5.12 - Have You Ever Been Employed as a Teacher in Your 
District? 
  Group 1 Group 2 All 
Yes 33.70% 10.05% 12.53% 
No 66.30% 89.95% 87.47% 
N 92 647 814 
 
 In total, school board members in the sample are likely to have served for a 
significant amount of time, been opposed in their previous election, and working 
professionally outside of their board service in a few specific areas.  Perhaps a reflection 
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of the unpaid nature of most board service, these findings suggest school board members 
in Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Florida, Utah, and Nevada are making significant 
time and effort commitments to serve in a position that does not provide them with 
economic support.    
What are board member priorities? 
 Thus far the presented survey results establish the demographics of board 
members and the ways in which they came to serve.  But what do they care about?  What 
are their priorities?  The research overview in Chapter one presented the traditional role 
of school boards as being the hiring and firing of staff, monitoring fiscal performance, 
and advocating for the district (Callahan, 1975).  The results in Table 5.13 suggest 
something slightly different for today’s school board members.   
 On average, board members in both groups of states ranked the setting of 
academic standards as their highest priority.  In other words, the observations of the Iowa 
Lighthouse Inquiry, that school boards play an important role in the academics of a 
district, hold true in the minds of board members.  Also highly ranked are the traditional 
roles of monitoring district finances and hiring the superintendent.  Though there appears 
to be a substantial difference in where the groups of states prioritize the hiring of the 
superintendent, this is likely do to a structural difference.  A significant number of 
superintendents in Florida are elected rather than hired, hence several observations in 
Group One list the hiring of a superintendent as their lowest priority due to the fact that 
they do not hire the superintendent.   
Table 5.13 - Ranking Board Member Priorities from 1 - 10 
  All Group 1 Group 2 
Setting Academic Standards 3.37 3.01 3.39 
Strategic Planning 3.44 3.83 3.52 
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Monitoring Fiscal Performance 3.67 4.4 3.56 
Hiring the Superintendent 4.8 6.17 4.74 
Setting Assessment Policies 5.44 4.88 5.48 
Holding Staff Accountable for District 
Performance 5.7 5.84 5.71 
Setting Behavior Policies 6.36 6.05 6.39 
Interacting with the Public 6.38 6.6 6.37 
Board Development 7.68 7.33 7.74 
Collaborating with Interest Groups 8.07 7.9 8.09 
 N 762 86 606 
 
 Somewhat confounding is the low priority placed on interacting with the public 
and collaboration with interest groups.  Scholarship by Moe (2005), Finn & Keegan 
(2004) and others have dismissed school boards as tools of special interest groups; these 
findings suggest that boards member themselves certainly do not see themselves that 
way.  In addition, the argument that school boards serve an essential public accountability 
function by being accessible democratically elected local officials is to a degree 
undermined by the comparatively low-priority placed on interactions with the public.   
What type of districts do they serve?   
 Tables 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16 list the summary statistics of various variables of the 
school board members included in the sample.  On average, school board members who 
responded to the survey serve in districts that are 80% white, have just over 1/3rd of their 
students receiving free/reduced lunch subsidies, and have graduation rates of 85.53%.  
There is large variation for all these variables, and the group-to-group differences mirror 
those identified in Chapter 4, suggesting that the school board members surveyed 
represent a good cross-section of districts in the two groups of states.  
Table 5.14 - Summary Statistics for Districts from all Board Member 
Respondents 
  N Mean  Std. Deviation Min  Max 
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Students 1032 7857.98 25759.36 44 347366 
Percent White 1032 0.8 0.19 0.02 1 
Percent Free/Reduced 
Lunch Eligible 1032 0.36 0.18 0 0.91 
Schools 1033 14.2 37.71 1 515 
Graduation Rate 974 85.53 12.74 3.8 100 
Student/Teacher Ratio 1032 16.29 2.71 8.2 24.8 
Per-Pupil Revenue 1027 1156.34 2059.76 7047 28158 
Percent Students w/ IEP 1032 .11 .06 0 .31 
 
Table 5.15 - Summary Statistics for Districts from Group 1 Respondents 
  N Mean  
Std. 
Deviation Min  Max 
Students 121 40224.93 64353.57 341 347366 
Percent White 121 0.63 0.21 0.04 0.94 
Percent Free/Reduced 
Lunch Eligible 121 0.52 0.14 0.22 0.82 
Schools 121 62.26 92.35 5 515 
Graduation Rate 103 72.78 11.43 40.7 100 
Student/Teacher Ratio 121 16.76 3.58 11.1 24.8 
Per-Pupil Revenue 118 10108.03 1760.06 7047 15402 
Percent Students w/ IEP 121 .14 .03 .09 .24 
 
Table 5.16 - Summary Statistics for Districts from Group 2 Respondents 
  N Mean  Std. Deviation Min  Max 
Students 911 3559.1 5546.43 44 77757 
Percent White 911 0.83 0.17 0.02 1 
Percent Free/Reduced 
Lunch Eligible 911 0.34 0.17 0 0.91 
Schools 912 7.82 11.83 1 175 
Graduation Rate 871 87.03 12.03 3.8 100 
Student/Teacher Ratio 911 16.23 2.57 8.2 24 
Per-Pupil Revenue 909 11733.05 2022.63 8548 28158 
Percent Students w/ IEP 911 .10 .07 0 .31 
 
 The summary statistics in Tables 5.14, 5.15, 5.16 also provide an opportunity to 
test the relationship between various school board member demographic variables and 
academic attainment as measured by graduation rates.  The black box model of school 
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board governance presented in Figure 3.2 theorizes that the background of school board 
members is a factor in determining the decision premise upon which school board 
members go about the actions of governance (Simon, 1957).     
Existing literature on school boards and local politics gives specific reason to 
suspect that the gender of school board members affects their priorities, methods, and 
ultimately performance.  Vijayalakshmi (2002) argues from a feminist perspective that 
women have specific unique interests tied to their gender that influence the performance 
of organized institutions.  Verba, Burns, and Schlozman (1997) give some context to the 
diversity of political interests among different genders by presenting evidence of a gender 
gap in political engagement, concluding the area female political engagement is most 
prominent is education politics.   
 Deckman (2007) identifies differences in the reasons why men and women, 
respectively, run for school board.  Men, for example, are more likely to say they want to 
impact government policy, and more likely to cite religious motivations than women.  
Fox and Scuhmann (1999) look at local city officials and find that female officials are 
more likely than men to say they want to serve the community.  Perhaps most interesting, 
Grogan (1999) finds women in education fields are more likely than men to have a strong 
instructional background, and to seek consensus rather than control in group settings.  
 Though dated, a 1974 NSBA study gives very specific reasons to suspect gender 
representation plays a role in school district performance.  That survey asked board 
members to cite their accomplishments during their service by area, specifically the 
NSBA asked board members to share the areas in which they feel they made the greatest 
contribution. A higher number of male board members than female cited 
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“Finance/Budget,” and a higher number of female than male board members cited 
“Instructional,” (NSBA, 1974, p. 35).  
 In addition to gender, there is ample research suggesting that ideology plays a 
significant role in the way in which people make both governance decisions and 
decisions in general (Gruenfeld, 1995; March, 1994; Hackworth, 2007).  Also of interest 
is the way school board member age might impact school board performance as 
measured by academic attainment.  Given the rapid changes in the use of technology and 
management techniques in education there is good reason to suspect that younger board 
members are more adept at governing for higher performance (Peterson, 2010; 
Christensen et. al., 2008; Moe & Chubb, 2009; Odden, 2011).   
 The three tables below, 5.17, 5.18, and 5.19, contain the results of OLS regression 
models testing the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between school board 
member demographics and background characteristics and school district performance as 
defined by high school graduation rates.2  Table 5.17 shows the results of three OLS 
regression models using data for all school board respondents where the dependent 
variable is high school graduation rates.  The only significant focal variable in these three 
models is the dummy variable indicating that a board member was formerly a teacher 
employed by the district.  Interestingly the relationship is negative, indicating that 
districts with former teachers serving on their school board have lower high school 
graduation rates.  However, comparisons of beta weights in each model show that the 
strength of this relationship is dwarfed by the negative relationships between race and 
                                                
2 Note that a control variable for the number of schools per-district was dropped due to 
multicolinearity.  The reference variable for ideology was Moderate, and the reference 
variable for education was Some College.    
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socioeconomic status and high school graduation rates.  In the All Variables model, for 
example, the former teacher dummy has a beta weight of -.07 while the Pct. 
Free/Reduced Lunch variable has a beta weight of -.52.     
Table 5.17 – OLS Models Predicting High School Graduation Rates for All 
Board Members 
 All Variables Background  Age and 
Gender 
VARIABLES Graduation 
Rate 
Graduation  
Rate 
Graduation 
Rate 
    
Age 0.0116  0.00299 
 (0.0389)  (0.0382) 
Female Dummy -0.852  -0.784 
 (0.742)  (0.725) 
Conservative Dummy 0.458 0.694  
 (0.869) (0.831)  
Liberal Dummy 0.231 -0.0304  
 (1.037) (0.990)  
Non-Partisan Dummy 1.502 1.644  
 (1.211) (1.168)  
High School Graduate Dummy -1.580 -1.460  
 (1.981) (1.841)  
Bachelor’s Degree Dummy 1.085 0.675  
 (0.966) (0.924)  
Advanced Degree Dummy 0.537 0.308  
 (0.994) (0.932)  
Former Teacher Dummy -2.903*  -2.785* 
 (1.185)  (1.146) 
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch -38.22*** -37.23*** -38.41*** 
 (3.016) (2.883) (2.915) 
Pct. IEP -8.233 -7.818 -6.103 
 (7.490) (7.269) (7.370) 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio -0.341* -0.312 -0.362* 
 (0.168) (0.163) (0.166) 
Revenue Per-Pupil 0.000201 0.000316 0.000278 
 (0.000250) (0.000244) (0.000243) 
Pct. Minority -15.35*** -16.65*** -14.98*** 
 (2.683) (2.569) (2.655) 
Number of Students in District -1.43e-05 -1.80e-05 -1.33e-05 
 (1.54e-05) (1.36e-05) (1.54e-05) 
Constant 106.1*** 104.3*** 106.7*** 
 (5.562) (5.094) (5.360) 
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Observations 642 689 649 
R-squared 0.532 0.528 0.527 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Tale 5.18 shows the results of identical OLS models restricted to school board 
members in Nevada, Utah, and Florida.  Notably the model for All Variables is 
particularly strong with a R-Squared statistics of .611.  The results are fairly similar to the 
all board member model with the notable exception of a statically significant relationship 
between a low board member level formal education, being a high school graduate, and 
district high school graduation rates.  Under the model being a board member with a high 
school diploma as their highest level of attainment lowers the district high school 
graduation rate by 21.64 and 24.45 percentage points in the two models in which the 
variable is included.          
Table 5.18 – OLS Models Predicting High School Graduation Rates for Group 
One Board Members 
 All Variables Background  Age and 
Gender 
VARIABLES Graduation 
Rate 
Graduation 
Rate 
Graduation 
Rate 
    
Age 0.103  0.107 
 (0.106)  (0.108) 
Female Dummy 1.626  1.613 
 (1.987)  (2.048) 
Conservative Dummy -2.956 -3.036  
 (2.231) (2.228)  
Liberal Dummy -4.109 -4.406  
 (5.118) (5.197)  
Non-Partisan Dummy -4.528 -4.309  
 (3.114) (3.138)  
High School Graduate Dummy -21.64* -24.45*  
 (9.348) (9.291)  
Bachelor’s Degree Dummy -1.920 -3.466  
 (2.678) (2.595)  
Advanced Degree Dummy 2.784 -0.0984  
 (2.863) (2.609)  
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Former Teacher Dummy -5.679*  -4.189 
 (2.462)  (2.359) 
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch -2.571 -7.330 -10.89 
 (10.67) (9.740) (10.31) 
Pct. IEP -72.08 -67.36 -62.15 
 (47.85) (45.50) (48.79) 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 0.295 0.286 0.144 
 (0.389) (0.386) (0.385) 
Revenue Per-Pupil 0.000983 0.00147 0.000170 
 (0.000752) (0.000741) (0.000710) 
Pct. Minority -39.60*** -38.12*** -32.56*** 
 (7.524) (6.884) (7.287) 
Number of Students in District 4.33e-05* 3.18e-05 3.52e-05 
 (1.96e-05) (1.73e-05) (1.99e-05) 
Constant 80.35*** 83.88*** 88.75*** 
 (18.23) (15.58) (17.58) 
    
Observations 72 78 72 
R-squared 0.611 0.574 0.534 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Table 5.19 shows the results of the identical OLS models restricted to board 
members serving in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota.  None of the focal variables in 
these models are statistically significant.  Only control variables for socioeconomic 
status, race, and district size reach levels of statistical significance.  Also of import is the 
lower R-Squared statistics for the Group One OLS models; the variables used in general 
are less explanatory than in Group Two.   
Table 5.19 – OLS Models Predicting High School Graduation Rates for Group Two 
Board Members 
 All Variables Background  Age and Gender 
VARIABLES Graduation 
Rate 
Graduation  
Rate 
Graduation 
Rate 
    
Age 0.0111  -0.000841 
 (0.0414)  (0.0406) 
Female Dummy -1.186  -1.079 
 (0.792)  (0.770) 
Conservative Dummy 0.975 1.267  
 (0.934) (0.882)  
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Liberal Dummy 0.628 0.255  
 (1.060) (1.002)  
Non-Partisan Dummy 2.021 2.118  
 (1.291) (1.235)  
High School Graduate Dummy -0.914 -0.790  
 (2.014) (1.860)  
Bachelor’s Degree Dummy 1.854 1.382  
 (1.016) (0.967)  
Advanced Degree Dummy 1.075 1.001  
 (1.053) (0.984)  
Former Teacher Dummy -2.658  -2.507 
 (1.355)  (1.312) 
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch -40.54*** -39.63*** -40.88*** 
 (3.178) (3.033) (3.089) 
Pct. IEP -3.968 -4.643 -1.603 
 (7.752) (7.464) (7.638) 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio -0.602** -0.570** -0.627** 
 (0.200) (0.193) (0.198) 
Revenue Per-Pupil -6.14e-05 -4.17e-05 2.45e-05 
 (0.000285) (0.000277) (0.000279) 
Pct. Minority -9.020** -9.638** -8.451** 
 (3.147) (3.025) (3.135) 
Number of Students in District -0.000198* -0.000198** -0.000202** 
 (8.36e-05) (7.06e-05) (8.21e-05) 
Constant 113.0*** 112.0*** 114.4** 
 (6.255) (5.816) (6.078) 
    
Observations 570 611 577 
R-squared 0.486 0.488 0.477 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The presented results yield several interesting insights and questions into the 
relationship between school board member backgrounds and district level attainment.  
Overall, there is very limited evidence of a general relationship between school board 
member demographics and backgrounds and district level attainment.  For example, a 
connection between gender and higher district level outcomes, identified by the author in 
a previous study of Wisconsin, does not appear to exist when Wisconsin results are 
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pooled with the five other states of interest (Ford, 2012).  In addition, ideology and age, 
both of which present a myriad of theoretical reasons to suspect a relationship with 
performance yield no statistically significant relationship in any of the presented models. 
 The only two statistically significant independent variables were the dummy 
variables for being a former teacher (though only in the all board member and Group One 
models), and the variable indicating high school graduate as the highest level of 
educational attainment (also restricted to Group One).  Somewhat surprisingly, the 
dummy for being a former teacher is negatively related to attainment in Group One.  
Intuitively, one might suspect that being a former teacher would bode well for school 
board performance given their experience on the ground in the district.   
Consideration was given to the possibility that former teachers, perhaps 
disheartened with the academic direction of the district, run for school board in an 
attempt to change things.  To test this possibility the author restricted the models in 
Tables 5.17 and 5.18 to school board members with three or more, and five or more, 
years of experience.  The logic being that once a former teacher had longevity on the 
board, his or her experience would begin to have a positive impact.  However, the results 
were not substantially different in the restricted models.  It is possible that the skills 
needed to manage a classroom do not translate well to board governance.  Or, because the 
negative impact was only in Group One, comprised of states with lower teacher pay and 
benefits, that former teachers serving on these boards ran primarily to improve the 
comparatively worse compensation packages in their states. 
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 The negative relationship between low board member education levels and district 
attainment observed in Group One is a meaningless finding.  It is driven be a single 
observation from a very low-performing district.  
 While the extensive original data presented on school board member 
characteristics in the six states of interest paint a picture of a typical school board 
member - White, in his or her 50s, politically moderate to conservative, elected in a 
contested election – the findings in Tables 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19 show that there is no ideal 
school board member in terms of demographics and background.  Even the finding of a 
negative link between being a former teacher serving on a school board and district 
graduation rates presents, at best, a flimsy case.   
This begs the question: Does it matter who serves on school boards?  Clearly 
school boards perform certain tasks as described in previous chapters, and intuitively the 
skills and background members bring to those tasks are important.  However, the primary 
finding in this chapter, that no ideal prototype of a school board member exists, is on the 
surface problematic.  The outgrowth of this conclusion is that improving the performance 
of school boards as it relates to affecting academic outcomes is not as easy as finding 
better people to serve on school boards. Hence, the increasingly popular notion that the 
primary failing of school board members is that they are merely interest group pawns 
elected in low-turnout elections is inherently flawed (Maeroff, 2010; Keegan & Finn, 
2004).  The challenge of improving school board performance is more complex than 
moving elections to increase turnout, recruiting better candidates, or limiting the role of 
Democracy. 
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The following chapter switches the unit of analysis from the individual school 
board member to the school board as a group.  This shift in the unit of analysis reflects 
prior research by Grissom (2012), but also assumes that when measuring the effects of 
adherence to the key work of school boards the board itself is greater than the sum of its 
parts.  While the demographics and backgrounds of school board members may not, on 
aggregate, directly affect district performance, they do affect the governance process.  In 
other words, as stated previously, the way in which board members go about performing 
the essential tasks of school boards matter in the context of the school board as a whole.  
We should not expect an ideal board member prototype to exist in an institution as 
localized and situation dependent as school boards.  So yes, the backgrounds of school 
board member do matter, but primarily as they relate to the school board as a whole.                      
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Chapter VI. 
Connecting Board Governance to Outcomes: Testing the NSBA Key Work of School 
Boards 
 
 A school board member serving in the United States looking to maximize the 
effectiveness of his or her governance behavior can draw upon any number of scholarly 
and non-scholarly sets of best practices.  Most of these best practices focus on common 
good government themes long present in existing literature on governance.  However, as 
the primary role of school boards is more universally recognized as raising student 
achievement there grows a need to better understand the connections between the best 
practice and good governance literature and academic outcomes.   
 The most prominent set of best practices is the Key Work of School Boards 
created by the National School Boards Association (NSBA).  As will be explained in the 
literature review, the Key Works consist of a several policy areas established through 
consensus that to which, the NSBA suggests, boards looking to improve academic 
achievement should adhere.  The following chapter operationalizes adherence to the key 
works of school boards with 17 survey items answered by school board members on a 
five point Likert scale.  The goal is to establish whether boards indicating greater levels 
of adherence to the Key Work areas also have better academic outcomes.  This chapter 
tests the following hypothesis: 
Greater adherence to the eight components of the NSBA’s Key Work of School 
Boards positively impacts district level academic outcomes.   
There are several notable limitations to the methodologies deployed in this 
chapter.  First, the questions operationalizing the degree of adherence to individual Key 
Works were generated by the author.  Though questions were tweaked, reviewed by 
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school board experts, fellow students, and faculty, there is no way to guarantee that they 
perfectly align with the Key Works.  However, the significant overlap between the survey 
questions and many of the concepts highlighted in the school board literature ensure that 
the responses at the very least contribute new and meaningful knowledge on the 
connection between board governance perceptions and academic outcomes. 
Second, the survey responses are only measures of school board member 
perceptions, not actual observations.  Though survey answers for boards with multiple 
respondents were averaged out in a methodology employed by Grissom (2012), they still 
must be taken as perceptions.  It is also possible that certain items were prone to response 
bias, but there is no reason to believe that any biases differed by sub-group, suggesting 
they were consistent.  The limited impact of individual board member characteristics on 
academic outcomes established in the previous chapter lends a degree of support to this 
conclusion.   
Third, the academic outputs used to measure board performance are flawed out of 
necessity.  Though high school graduation rates is an intuitively satisfying indicator of 
school district success reported to the National Center for Education Statistics, the 
standards and requirements for graduation vary across states.  Similar limitations exist 
with the use of high school dropout rate as a dependent variable.  Whenever possible 
group-to-group comparisons and the use of test achievement data in Wisconsin are used 
to strengthen (or give cause to question) identified links between governance and 
outcomes.   
Finally, the largest limitation is the difficulty in proving with a high-degree of 
confidence that adherence to these keys actually caused better or worse district academic 
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outcomes.  To offset this limitation, models restricted to boards with a self-identified high 
level of stability in terms of board turnover, control variables for district level 
demographics, and control variables for board member characteristics are used.  Though 
the use of these methods still precludes concluding with absolute certainty that board 
governance characteristics directly changed academic outcomes, they do allow for a high-
degree of confidence in conclusions that certain governance behaviors are linked to 
higher school district-level outcomes.     
Literature Review 
Gemberling et. al. (2000) authored the official Key Work of School Boards 
document with their stated goal as answering “[w]hat can board members do to ensure 
that their school boards meet the demands for increased student achievement” and “what 
are the actions boards need to take.” (Gemberling et. al., 2000, p. 1.)”  Much emphasis in 
the document is placed on systems thinking; in other words all of Key Works are 
described with the other Key Works in mind.  The specific Works are:   
• Vision; 
• Standards; 
• Assessment; 
• Accountability; 
• Climate; 
• Collaboration; and 
• Continuous Improvement 
Importantly the NSBA does not claim that their recommendations are research 
based, however the organization does state (Gemberling et. al., 2000, p. 1):  
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The purpose of the Key Work is to help school boards engage their 
communities and improve student achievement through effective 
governance.  The better these eight essential areas are integrated into a 
systematic process, the better the results will be for all stakeholders.  
 
 In other words a very specific claim is made that adherence to these areas should 
be expected to improve district level results.  The best practices highlighted by the NSBA 
mirror best practice recommendations for school boards made by other organizations.  
The Center for Public Education’s “Eight Characteristics of Effective School Boards,” for 
example, emphasize that effective boards work together, work closely with their 
superintendent, use data, and collaborate with staff and the community (Devariecs & 
O’Brein, 2011).   
Others, including Rice et. al (2000), Walser (2009) and Smoley (2009) offer up 
very similar best practices emphasizing collaboration with stakeholders, staff 
accountability, and systems thinking.  But in all of these best practices there is limited 
research that higher achieving boards actually focus on the highlighted topics or exhibit 
highlighted characteristics.   The following section attempts to fill this research gap by 
building on the evidence identifying the importance of school boards unearthed by the 
Iowa Lighthouse Inquiry by specifically linking each Key Work of board governance to 
the survey answers of school board members in Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nevada, Florida and Utah.   
Data  
 Figure 6.1 lists the numbers of board level responses by state and group, as well 
as the number of districts in each category.  As stated earlier the board level response 
rate, defined as the number of school boards where at least one board member responded 
to the survey, was 44.2%.  By design this project is a case study, meaning the results 
 120 
 
should not be taken as generalizable to school boards as a whole, however, the large 
number of observations compared to previous school board research as well as the 
comparative design does allow for meaningful insight into the effects of school board 
governance (Hess & Meeks, 2011). 
 
 Table 6.1 contains the actual survey statements board members were asked to 
evaluate on a five point Likert scale (where 1 = no agreement or description and 5 = 
complete agreement or description).  Responses from boards with multiple respondents 
were, in-line with previous school board survey research, averaged out to create board 
level variables (Grissom, 2012; Hess & Meeks, 2011).  The means and standard deviation 
of each board level variable are also listed in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 – Questions Linked to Key Works of School Boards 
Vision Obs. Mean SD 
We engage in continuous strategic planning, our plan is 
frequently updated 
 
482  2.99  1.23 
We engage in planning when the academic and/or fiscal 
direction of the district needs to be changed. 
 
482 3.22  1.08 
Standards  
  We set and tweak district academic standards in response to 
student needs. 
 
483 3.31 1.01 
Assessment       
We set and tweak district assessment policies in response to 
student needs. For example, if we see our students struggling in 
math we will increase the use of math assessments. 
 
 
481 3.29  .99 
Accountability       
We support and defend the decisions of the Superintendent until 
concerns with those decisions arise. 
 
478  3.00  1.16 
We allow the Superintendent to manage the district as he or she 
sees fit, but regularly monitor and review his or her performance 
 
479  3.90  .96 
Members take responsibility for past decisions. 488 3.63 .78 
Alignment       
My school district has adopted a performance budgeting 
process. Programs must show and document activities and levels 
of program success in order to continue receiving current levels 
of funding. 
 
 
 
488 1.96  .92 
Climate      
Members are open about how they feel about other members’ 
preferences. 
 
487 3.29   .84 
Members are open about their own preferences. 488 3.81   .70 
Members willingly try new things without fear of ridicule. 488  3.47  .87 
Members willingly try new things without fear of retribution. 487 3.55 .88 
Collaboration and Engagement      
We look for a superintendent (or principal if a charter board) 
that shares the values of, and is willing to be a collaborator 
with, the school board. 
 
 
478 3.94 1.03 
We regularly listen to the ideas of organized interest groups and 
act on their input when we deem it appropriate. 
 
478  2.83  1.05 
We regularly listen to the ideas of community members and act 
on their input when we deem it appropriate. 
 
478 3.52 .84 
Continuous Improvement      
We frequently and consistently engage in board development 
activities. 
 
475  2.90 1.30 
We do not engage in any formal board development 479 2.04 1.11 
All variables on 1 to 5 scale where 1 = No agreement or description and 5 = Complete 
agreement or description  
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 Table 6.2 contain summary statistics for the district-level outcomes variables 
sorted by group, where Group One = boards in Nevada, Utah, and Florida, Group Two = 
boards in Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, and Stable = boards where the board level 
response to the statement “In the past five years our school board has had very little board 
turnover” is at or above three.  The use of the stable board restriction is an attempt to 
gauge any differences between boards with a mutual governance history and those where 
governance behaviors which may not have had time to actually affect outcomes.   As 
explained earlier, the two dependent variables measure two fundamentally different 
things.  High school graduation rate represents a long-term achievement and is an 
intuitive measure of district academic health (Swanson, 2003).  Dropout rates are a single 
year variable measuring a district failing; the inability, for whatever reason, to keep a 
child enrolled in school.     
    Table 6.2 – Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Graduation Rate N Mean Std. Dev. 
All Boards 597 85.33 12.92 
Group One 60 72.63 11.09 
Group Two 537 86.75 12.33 
Stable Boards 414 85.08 13.06 
Drop Out Rate       
All Boards 593 2.47 3.19 
Group One 67 2.64 1.73 
Group Two 524 2.46 3.34 
Stable Boards 414 2.52 3.39 
 
In all models the following district level control variables are used unless 
otherwise noted: 
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• Percent of students eligible for free/reduced lunch: A proxy for low-income 
status; 
• Percent white student population; 
• The percent of students with special needs as indicated as being assigned an 
individual educational plan; 
• The pupil-teacher ratio, an indication of school level staffing; and 
• The total amount of public revenue per-pupil received by the district. 
All of these control variables are well established to have an effect on academic 
achievement outside of the control of school districts (socio-economic status, special 
needs status) or offer intuitive potential relationships with academic outcomes even if 
research is mixed (pupil-teach ratio and total revenue per-pupil).  Additional control 
variables were considered and excluded.  The percentage of district students with English 
Language Learner status was excluded due to high multicolinearity with race.  The 
number of schools operated by the district as well as the location (urban, rural, suburban, 
or town) were excluded due to high multicolinearity with number of students served.   
Board member control variables for race, background, age, and sex were excluded 
in board level models due to a low degree of certainty that the demographics of a subset 
of board members across districts represents the demographics of the board as a whole.  
While this problem may be present in any board level variable, there is more reason to 
assume, including in the results linking board member demographics to outcomes in the 
previous chapter, that perceptions of board members and any potential perception bias are 
evenly distributed (Hess & Meeks, 2011; Grissom, 2012). 
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Lastly many of the OLS models discussed in this chapter, as well as in following 
chapters, presented a significant heteroskedasticity problem.  These issues are likely a 
result of using pooled data across states.  As was demonstrated in Chapter Four, there are 
substantial data differences between states.  In general heteroskedasticity, as detected 
through Breusch-Pagan and White Tests, was more of an issue in models including data 
from all six states, and less of a problem in models restricted to groups of similar states. 
When found to be an issue robust regression models were run and results compared to the 
regular OLS models.  Though the robust regressions did not reveal any substantive 
changes in results, the presence of heteroskedasticity nonetheless should be kept in mind 
when reviewing results for models using data from multiple states. 
Results 
 Tables 6.3 – 6.6 list the statistically significant OLS regression results (at at-least 
the 90% level of confidence) for each individual focal variable listed in Table 6.2 on four 
populations of school boards:  All districts, Group One, Group Two, and stable boards.  
The rationale behind running models for each variable individually is two-fold.  First, the 
existence of multiple indicators for each key created large multicolinearity problems in an 
all-inclusive model.  Second, understanding the individual effects allowed for additional 
analysis that combines the responses for variables suspected of having an impact.  This 
additional analysis is important given the NSBA’s assertion that the Key Works are 
meant to work in a systems model.     
Table 6.3 – Significant Results for OLS Regression Models Testing 
Relationship Between Individual Key Works and Graduation Rates -1 
 
All Districts Group 1 
Accountability          
Regularly monitor and review 
Superintendent. 
.762* 
(.455) 
N= 452 
R-Sq.=.507     
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Collaboration and Engagement         
Listen to organized interest groups 
when appropriate. 
-.985** 
(0.413) 
N=450 
R-Sq.=.516     
Superintendent as willing 
collaborator.     
1.738* 
(.863) 
N=44 
R-Sq.=.67 
Continuous Improvement         
No board development.         
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.10 **p<.05  
Table 6.4 – Significant Results for OLS Regression Models Testing Relationship 
Between Individual Key Works and Graduation Rates - 2 
 
Group 2 Stable Boards 
Accountability          
Regularly monitor and review 
Superintendent. 
.815* 
(.491) 
N=407 
R-Sq.=.458     
Collaboration and Engagement         
Listen to organized interest groups 
when appropriate. 
-.968** 
(.443) 
N=405 
R-Sq.=.466 
-1.135** 
(.528) 
N=268 
R-Sq.=.506 
Superintendent as willing 
collaborator         
Continuous Improvement         
No board development 
-.798* 
(.418) 
N=407 
R-Sq.=.469 
-1.250** 
(.561) 
N=269 
R-Sq.=.518 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.10 **p<.05  
 Tables 6.3 and 6.4 test the relationship between indicators of adherence to 
individual Key Works and high school graduation rates.  Among all districts the main 
findings are that superintendent accountability has a positive relationship with graduation 
rates, and that collaboration with interest groups has a negative relationship with 
graduation rates.  The Group One only results also reveal a positive relationship between 
superintendent collaboration and graduation rates, but no indication of a negative impact 
from collaboration with interest groups.  The Group Two results and stable boards only 
results reveal an additional notable finding of a negative relationship between the absence 
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of formal board development and graduation rates.  Also, the positive relationship 
between the superintendent and board disappeared when restricted to stable boards only.       
Table 6.5 – Significant Results for OLS Regression Models Testing 
Relationship Between Individual Key Works and Dropout Rates -1 
 
All Districts Group 1 
Accountability          
Support and defend Superintendent 
until concerns arise. 
-.212** 
(.092) 
N=447 
R-Sq.=.213     
Regularly monitor and review 
Superintendent 
-.234** 
(.110) 
N=448 
R-Sq.=.212     
Collaboration and Engagement         
Listen to organized interest groups 
when appropriate. 
.197** 
(.098) 
N=447 
R-Sq.=.197     
Continuous Improvement         
Consistently engage in board 
development. 
-.139* 
(.084) 
N=444 
R-Sq.=.213     
Standards         
Set standards in response to needs 
    
.425* 
(.228) 
N=49 
R-Sq.=.478 
Collaboration and Engagement         
Superintendent as willing 
collaborator 
-.314** 
(.125) 
N=473 
R-Sq.=.163  
  Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.10 **p<.05  
Table 6.6 – Significant Results for OLS Regression Models Testing Relationship 
Between Individual Key Works and Dropout Rates - 2 
 
Group 2 Stable Boards 
Accountability          
Support and defend Superintendent 
until concerns arise. 
-.206** 
(.100) 
N=398 
R-Sq.=.215 
-.213** 
(.108) 
N=269 
R-Sq.=.238 
Regularly monitor and review 
Superintendent 
-.250** 
(.121) 
N=398 
R-Sq.=.217     
Collaboration and Engagement         
Listen to organized interest groups 
when appropriate. 
.237** 
(.107) 
N=397 
R-Sq.=.203 
.242** 
(.109) 
N=269 
R-Sq.=.217 
Continuous Improvement         
Consistently engage in board 
development.         
Standards         
Set standards in response to needs         
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Collaboration and Engagement         
Superintendent as willing 
collaborator 
-.268** 
(.136) 
 N=422 
R-Sq.=.156     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.10 **p<.05  
 Tables 6.5 and 6.6 list the results of OLS regression models for indicators of 
adherence to the Key Work of School Boards and high school dropout rates.  The results 
across groups are very similar to the results presented for the dependent variable 
graduation rates.  Among all boards support and even collaboration with the 
superintendent is related to lower dropout rates, as is engagement in continuous strategic 
planning.  Also present is the negative impact of collaboration with interest groups.   
The one confounding finding is the presence of a positive relationship between 
dropout rates and setting standards in response to student needs on Group One boards; in 
other words setting standards in response to student needs relates to higher dropout rates.  
One plausible explanation is that because Florida, Utah, and Nevada all use high stake 
testing that can result in grade retention, struggling students are discouraged and drop 
out.  Even simpler, increasing standards could drive away some students that are unable 
to meet these higher standards. So, while dropout rates go up students remaining in 
school may be better served, or at least show better aggregate results.  
The OLS regression results presented show some initial findings.  First, none of 
the indicators of the Key Works have a negative relationship with district level outcomes 
except collaboration with interest groups.  Second, two concepts appear to have a positive 
relationship with district outcomes: 
1) Planning and development; and 
2) Superintendent accountability and collaboration. 
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   Table 6.7 lists the summary statistics for an additive index variable combining 
board level responses to indicators of adherence to several Key Works.  Accountability 
and Collaboration as measured by the board’s perception of their level of collaboration 
with their superintendent, and Vision and Improvement as measured by the level of 
agreement that a board engages in frequent board development and consistently updates 
its strategic plan.  This combined variable measures the board’s focus on several Keys 
suspected of having a positive impact, 
Table 6.7 – Summary Statistics for Combined 
Positive Keys 
  N Mean  
Std. 
Deviation 
Combined Keys 470 10 2.5 
  
Table 6.8 lists the OLS regression results for four models predicting the 
dependent variable graduation rates.  In none of the models is the focal variable 
Combined Keys statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence.  However, in 
three of the four models the focal variable Interest Group Collaboration is statistically 
significant at the 95% level of confidence.  The group-to-group difference in this finding 
is of particular interest and will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.    
Table 6.8  - OLS Regression Results for the Dependent Variable Graduation Rates 
VARIABLES All Boards Group 1 Group 2 Stable Boards 
     
Combined Keys -6.25e-05 0.492 0.0257 0.105 
 (0.178) (0.539) (0.191) (0.239) 
Interest Group Collaboration -1.032* 0.0930 -0.948* -1.176* 
 (0.426) (1.164) (0.456) (0.544) 
Students -9.89e-06 1.25e-05 -0.000234 -1.60e-05 
 (1.88e-05) (1.84e-05) (0.000141) (2.48e-05) 
Pct. White 16.92** 15.43 12.51** 11.23** 
 (3.139) (8.257) (3.878) (4.323) 
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch  -38.91** -29.76** -40.09** -45.25** 
 (3.533) (10.83) (3.863) (4.611) 
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Pct. w/ IEP -1.305 0.625 2.535 -6.168 
 (8.969) (51.19) (9.432) (12.14) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio -0.441* 0.563 -0.616* -0.549 
 (0.210) (0.468) (0.251) (0.289) 
Revenue Per-Pupil 0.000283 0.000322 0.000103 -0.000261 
 (0.000302) (0.000936) (0.000344) (0.000444) 
Constant 93.25** 59.33* 102.3** 107.5** 
 (8.037) (22.59) (9.152) (10.92) 
     
Observations 440 43 397 261 
R-squared 0.522 0.667 0.469 0.517 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Table 6.9 contains regression results predicting the dependent variable Dropout 
Rate.  Here only the All Boards model shows a statistically significant relationship 
between adherence to the Combined Keys variables and lower dropout rates at the 95% 
level of significance.  In addition, the negative effect of interest group collaboration as 
projected through a relationship with higher dropout rates is present.    
Table 6.9 - OLS Regression Results for the Dependent Variable Dropout Rates 
VARIABLES All Boards Group 1 Group 2 Stable Boards 
     
Combined Keys -0.0918* -0.143 -0.0650 -0.0413 
 (0.0423) (0.108) (0.0463) (0.0501) 
Interest Group 
Collaboration 
0.229* 0.155 0.248* 0.284* 
 (0.101) (0.227) (0.110) (0.114) 
Students -4.85e-06 -1.70e-06 5.16e-05 -4.98e-06 
 (4.47e-06) (3.69e-06) (3.39e-05) (5.21e-06) 
Pct. White -0.542 -0.510 -0.216 -0.979 
 (0.751) (1.602) (0.942) (0.915) 
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch  6.549** 8.730** 6.881** 5.622** 
 (0.848) (2.111) (0.944) (0.982) 
Pct. w/ IEP -9.547** -5.244 -10.19** -7.509** 
 (2.145) (9.316) (2.307) (2.554) 
Pupil Teacher Ration 0.120* 0.270** 0.0646 0.0710 
 (0.0482) (0.0930) (0.0581) (0.0582) 
Revenue Per-Pupil -0.000141* 4.25e-06 -0.000220** -0.000171* 
 (6.92e-05) (0.000162) (7.97e-05) (8.62e-05) 
Constant 1.346 -4.132 2.395 2.318 
 (1.868) (4.550) (2.163) (2.206) 
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Observations 437 47 389 262 
R-squared 0.205 0.491 0.204 0.220 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 All of the models thus far focus on graduation rates and high school drop-out 
rates, but what about test scores?  As explained earlier the use of test scores as a 
dependent variable is problematic in a multi-state study due to the non-comparability of 
tests between states.  However, for the sake of exploratory research models were run for 
each Key Work indicator using the percentage of students scoring advanced or proficient 
on the Wisconsin Knowledge and Concepts Reading Exam as the dependent variable.  
Table 6.10 shows the lone significant finding at the 95% level of confidence was the 
negative effect of the absence of board development on Reading proficiency levels.  
Results were similar when 2008 test scores were used a control variable, meaning that at 
least in Wisconsin the absence of board development is a negative predictor of reading 
test score proficiency, as well as a negative predictor of changes in test score proficiency 
since 2008.      
 Table 6.10 – Significant Result for OLS Regression Models Testing Relationship 
Between Individual Key Works and Reading WKCE Scores 
No board development. 
-1.37* 
(.542) 
N=149 
R-Sq.=.256 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 On whole it is possible to accept the hypothesis that yes, adherence to the Key 
Work of School Boards has a generally positive impact on academic outcomes.  Of 
course, this conclusion comes with many caveats that merit further discussion. 
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 First, of all the keys only accountability, vision, and continuous improvement 
yield a generally positive effect.  There is clear evidence holding the superintendent 
accountable for performance, and planning through the use of a strategic plan and board 
development yields positive outcomes compared to boards that are less focused on these 
things.  However, the effect of collaboration is trickier. 
 Collaboration with the superintendent is a positive form of collaboration.  In 
contrast to some recommendations in the governance literature that boards should 
maintain a hands-off relationship with their CEO, close relations and collaboration 
between the superintendent and school boards in the states of interest serve a positive 
function (Carver, 2007).  However, collaboration with interest groups has a clear negative 
effect on student outcomes.  Interestingly this negative effect appears to be driven by the 
school boards in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota, as well as boards that have a 
higher level of stability.  There are many reasons to theorize why school board 
collaboration with interest groups has a negative effect on outcomes in these situations.        
 First, it is possible that interest groups dedicated to employee issues as opposed to 
student issues shift board member attention away from improving student performance.  
For example, if the primary policy issue in a district is teacher pay it is possible that 
student achievement concerns will be made secondary, if not ignored.  It is also possible 
that interest groups dedicated to lowering the property tax levy or increasing the use of 
charter schools have a similar impact of moving student achievement concerns to the 
bottom of the priority list.   
 Second, the larger number of school districts and more localized nature of district 
in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota may increase the number and scope of interest 
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groups which board members in these states have to deal with.  Simply, interest group 
collaboration may be a time-suck for hyper-localized districts dealing with hyper-
localized concerns that fall out of the scope of daily work for board members overseeing 
large districts.   
 Third, the negative effect of interest group collaboration on stable boards may be 
related to the politicization of school board elections.  The longer a board member serves, 
the more they may feel indebted to the interest groups that supported them in their most 
recent election.  If those interest groups are pushing issues unrelated to student 
achievement academic improvement may become a lower priority.   
 The theoretical explanations for the positive relationships between good 
superintendent-board relations and board development and improved outcomes fits nicely 
with the theorized black box model of school board governance in Chapter Three.  In that 
chapter school board governance is described as a series of situation dependent decisions, 
which if made correctly, positively impact district academic performance.   Not only 
must board members be in tune to what is possible, wanted, and beneficial in their local 
context, they must be high functioning with each other to enable them to even begin their 
decision making process under the correct premise.   Engaging in strategic planning is an 
easily identifiable way to determine that a school board is working to understand what it 
wants to be, thereby understanding how it might get there.  Engaging in board 
development is a clear indicator that a board is seeking to improve the way in which it 
goes about decision-making.  Together it increases the odds that a board understands 
what it wants to do and is working actively to ensure the governing processes are in place 
that allow the board to accomplish its goals.  It follows that good relations with the 
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superintendent are a positive.  The ground game of education is constantly shifting and 
some sort of connection between the man or woman making decisions influencing that 
ground game is in tune with improving the situation dependent decision-making ability of 
the school board.  
 The fact that many of the indicators of the Key Work of School Boards did not 
have a direct relationship with academic outcomes is not reason to discount the individual 
concepts or to mothball the entire document.  The fact that the only negative finding was 
a very specific type of collaboration should lead to a high degree of confidence that 
boards adhering to the best-practices presented by the NSBA are experiencing better 
outcomes than those that are not.  
 Potential future work to further these findings includes observational research of a 
sample of school board meetings testing actual adherence to these best practices by a 
neutral observer as opposed to a survey of member perceptions.  Additional work digging 
deeper into the content of specific strategic plans and better understanding of the range of 
board development processes can also further these findings.  However, the presented 
results provide good evidence that: 
1) Specific concepts highlighted by the NSBA – accountability, vision, and 
continuous improvement – are positively related to improved district level 
outcomes; and 
2) Collaboration with interest groups is generally correlated with negative district 
level academic outcomes. 
  Thus far it has been established that what board members bring to the governance 
process has a minimal direct connection to district academic outcomes but where they 
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focus their efforts does impact district academic outcomes.  The next chapter will look 
beyond the topic areas of focus for school boards in the six states to their perceptions of 
how they actually go about the governing process. 
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Chapter VII. 
School Board Group Dynamics, Zones of Discretion and Academic Outcomes 
 
 In its most romantic form a school board is the ultimate exercise in local control 
and democracy.  Citizens of communities win elections for unpaid positions to gather 
with other citizens to decide how best to educate the children in their community. 
Elections are non-partisan, so the institution is not poisoned by party politics.  The lack of 
pay ensures people view the position as public service; the desire to do good outweighs 
the desire for power.  But reality is not so romantic. 
 Sometimes board members disagree on the appropriate direction of a district; both 
sides convinced they are right.  Sometimes board members form coalitions.  Sometimes 
board members do not like each other.  Sometimes non-partisan board elections are non-
partisan in name only.   Sometimes board members have radically different 
constituencies and agendas, i.e. taxpayers versus public employees.  And more times than 
not local control is undermined by state and federal policies. 
 This chapter attempts to explain the relationship between the small group 
dynamics of publicly elected school boards and academic outcomes.  Unlike the previous 
chapter, the unit of analysis will be the individual board member rather than the board as 
a whole.  This approach, used in previous research on the small group dynamics present 
in city councils, still allows for connections to be made between board member 
perceptions and the performance of the school districts they represent, but also for the use 
of board member control variables that allow for a better isolation of the connection 
between small group dynamics and outcomes (Ihrke & Niederjohn, 2005; Nelson & 
Nollenberger, 2011). 
 Specifically this chapter tests two hypotheses: 
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1) The presence of dynamics typical to a high-functioning small group on a school 
board positively impacts district level academic outcomes; and 
2) Boards exercising larger zones of discretion have comparatively better academic 
outcomes. 
Literature Review 
 The sociologist Lewis Coser (1956) laid out a basic framework for understanding 
the positive and negative functions of social conflict in small groups.  Coser argued that 
not all conflict is bad, in fact conflict can often be a way for people to blow-off steam, 
say in an argument, without damaging the quality of work at the task at-hand.  To put in 
another way, conflict is more complicated than a good-bad dichotomy.   
  Almost fifty years after Coser Jehn (1997 & 1999) used qualitative work to 
identify three specific types of conflict; relationship, task, and process.  A school board 
can conflict over a process such as who should be the board president, a task such as 
which superintendent to hire, or over a personal relationship where two people do not get 
along.  All three of the types of conflict identified by Jehn were shown by Heidbreder et. 
al. (2011) and Ihrke & Niederjohn (2005)  to have slightly different effects on city 
councils in Michigan and Wisconsin. 
 But small group interaction is more than conflict.  Gabris (2006) identified several 
characteristics of high-functioning small groups, including sharing common goals and 
values, and getting along with the CEO or superintendent in the case of school boards.  
Small group interactions also are driven by governance structure.  How did a board 
member come to serve? For example was it through a contested election?  Or does the 
board adapt a specific governance model as identified by Gill (2002).      
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 And what about the environment in which boards operate?  What is their capacity 
to make decisions?  Michael Kirst (2009) and Jennifer Hochschild (2005) argue that 
school boards have a very small zone of discretion that limits their ability to make 
decisions that impact district academic outcomes.   
 The following sections of this chapter will explore the role of small group 
dynamics on school boards.  Unlike many non-profit boards or city councils, school 
boards have the advantage of having simple to understand intuitive indicators of the 
success of the organization they oversee: graduation rates, drop-out rates, and test sores.  
As explained in Chapter one this study accepts that the primary role of school boards is to 
maximize academic achievement.  Hence, quantitative methods are used to better 
understand the relationship between the small group dynamic perceptions of school board 
members in Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Utah, Nevada, and Florida, and district-
level academic outputs.   
Data and Results 
 School board members in the six states of interest were asked their level of 
agreement with a series of statements related to small group dynamics.  All questions 
were adapted, word-for-word whenever possible, from previous surveys of city councils 
conducted by Heidbreder et. al. (2011) and Ihrke & Niederjohn (2005).  The survey had a 
total individual board member response of rate of 23.9% (See Table 5.2).  The mean 
responses are presented in Figure 7.1; the total number of observations with valid 
responses range from 808 to 814 (Note that the 5 point Likert scale is reversed for the 
regression models so that 5 =  strong agreement and 1 = strong disagreement, for the ease 
of interpretation).    
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 To partially test the first hypothesis, using the same district level control variables 
as the previous chapter, a series of OLS regression models for all board members testing 
the relationship between graduation rates and indicators of overall, relationship, task, and 
process conflict were run.  Like in the previous chapter, the decision to run individual 
models for each small group dynamic variable was made due to high muticolinearity in 
an all-inclusive model.  The results in Table 7.1 indicate that board members perceiving 
higher levels of overall conflict and having higher levels of agreement that prior conflicts 
resurface have a significantly lower graduation rate at the 95% level of confidence.   
Table 7.1 – OLS Regression Results for the Dependent Variable Graduation Rates, 
Focal Variables Only 
Overall Conflict Coefficient N R-Squared 
High conflict -.774**(.290) 696 0.529 
0	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High cooperation .458 (.387) 697 0.525 
Relationship Conflict       
Disagreements become personalized -.127  (.301) 693 0.523 
Prior conflict resurfaces -.688* (0.308) 697 0.525 
Coalitions form along predictable lines -.466 (.280) 696 0.527 
Task       
Conflict is productive .546 (.376) 698 0.527 
Decisions are supported once made .363 (.336) 698 0.525 
Process       
The board has a clear leader .333 (.326) 695 0.526 
The clear leader is also the president .361 (.304) 697 0.525 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
These results suggest that broadly school board conflict serves a negative function 
as it relates to graduation rates.  Relationship conflict appears to be particularly 
destructive.  Table 7.2 shows the results of the same OLS models except the dependent 
variable is dropout rates, yielding only one statistically significant variable; higher 
perceptions of cooperation yield lower dropout rates.  These results too support the 
conclusion that conflict in general serves a negative function on school boards as it 
relates to impacting academic outcomes, while cooperation in general is positive.  
Table 7.2 – OLS Regression Results for the Dependent Variable Dropout Rates, 
Focal Variables Only  
Overall Conflict Coefficient N R-Squared 
High conflict .083 (.076) 555 0.306 
High cooperation -.231* (.103) 557 0.31 
Relationship Conflict       
Disagreements become personalized .123 (.079) 553 0.306 
Prior conflict resurfaces .027 (.083) 556 0.302 
Coalitions form along predictable lines .052 (.074) 555 0.306 
Task       
Conflict is productive .007 (.100) 558 0.303 
Decisions are supported once made -.122 (.089) 557 0.306 
Process       
The board has a clear leader -.003 (.088) 555 0.305 
The clear leader is also the president .083 (.080) 556 0.306 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 But what about the impacts of board member characteristics?  The same models 
were run incorporating the following series of board member control variables (See 
Chapter Five for summary statistics):   
• Board member race; 
• Board member age; 
• Board member sex; 
• Board member ideology through a dummy variable indicating identification as a 
conservative or moderate; 
• Education level as indicated by a dummy variable for being a college graduate; 
and 
• Dummy variables for employment in education or business. 
The significant results for the focal variables presented in Table 7.3 shows that 
controlling for board member backgrounds yielded very similar results as the models 
without board member controls.  Two focal variables, high conflict and the prior conflict 
resurfaces indicator of relationship conflict, are negatively related to graduation rates.  
The lack of influence of control variables is not surprising given the findings in chapter 
five on the relationship between board member backgrounds and academic outcomes.  
However, several models yielded a statistically significant relationship between board 
member employment in business or education sector and graduation rates, suggesting the 
possibility of an interaction between conflict and employment sector.           
Table 7.3 – OLS Regression Results for the Dependent Variable Graduation Rates, 
Focal Significant Variables Only (with Board Member Controls) 
Overall Conflict Coefficient N R-Squared 
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High conflict -.886**(.309) 639 .534 
Relationship Conflict       
Prior conflict resurfaces -.886**(.327) 640 .533 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 There are logical theoretical reasons to suspect that experience in the business or 
education sector may interact with board conflict.  Traditionally businessmen were 
viewed as the ideal school board members given boards’ perceived role as the guarantor 
of public monies and the desire for public entities be run more like private business 
(Ashby, 1967; Ostrom, 2007; Goodsell, 2003; Stillman, 1990).  It is possible that board 
members with business backgrounds (25.4% of survey respondents) and members with 
education backgrounds (15.84% of survey respondents) see the functions of the school 
board in different ways.  Indeed, when comparing rankings of priorities for board 
members those employed in the business sector rank monitoring district finances at a 
higher level (3.19 out of 10) than those with an education background (3.51 out of 10).   
Conversely those employed in education rank the setting of academic standards at a 
higher rate (3.30 out of 10) than members employed in business (3.90 out of 10).  It is 
easy to see how these differences in priorities interact with perceptions of conflict and 
cooperation.  In addition, the significant findings regarding relationship conflict give 
reason to suspect that long-serving board members, by virtue of having had more time to 
form relationship conflicts, may also present an interaction effect. 
 Table 7.4 contains the results of two OLS models predicting graduation rates with 
several interaction terms.  In Model One, the interaction term for high levels of 
cooperation and being employed in the business sector is statically significant at the 90% 
level of confidence (falling just short of the 95% threshold with a P-value of .056).  
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Meaning, the effect on graduation rates of having a higher level of cooperation for 
businessmen is actually negative (.267 - .380 = -.113).  This is a somewhat confounding 
finding, but perhaps an indicator that cooperation among businessmen may fit along the 
historical school board literature as a sign of favoring fiscal health over academic 
outcomes (Ashby, 1967).  The interaction term for high cooperation and working in the 
education sector is not statistically significant.   
 The results of Model Two presented in Table 7.4 indicate the interaction between 
having served as a board member for five or more years with higher levels of agreement 
that disagreements become personalized is statistically significant at the 95% level of 
confidence.  Meaning, the effect on graduation grates of having a higher level of 
agreement that disagreements on your board often become personalized is negative for 
long-serving board members  (.823 – 1.945 = -1.122).  This finding is less confounding; 
it is logical that the detrimental effects of relationship conflict on district outcomes 
intensify the longer time period a board member has to experience personalized conflict.     
Table 7.4 - OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
Graduation Rates with Interaction Terms 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
 
   
High Cooperation 0.267  
 (0.455)  
Conservative/Moderate Dummy -1.177 -1.138 
 (0.915) (0.886) 
Business Sector 2.289* 0.551 
 (1.323) (0.912) 
Education Sector 0.601 -0.392 
 (1.734) (1.118) 
Minority Member 0.319 0.124 
 (2.059) (1.947) 
College Grad Dummy 0.921 0.369 
 (0.908) (0.874) 
High Cooperation-Education -0.282  
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Sector Interaction 
 (0.339)  
High Cooperation-Business Sector 
Interaction 
-0.380*  
 (0.216)  
Students -0.000208** -1.64e-05 
 (8.84e-05) (1.90e-05) 
Pct. White 7.150** 14.50*** 
 (3.370) (2.938) 
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch -37.74*** -36.90*** 
 (3.386) (3.262) 
Pct. w/ IEP -10.57 -13.32* 
 (8.228) (7.904) 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio -0.484** -0.286 
 (0.214) (0.190) 
Revenue Per-Pupil -0.000129 0.000120 
 (0.000299) (0.000278) 
Sex -0.986 -0.728 
 (0.843) (0.808) 
Age -0.00511 -0.0370 
 (0.0482) (0.0474) 
Disagreements Become 
Personalized 
 0.823** 
  (0.376) 
Served for 5 of More Years  4.723*** 
  (1.100) 
Personalized Disagreements-
Served for 5 Years Interaction 
 -1.945*** 
  (0.488) 
Constant 106.7*** 93.86*** 
 (8.444) (7.824) 
   
Observations 437 469 
R-squared 0.489 0.552 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 In general the models including interaction terms lend support to the idea that 
conflict and cooperation affect boards differently depending on their unique make-up.  
Certainly, the potential for relationship conflict to increase its detrimental effects on 
graduation rates the longer it festers is supported.       
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 As stated numerous times the absence of comparable test score data makes good 
comparisons of test score achievement across states impossible.  However a crude 
measure of test scores achievement across states was developed to at the very least see if 
the negative relationship between relationship conflict and attainment and drop-out rates 
appears in test scores.  Using the state level tests explained in chapter four a dummy 
variable indicating whether the percentage of district students deemed proficient on the 
state reading test increased between 2008 and 2012 was created. 386 of the board 
members surveyed in 2013 represented districts that experienced gains on their official 
state reading tests, while 223 represented districts that experienced reading test score 
declines.      
 The results presented in Table 7.5 must be taken with a huge grain of salt, 
however they do supplement the previous results showing a connection between 
relationship conflict as indicated by agreeing that coalitions form along predictable lines 
and the odds of having experienced gains in district level reading proficiency between 
2008 and 2012.     
Table 7.5 - Logistic Regression Results for the Dependent Variable Reading Gains, 
Significant Focal Variable Only 
 Relationship Conflict Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio N 
Coalitions form along predictable lines -145 (.074)* 0.865 651 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Thus far this chapter has focused on small group dynamics through the prism of 
conflict and cooperation rather than board structure.   Table 7.6 shows the results of focal 
variables for six OLS regression models testing the relationship between board structural 
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variables and academic outcomes (Note all models included district control variables).  
The three structural categorical variables are: 
1) Stability – Has the board member served for five or more years (686 of 1,143 
members have)?; 
2) Opposed in the most recent election (712 of 1,116 respondents were)?; and    
3) Shared politics – Does the board member at least somewhat agree that they share 
political beliefs with their fellow board members (835 of 1,43 respondents 
agreed)? 
Table 7.6 – OLS Regression Results for Structural Variables, Focal Variables Only 
Dependent Variable: Grad Rate Coefficient N R-Squared 
Stable Board -.207 (.245) 668 0.535 
Opposed Election .739 (.603) 956 0.527 
Shared Politics -272 (.648) 974 0.524 
Dependent Variable: Dropout Rate       
Stable Board .057 (.065) 534 0.309 
Opposed Election -.243 (.218) 765 0.254 
Shared Politics -.515* (.238) 778 0.264 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Overall these structural variables had little impact on district outcomes, the 
notable exception being the positive impact of shared politics on dropout rates.  Agreeing 
that you shared politics with most of your fellow board members lowered the dropout rate 
by over half a percentage point.   
 Another structural characteristic of school boards potentially influencing 
academic outcomes is their governance model.  Unfortunately there is little widespread 
agreement on best how to measure or characterize board governance models.  After 
several attempts to operationalize the characteristics of certain models into a governance 
model scale the decision was made to simply to use the descriptions of several 
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governance models offered by Mel Gill (2002).  Specifically board members were asked 
to identify which description best describes their board.  
 The responses, listed in Table 7.7, indicate that the overwhelming majority of 
boards say they are using the policy or management model of governance (responses 
were randomized in the survey design).  Whether or not boards are actually formally 
adopting one of these models of governance is a separate issue.  For example, though 
54% of respondents chose the Policy Model description as the best description for their 
board, follow-up research suggests only a small handful of boards actually adopted the 
Policy Model of governance as described by Carver (2006).  
Table 7.7 – Board Response to Governance Model Survey Question 
  Pct. N 
Traditional: The board governs and oversees operations through 
committees established along functional lines (finance, human 
resources, programs) but delegates the management functions to the 
superintendent  3.39 27 
Operational: The board manages, governs and performs the work 
of the organization.  3.02 24 
Policy Model: The board governs through policies that establish 
organizational aims (ends), governance approaches, and 
management limitations. These policies also should define the 
relationship of the board with the superintendent.  The 
superintendent broad freedom to determine the means that will be 
used to achieve organizational aims.  54.15 431 
Management: The board manages operations through functional 
committees that may or may not have a staff coordinator.  39.45 314  
Note: Bolded text not included in survey item. 
 With that caution in mind, OLS regression models using the descriptions of 
governance models as the independent variable (with operational model as the reference 
category) and graduation rates and dropout rates as the dependent variables were tested.  
The results, shown in Table 7.8, reveal that the only significant effect among focal 
variables was in Model Two, with boards using the policy model of board governance as 
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described by Mel Gill (2002) having a negative relationship with dropout rates.  Agreeing 
with the policy model description lowers the dropout rate in the district the board member 
represents by over half a percentage point.    
 Table 7.8 - OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Graduation 
Rates 
 Variables 
Model 1 
Graduation Rate 
Model 2 
Dropout Rate 
      
Policy Model 0.597 -0.533* 
  (0.678) (0.244) 
      
Management Model -0.0155 -0.224 
  (0.743) (0.272) 
      
Traditional Model 1.671 0.0440 
  (1.909) (0.761) 
      
Students -0.0000249* -0.0000121** 
  (0.0000122) (0.00000397) 
      
Pct. White 12.37*** -3.678*** 
  (2.083) (0.723) 
      
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch -39.55*** 8.051*** 
  (2.294) (0.857) 
      
Pct. w/ IEP -6.017 -12.21*** 
  (5.703) (2.093) 
      
Pupil/Teacher Ratio -0.384** 0.311*** 
  (0.132) (0.0461) 
      
Revenue Per-Pupil 0.000400* 0.00000723 
  (0.000189) (0.0000700) 
      
Constant 92.40*** -1.273 
  (5.009) (1.801) 
      
Observations 974 778 
R-Squared 0.520 0.255 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 This finding should not suggest that adaptation of the formal Carver model of 
board governance should be expected to lower drop-out rates, as mentioned very few 
boards in the six states of interest actually formally adopt the Carvel model.  However, it 
does suggest that board use of policies to define goals has a positive impact on outcomes.  
This finding is line with previous results in Chapter Six showing the connection between 
board vision and academic outcomes.  
 The presented results give no reason to reject the hypothesis that the dynamics 
typical to a high-functioning small group on a school board positively impact district 
level academic success.  The evidence is strong that minimizing overall conflict, 
encouraging cooperation, minimizing relationship conflict, and sharing political views 
with fellow board members had a general positive impact on district level academic 
outcomes.  However, these effects are influenced in part by the professional experience 
of board members who serve, and the length of time in which board members serve.            
 But what about board members capacity to make decisions?  What about their 
zones of discretion?  In Table 2.4 basic state-to-state differences in board member levels 
of discretion in different policy areas are presented.  Understanding these differences is 
important, but simply comparing achievement outcomes across the states and drawing 
connections between their levels of discretion in certain policy areas and those outcomes 
is unlikely to pick up the level of micro-and-macro restrictions that boards face.  For 
example two boards in the same state policy environment might have different local 
policies, some enacted by a prior board, that restrict their capacity to make decisions.  
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Instead, the impact of zones of discretion exercised by school board members is tested by 
modeling for the effects of going above what is required by state policy in the areas listed 
in Figure 7.2.  The tested hypothesis is: 
Boards exercising larger zones of discretion have better academic outcomes. 
 
       Figure 7.2 shows the board level average scores on a five point Likert scale 
asking board members to state their level of agreement that their board went beyond state 
requirements when setting academic standards, student assessment policies, behavior 
policies, and fiscal policies.  In other words, the higher their score the more they agreed 
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they were exercising discretion in key policy areas.  The lower the scores, the more likely 
they were to be simply following policies required under state law. 
 The board-level responses to each of these four survey items were added together 
to create a single variable indicating that boards in general exercise a high-level of 
discretion in key policy areas.  The summary statistics for that variable can be seen in 
Table 7.9.  In addition, a high discretion variable was created in the data set containing all 
board members with valid survey responses.  This allows for additional analyses with 
board member control variables and interaction terms.   
Table 7.9 - Summary Statistics for Additive Discretion 
Scale 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Board Level  463 12.98 3.56 4 20 
Individual Level 744 13.00 3.91 4 20 
 
 OLS regression model with the dependent variables graduation rates and dropout 
rates with school district control variables showed no significant relationship between the 
board-level variable for high discretion and outcomes.  However, shifting to the school 
board member unit of analysis revealed an interesting interaction term between high 
discretion and being employed in the business sector.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
there are reasonable reasons to suspect that board members employed in the business or 
education sector have unique roles in board governance.  Table 7.10 shows the results of 
an OLS regression model predicting the dependent variable dropout rate; in the model the 
interaction between the high discretion variable and business sector dummy variable is 
statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence.   
Table 7.10 - OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
Dropout Rate with Interaction Terms 
VARIABLES High School Dropout Rate 
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High Discretion -0.0360 
 (0.0440) 
Students -2.01e-06 
 (5.57e-06) 
Pct. White -0.160 
 (0.930) 
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch 9.751*** 
 (1.149) 
Pct. w/ IEP -12.47*** 
 (2.773) 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 0.250*** 
 (0.0629) 
Revenue Per-Pupil -6.45e-05 
 (9.12e-05) 
Conservative/Moderate Dummy -0.847*** 
 (0.301) 
Business Sector -2.075** 
 (1.051) 
Education Sector -0.325 
 (0.376) 
Minority Member -0.666 
 (0.587) 
College Grad Dummy 0.147 
 (0.301) 
Age -0.00479 
 (0.0159) 
Sex 0.368 
 (0.280) 
High Discretion-Business 
Background Interaction 
0.154** 
 (0.0773) 
  
Constant -2.373 
 (2.636) 
  
Observations 340 
R-squared 0.326 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Specifically, being employed in the business sector has a negative effect on the 
relationship between exercising a high zone of discretion and dropout rate (-.0360 + .154 
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= .118); a businessman exercising a higher zone of discretion raises dropout rates 
compared to non-businessmen exercising a large zone of discretion.   There are several 
plausible reasons to explain this finding; businessmen may be more active in fiscal 
policies and hence paying less attention to academic policies, or businessmen might be 
very active in setting strong behavior policies, which may drive disruptive students to 
drop out.  Regardless, it is clear that businessmen exercising high levels of discretion 
have a slightly different effect on dropout rates than non-businessmen.     
Two additional models testing the relationship between high board level 
discretion and test score proficiency on the Wisconsin state tests did find a significant 
relationship between boards exercising higher levels of discretion and the percentage of 
students scoring at least proficient on Wisconsin’s state math test.  The results, presented 
in Table 7.10, are a very specific case.  But they do suggest, at least in Wisconsin, that 
school boards going beyond what is required in state law in setting key policies has a 
positive effect on test sores that is not seen in high school graduation or dropout rates.   
Table 7.11 – OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
Graduation Rates, Wisconsin Only 
VARIABLES Pct. Proficient 
Math 2012 
Pct. Proficient 
Reading 2012 
   
High Discretion 0.314*** 0.155 
 (0.0825) (0.199) 
2008 Math Proficiency 0.622***  
 (0.0654)  
Students -1.40e-05 5.57e-05 
 (9.83e-05) (0.000235) 
Pct. White 2.689 -5.429 
 (4.395) (10.40) 
Pct. Free/Reduced Lunch -11.08** -9.185 
 (3.849) (8.869) 
Pct. IEP 18.02 8.536 
 (9.344) (22.70) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio -0.135 -0.242 
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 (0.185) (0.451) 
Revenue Per-Pupil 5.88e-05 0.000337 
 (0.000226) (0.000540) 
2008 Reading Proficiency  0.844*** 
  (0.208) 
Constant 28.79** 15.56 
 (8.793) (26.33) 
   
Observations 139 139 
R-squared 0.764 0.299 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 Overall there is insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that school boards 
or individual board members exercising high zones of discretion in key policy areas are 
positively impacting academic outcomes.  Though the Wisconsin specific results cannot 
be used to make conclusions beyond Wisconsin, as more states move towards a common 
comparable testing framework the possible connection between high exercising of 
discretion and math scores should be explored.   In addition the effects of business sector 
employees on school board governance is worthy of future research.        
Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter tested two hypotheses and found compelling support for one; that the 
districts overseen by school board members with positive group dynamic attributes are 
higher performing than those without such attributes.  This finding has several 
implications. 
 First, school boards should work to minimize conflict and maximize cooperation.  
Though this recommendation is somewhat obvious, the direct connection between high-
conflict and lowered graduation rates can cast the connection in a new light.  Not only 
should conflict be reduced because it may create an unpleasant work environment, it may 
also be hurting a school district academically.   The negative effects of relationship 
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conflict in particular fit into the framework of the black box model of school board 
governance.  The task of making good situation dependent decisions is made more 
difficult if not impossible when a board is dominated by personal conflict.  The finding 
that the negative effects of relationship conflict are enhanced when board members serve 
for long periods of time suggest that periodic turnover on boards, whether voluntary or 
enforced through term-limits, may have a positive impact on district outcomes.          
 The relationship between board members’ use of the policy model of governance 
and lower dropout rates lends further support to the findings in the previous chapter that 
board planning and vision are linked to enhanced outcomes.  Simply, when boards have 
an idea of what they want to be, when they are cohesive, their districts have better 
outcomes.   
The failure to find compelling support for the second hypothesis - that boards 
going beyond state requirements do not have improved outcomes - is still a substantively 
interesting finding.  Boards should not expect to make better policy decision simply 
because they are making more policy decisions.  Indeed, in some situations the policy 
dictated by the state may in fact be the best medicine for the district.  Consistently going 
beyond state requirements in key policy areas may also lead to incoherent policies that 
change frequently over time.  Though measuring frequent changes in policy over time is 
beyond the scope of the single-point survey used in this analysis, archival research on the 
policy coherence of school boards over time may be a useful future endeavor.   
Perhaps the most relevant question stemming from the findings of this chapter is 
how?  How can boards reduce conflict, particularly relationship conflict?  How can 
boards be encouraged to have a coherent vision?  How can boards find the right balance 
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between the quantity and quality of decisions in important policy areas?  There are formal 
and informal answers to these questions. 
Informally school board members can be aware of the presence of conflict on 
their board.  A more formal approach is for board members to take a planning retreat, or 
dedicate a closed session every few months to the mitigation of board conflict.  A 
statutory approach is for the legislature to proscribe that boards overseeing consistently 
low achieving districts be subject to a governance intervention where the board engages 
in a period of self-study with a governance consultant, or the more extreme action of 
forced term-limits.  States could also build in use-or-lose-it funding for boards to spend 
on board development or strategic planning.  Though in a period of tight state budgets 
such an approach is likely to face opposition, the potential pay-off in terms of improved 
district academic performance may actually make it preferable to other costly academic 
interventions yielding similar if not less-impressive academic gains.   
It is more difficult to prescribe specific ways for boards to balance between high-
action and actual high-productivity.  The best approach to ensuring that the exercise of 
discretion yields academic gains is through the use of board development and strategic 
planning so the creation of policies that go beyond state requirements are made with 
measurable goals in mind.  In other words, a new academic standard is not considered a 
governance end, but rather a tool to meet a measurable goal, such as test score 
improvement, prior to the implementation of the policy.  Therefore, it will be easy to 
identify if a policy had or did not have its intended affect.        
Further discussion of the implications of the findings in this chapter and those that 
preceded it will be presented in the concluding remarks in chapter nine.  However it is 
 156 
 
becoming clear by this point that public school board governance is linked to measures of 
academic outcomes in meaningful ways in Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Utah, 
Nevada, and Florida.  Thought subtle differences between these groups of different states 
do reflect the localized nature of school board governance, the many common findings 
support the notion that governance is important in influencing academic achievement in 
in very different contexts.   But first, I will take a brief look at a very different type of 
school board member; one representing a non-profit non-district charter school. 
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Chapter VIII. 
Characteristics of a Sample of Non-Profit Charter School Boards 
 
 What is a charter school?  Ask 100 people this question and it would not be 
surprising to get 100 different answers.  Nor would it be unreasonable.  According to the 
National Alliance for Public School Charter Schools, a national advocacy group, 42 U.S. 
states have a charter law.  However these laws differ dramatically by, and even within, 
states (Renzulli & Roscigno, 2005).  For example, the stat of Wisconsin has three distinct 
types of charter schools: 
1) Instrumentality charter schools authorized by public school boards and staffed by 
school district employees; 
2)  Non-instrumentality charter schools authorized by public school boards and 
staffed by non-district (and usually non-unionized) employees; and 
3) Non-instrumentality independent charter schools authorized by the City of 
Milwaukee, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and the University of 
Wisconsin-Parkside. 
The general concept behind charter schools, however, is common across different 
states and types (Mintrom, 1997).  The basic idea is that charter schools are public 
schools that are given a degree of freedom from school district and sometimes state 
policies in exchange for meeting performance targets spelled out in a contract between 
the school and the authorizing entity, be it a school board or not.  Charter schools often 
develop their own curriculum, engage in their own budgeting, and hire and fire their own 
staff.  Though there is intense political and research debate on whether charter schools in 
general actually fulfill their promise of increased outcomes in return for increased 
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autonomy, the basic goals and concepts underlying the charter school movement are clear 
(Witte et. al, 2007; Hoxby et. al., 2009). 
 Most research on charter school governance refers to the macro idea of shifting 
the oversight of public schools away from traditional public school boards and towards 
independent authorizers (Hall & Lake, 2006).  This strain of research leaves a huge gap 
in understanding the micro-governance of charter schools.  Consider again the case of 
Milwaukee.  The City of Milwaukee common council authorizes several schools, and 
much attention is paid to the way in which that board chooses which non-profits to enter 
into chartering contracts with.  But what about the non-profits to which contracts are 
given?  They too have boards, but are generally not in current popular discussion of 
education governance.   
 This chapter, using limited evidence, seeks to open a new-line of scholarly inquiry 
on the way in which non-profit charter school boards oversee this unique subset of public 
schools.  Though some of the non-profit literature on board governance can be applied to 
the case of charter schools, they are unique enough to warrant a sub-field in the area of 
non-profit board governance (Houle, 1989; Carver, 2006; Cornforth, 2003).   
 First, non-profit charter school boards not only are reliant on government revenue, 
but are defined specifically as public institutions in both the public discourse and state 
statutes (Merrifield, 2013).  This unique tension puts charter schools in an undefined 
space between private and public.  It follows that there is intense political debate over 
whether or not charter schools are indeed public institution, despite their officially 
defined status.  While many non-profits are forced to defend their productivity with 
public dollars they rarely are expected to have to defend their status as public entities; in 
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fact one would suspect many non-profits would actively resist being defined as public 
entities. 
 Second, non-profit charter schools engage in forum shopping in a way that 
parallels non-profit grant seeking behavior, but fundamentally differs from it.  Most non-
profits obtain funding from either selling a service, applying for foundation and 
government support, or some combination of both (Seltzer, 2001).  Non-profit charter 
schools may do these same things, but the bulk of their funding comes from government 
payments which the schools only become eligible for if they find an entity willing to 
authorize them.  Where most non-profits might submit grant applications to several 
foundations, a non-profit charter school submits applications to several charter 
authorizing bodies.  In other words the connection between government and the non-
profit charter school is always mitigated through a middleman.   
 Third, it is very difficult if not impossible for non-profit charter schools to change 
their mission.  They may modify it terms of the types of students they want to serve, but 
their basic mission will always be the education of students.   At least in theory, a school 
struggling at this mission will lose its charter, thereby ceasing to be a non-profit charter 
school. So, any significant change in mission equates to no longer being a charter school.  
 Originally, I planned to compare the relationship between governance and 
academic outcomes on non-profit charter school boards and traditional public school 
boards.  However, a low-survey response rate (just under eight percent of the 400 board 
members surveyed responded compared to 24% of public school board members) forced 
a shift in the research question.  Instead of comparing the relationship between 
governance and outcomes on non-profit charter boards, I attempt to answer: Who serves 
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on non-profit charter school boards in Wisconsin and Michigan, what are their beliefs, 
and what do the descriptive statistics say about their status as “public” entities?  
Background 
 Charter school board members in the states of Michigan and Wisconsin were 
chosen for this analysis due to the sizable number of non-district non-profit charter 
schools in these states.  As can bee seen in Table 8.1, in 2012 Wisconsin had 18 non-
district independent charter schools in operation while Michigan had 206.  Under 
Wisconsin law independent charter schools may only be authorized by the University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, the City of Milwaukee, the University of Wisconsin-Parkside, or 
the Milwaukee Area Technical College (Merrifield, 2013).  However, the University of 
Wisconsin-Parkside may only authorize a single school in Racine, and the Milwaukee 
Area Technical College has never acted upon its chartering authority.  In Michigan 
universities and community colleges may authorize independent charter schools.  
Currently 11 institutions are authorizing 206 schools.   
Table 8.1: Non-District Charter School Characteristics, 2012 
 Wisconsin  Michigan 
Non-district charter schools 18  206 
Active charter school 
authorizers 
3 11 
Funding source Dedicated appropriation State education funding 
formula 
Unionized No School-by-school basis 
Teachers Licensed by the state Licensed and deemed 
“highly effective” under No 
Child Left Behind law.  
College faculty may teach 
without licensure 
Funding level $7,775 per-pupil Variable 
Location Milwaukee and Racine Statewide 
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 Though there are variations in some of the structural characteristics of 
independent charter schools in both states, both share the common characteristic of being 
overseen by a board.  Surveys were sent to the universe of independent school board 
members in theses state, but as mentioned less than eight percent were returned.  
Accordingly the following sections should be understood as an exploratory review of 
descriptive statistics rather than a representative sample of charter school board members 
in Michigan and Wisconsin. 
Who Were the Survey Respondents? 
 The descriptive statistics in Tables 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 detail the characteristics of 
survey respondents.  A strong majority were male and White.  Very few identified as 
liberals, like public school board respondents charter board respondents were generally 
conservative or moderate.  Not surprisingly given the independent charter school board 
members are chosen rather then elected, only three had held elected office prior to their 
term on the board.  The average age was 58, and the length of service was varied.  
Overall charter survey respondents looked very similar to public school board 
respondents: White males in their 50s who identify as conservative or moderate.         
Table 8.2 – Characteristics of Charter Survey 
Respondents 
Sex N Pct. 
Male 19 73.1 
Female 7 26.9 
Race N Pct. 
White 21 77.8 
African-American 5 18.5 
Prefer Not to Say 1 3.7 
Ideology N Pct. 
Liberal 4 14.8 
Conservative 8 29.6 
Moderate 13 48.2 
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Non-Partisan 2 7.4 
Held Political Office 
Before N Pct. 
Yes 3 11.5 
No 23 88.5 
Length of Service N Pct. 
0-2 Years 6 22.2 
3-4 Years 8 29.6 
5-6 Years 6 22.2 
More than 6 Years 7 25.9 
 
Table 8.3 – Mean Age of Survey 
Respondents 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
24 58 11.8 
 
 Also like public school board respondents, many charter school board member 
respondents were employed in the education and business sector, and highly educated.  
The sheer number of respondents with advanced degrees does raise some concern.  It is 
possible that charter school board members in general are highly educated.  However, it 
also could be a sign of response bias.  While public school board members may have felt 
compelled to answer the survey because of their commitment to public service (a 
sentiment communicated to the author via e-mail by several respondents), charter board 
members may have been disproportionately compelled out of sympathy for a student 
seeking an advanced degree.   This possibility is further supported by the way in which 
board members viewed their interactions with the public.      
 Table 8.4 – Backgrounds of Survey Respondents 
Job Type     
Education 8 40 
Business 5 25 
Labor 1 5 
Professional (Law, Medicine, 4 20 
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etc.) 
Nonprofit 1 5 
Other 1 5 
Education Level     
Some College 1 4.6 
Bachelor’s Degree 3 13.6 
Advanced Degree 18 81.8 
 
What are the Governance Priorities of Survey Respondents? 
 As can be seen in Table 8.5, charter school board member respondents ranked 
interacting with the public as a very low-priority compared to other tasks.  In comparison 
public school board respondents ranked interactions with the public considerably higher, 
6.4 out of 10.  The highest priority was placed on the setting of academic standards, and 
strategic planning.   
Table 8.5 – How Do You Rank Priorities on a Scale of 1-
10? (Selected Answers Only) 
   N  Mean Std. Dev. 
Strategic Planning 18 2.6 1.8 
Academic Standards 18 2.7 2 
Interacting With 
Public 18 8.9 1.2 
 
 The priority ranking of charter board member respondents suggest a high internal 
focus on these boards.  This is not necessarily a bad thing.  Being freed from external 
pressures may enable greater focus on academic achievement.  Perhaps more telling 
when asked if all board members shared a common definition of accountability 100% of 
respondents said yes.  The results in Table 8.6 also suggest a high internal focus.  Though 
board members agree that they listen to the ideas of the community, they disagree that 
community members or interest groups have significant influence over board decisions.  
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Boards also seem to be stable, with strong engagement in both frequent and consistent 
board development. 
  
Table 8.6 – Charter Board Member Agreement with Statements where 1 = Strong 
Disagreement and 5 = Strong Agreement 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
Engage in Consistent Board Development 21 4 1.2 
Collaboration with Interest Groups 17 2.1 1 
Community Member Have Significant 
Influence 19 2.2 0.9 
Our Board Listens to the Ideas of the 
Community 20 3.4 1.2 
Our Board Engage in Frequent Board 
Development 20 3.5 1.3 
Our Board has had Very Little Turnover in the 
Past Five Years 19 3.4 1.1 
 
What are the Governance Behaviors of Survey Respondents? 
 Table 8.7 lists board member responses to a series of statements with which board 
members were asked to state their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale.  Most 
striking is the complete absence of conflict.  Respondents believe their boards are 
productive, cohesive, and highly cooperative.  These responses differ greatly from the 
much larger public school board member sample, begging the question, are the 
differences from the small sample, or is their something inherently insular and different 
about non-profit charter school boards?  
Table 8.7 – Charter Board Member Agreement with Board Descriptions 
where 1 = Strong Disagreement and 5 = Strong Agreement 
   N Mean  Std. Dev. 
High Conflict 22 0.7 1.2 
High Cooperation 22 3.6 0.7 
Conflict is Productive 22 2.9 1.1 
Disagreements Become Personalized 22 0.5 0.7 
Coalitions form Among Predictable 22 0.5 0.6 
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Lines 
Prior Conflicts Resurface 22 0.9 1.2 
Board has a Clear Leader 22 3.4 0.7 
Board is Productive 22 3.4 0.7 
Decisions are Supported Once Made 22 3.4 0.7 
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
 As discussed the low-sample size makes any definitive conclusions, much less the 
deployment of any meaningful quantitative analysis, impossible.  However, the limited 
evidence does give good reason to suspect that though non-profit charter school may be 
public by definition, their boards are far from public entities.  There are obvious 
differences including the absence of electoral accountability and the protection of charter 
school boards from open-records laws.  But the way in which these differences manifest 
in governance – high internal focus, low conflict, high levels of agreement, limited 
engagement with the public – warrants further study. 
 The obvious problem with the high internal focus is that significant amounts of 
public money, and the provision of a public good by entities accepted to be public bodies, 
is being overseen by boards that are far from public.  While unelected special purpose 
public boards are commonplace, an unelected non-profit board is shielded from both 
electoral accountability and some of the accountability provided by public oversight.  
However charter boards are not completely free of monitoring.  State agencies like the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction do keep close tabs on schools’ finances and 
use bureaucratic authority to watch and sanction deficient schools.   
I should note these critiques of charter school boards are not original; high profile 
academics such as education historian Diane Ravitch vocally question the public 
accountability of the charter school model.  But the clearness in which some of the 
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critiques of the charter school model are supported in even limited survey results (as well 
as the comparatively low-response rate itself) support the need for further study of the 
role of non-profit school boards in the charter school accountability framework. 
 The greater potential weakness of the non-profit charter school board model is 
that the benefit of good governance on academic outcomes identified in previous chapters 
may be inaccessible to highly cohesive insular boards.  The black box model of school 
board governance presented in Chapter Two argues that the situation dependent decisions 
crucial to governance success in the hyper-localized context of education requires the 
ability to understand the context in which a board is operating.  An insular board, public 
or non-profit, is likely lacking this context.  If insularity is a structural characteristic of 
non-profit charter boards, it may become a real obstacle to improving charter school 
academic outcomes.  As more national charter school operators export their academic 
models to other states there lies a genuine risk that the charter model itself will be undone 
by stubborn adherence to a one best way line of thinking (Stillman, 1990; Hall & Lake, 
2011). 
 The main conclusion from this chapter is that the micro-governance of non-profit 
charter schools deserves higher-scrutiny by the academic community.  The limited survey 
results presented give good reason to suspect fundamental differences between the 
governance behavior of non-profit charter school board members and public school board 
members exist. Additional research is needed to find out exactly how these differences 
limit or enhance the potential of the charter school model to yield strong academic 
outcomes.   
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Chapter IX. 
The Problem of the American School Board Revisited 
 
 The first chapter of this piece is titled The Problem of the American School 
Board.  The problem of the American school board is more about perception than reality.  
No doubt there are school boards that do a poor job, but that is not, as some have 
claimed, reason to scrap the institution as a whole.  The connections between governance 
and district academic performance identified and explored in the preceding chapters gives 
no reason to support the notion that democratically elected school boards are 
fundamentally flawed.  The common finding across the groups in the comparative case-
study design reveals the school board to be a flexible institution capable of effectiveness 
in very different situations precisely because there is no one best way to improve 
academic outcomes. 
 In this concluding chapter the problem posed in chapter one; that there is no 
consensus about what school boards should be doing, will be addressed.  In addition the 
key findings of this dissertation will be reviewed, the many remaining unknowns will be 
addressed, and topics for future study on school board governance will be proposed.     
What Should School Boards Be Doing?   
 A simple yet accurate answer to the question posed in the subsection title is that 
school boards should be governing.  The black box model of school board governance 
described in chapter two serves as a theoretical guide for how board governance can 
impact academic outcomes.  Accepting that there is no one best way to govern a school 
district and that in fact the key to educational success is making the right decision in the 
right way at the right time provides space for the unique role of democratically elected 
school boards in the broader field of education reform.  No single canned set of education 
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reform strategies should be expected to raise academic outcomes in every situation; the 
long unsatisfying track record of well-intentioned education reform efforts bears out this 
reality. 
 The democratically elected school board provides a tried and true model for 
improving school district success.   It is true that some of the historical functions of 
school boards, such as fiscal oversight and human relations, have become less important 
over time.  However, school boards did for years serve these important functions because 
they were considered primarily a local concern, and the public understood that an elected 
board of flexible public servants was well positioned to oversee these functions in an 
accountable and acceptable manner.  As increased unionization reduced board control of 
human resources, and as state and federal funding and revenue caps were enacted, it is 
only logical that boards shifted their focus.   
 The presented findings provide further evidence that school boards can and do 
impact district academic outcomes through their governance behaviors.  Districts that 
show a commitment to board development and strategic planning, exercise close relations 
with the superintendent, minimize conflict and maximize cooperation, and minimize 
relationship conflict in particular oversee districts with higher graduation rates and lower 
dropout rates. And these attributes, at-least in Wisconsin, also have a positive effect on 
test score proficiency in certain subject areas.   
 The comparative case study design lends further heft to these finding despite it 
being a case study.  The education environment faced by school boards in Utah, Florida, 
Nevada, and Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, are vastly different.  Yet, the common 
positive impacts of minimizing conflict, focusing on vision and continuous improvement 
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through policy-setting and strategic planning, and good superintendent-board relations 
hold true across the groups of states.  Notably, the negative relationship between interest 
group collaboration and academic outcomes is isolated to boards in Michigan, Minnesota, 
and Wisconsin.  This too suggests that state policy environments play a role in the 
governance-outcomes relationship.   
 But there is also much more to be discovered about school board governance and 
school district outcomes.  In particular the relationship between governance and test score 
performance identified to a mild degree here and in other recent work demands more 
attention (Grissom, 2012).  The relationship between board governance and academics is 
complex and continued improvement in the quality and comparability of standardized 
tests scores will enable future research to dig deeper into that complexity.  For example, 
does board governance influence performance in certain areas i.e. math or reading, more 
than others?      
 The clear presence of interaction effects for board members with different 
professional backgrounds and lengths of service on school boards also reveals a complex 
relationship between certain types of board members and the impact of small group 
behavior.  Better understanding how different personality types mitigate or increase the 
negative effects of conflict or positive effects of planning can better inform sitting board 
members of how best to govern for results in their specific governance context.  
 The next steps in school board governance research should focus on the collection 
of longitudinal school board data comparable to the snapshot data used in this study and 
further individual board case studies similar to those conducted by the Iowa Lighthouse 
Inquiry in order to gain a better understanding of how manipulations to school board 
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governance changes academic outcomes over time.  Understanding the role of school 
board governance in explaining variation in district level performance is necessary and 
practical for boards looking to improve outcomes.  But more specific understanding of 
changes over time could go one step further and enable the creation of hyper-specific 
roadmaps for districts looking to improve outcomes through governance reform.  
 Finally, more needs to be known about non-profit charter school boards.  The 
limited data obtained give good reason to suspect that they are very distinct creatures 
compared to public school boards.  As charter reform efforts increase in number, a better 
understanding of what is gained, or lost, through this still new accountability framework 
is warranted.  
How Can the Connection Between Board Governance and Outcomes Be Utilized? 
 Much discussion in this study has been dedicated to explaining how and why the 
institution of the school board can serve its role of maximizing academic output.  But 
what lessons can individual boards, legislatures, and education reformers take from this 
dissertation? 
 The lessons for school boards are easy.  If your board is adhering to the NSBA’s 
Key Work of School Boards, continue to do so.  Adherence to the concepts embedded in 
the Keys has a positive or neutral effect on graduation and dropout rates.  Particular focus 
should be placed on relations with the superintendent, board development, and creation 
and frequent updating of a strategic plan.  In addition boards should work to reduce 
conflict, particularly personal conflict, and be wary of collaboration with interest groups.  
Doing all these things is likely to yield district academic gains. 
 171 
 
 The lessons for state legislatures are more complicated.  First, do not dismiss the 
potential of the elected school board.  While there may be situations where global 
governance reforms are warranted the potential positives of the governance reform must 
be weighed against the established potential for school boards to add academic value.  
The assumption that democratic representation is the lone or dominant positive attribute 
of elected school boards is a false one.  Legislators should also consider strategies to 
encourage better governance and consider intervention responses to poor governance.   
For example, most public school districts receive a fiscal audit from the state at 
least once every three years; a board governance audit could go along with these fiscal 
audits to gauge the performance of the school board.  Developing a framework for 
identifying board dysfunction in chronically low-performing districts could be a first step 
to meaningful interventions such as board development or forced turnover for struggling 
boards.     
 Education reformers should exercise caution in universally dismissing the 
democratically elected school board as an obstacle to education reform.  It is 
demonstrably not an inherent obstacle.  Sure, abolishing elected school boards would 
solve the problem of dysfunctional boards, but only at the expense of high-functioning 
boards that are having a positive impact on academic outcomes.  Further, recognition that 
improving school board governance behavior is a potentially fruitful approach to 
improving academic performance is warranted.  School boards deserve a place in the 
broad field of education reform.          
Conclusion 
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 The original survey data and extensive analysis in the preceding chapters and 
pages establish a connection between board governance and performance.  If the reader 
takes one thing way from this study it should be that governance matters.  Sometimes 
governance fails, sometimes it is irrelevant, but the capacity of small groups of diverse 
people to oversee organizations in ways that increase results – however defined – should 
not be dismissed.  Boards are vehicles for human interaction and decision-making with 
the goal of providing oversight to an organization.  Boards are flawed because humans 
are flawed, not because the concept, in education or elsewhere, is flawed.  Or to put it 
another way, the American school board is not a problem.  It is a solution.  
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Appendix A. 
School Board Survey Questions and Results: Public School Board Members Only 
 
1. What is your sex? 
 
 
Pct. N 
Male 53.38 600 
Female 46.62 524 
n=1,124 
 
2. Which best describes your race? 
 
  Pct. N 
White  93.47 1,045 
African-American  1.79 20 
Hispanic  .45  5 
Asian  .18  2 
Native American  .72  8 
Other 1.43 16 
Prefer Not to Say 1.97 22 
n=1,128 
 
3. What is your age? 
 
Mean N 
53.25 1,042 
n=1,042 
 
4. Would you identify yourself as: 
 
  Pct. N 
Liberal  18.11  201 
Conservative  32.61  362 
Moderate  37.12 412 
Non-Partisan  12.16  135 
n=1,110 
 
5. Do you share political beliefs with: 
 
  Pct. N 
All of your fellow board members  6.07 67 
Some of your fellow board 
members  69.57 768  
Few of your fellow board  16.49  182 
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members 
None of your fellow board 
members  7.88  87 
n=1,104 
 
6. Have you held elected office prior to serving on your school board? 
 
  Pct. N 
Yes  13.31  148 
No  86.69  964 
n=1,112 
 
7. Do members of your board serve under term limits? 
 
  Pct. N 
Yes  32.26 359 
No  67.74  754 
n=1,113 
 
8. How long have you served on your school board? 
 
  Pct. N 
0-2 years  19.79  222 
3-4 years  19.07  214 
5-6 years  14.35  161 
More than six years  46.79  525 
n=1,122 
 
9. In your last election did you have an opponent? 
 
  Pct. N 
Yes 63.80 712 
No 36.20 1,116 
n=1,116 
 
10. Do you have a job outside of the school board? 
 
  Pct. N 
Yes  76.83 859 
No  23.17  259 
n=1,118 
 
11. If yes, which best describes the nature of your non-school board job?  
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  Pct. N 
Education  15.84  96 
Business/commerce  25.41  154 
Labor/production  2.48  15 
Transportation  1.98  12 
Farming/fishing/forestry  4.62  28 
Sales  6.27  38 
Construction  3.63  22 
Professional services (law, medicine, 
etc.)  17.82  108 
Nonprofit  5.28  32 
Government  9.41  57 
Homemaker  .50  3 
Other  6.77  41 
n=606 
 
12. Which best describes your education level? 
 
  Pct. N 
Did not complete high school  .12 1  
High school Graduate or GED  3.92  32 
Some college or other post-secondary education/ training 
(including AA or AS degree)  24.26  198 
Bachelor’s degree  34.19  279 
Advanced degree (MA, MS, Ph.D., Ed.D., MD, JD, DVM, etc.)  37.50  306 
n=816 
 
13. Have you ever been employed as a teacher in your district? 
 
  Pct. N 
Yes  12.53 102  
No  87.47  712 
n=814 
 
How strongly do you agree with the following statements? 
 
14. My school district has adopted a performance budgeting process. Programs must 
show and document activities and levels of program success in order to continue 
receiving current levels of funding. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  6.04 49  
Agreement  26.26  213 
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Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  31.44  255 
Disagreement  30.70  249 
Strong, intense disagreement  5.55  45 
n=811 
 
15. Conflict among some school board members is high. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  6.64 54  
Agreement  15.50  126 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  15.99  130 
Disagreement  37.39  304 
Strong, intense disagreement  24.48  199 
n=813 
 
16. Cooperation among school board members is high. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  30.26 246  
Agreement  48.71  396 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  14.39  117 
Disagreement  4.80  39 
Strong, intense disagreement  1.85  15 
n=813 
 
17. Disagreements between board members often become personalized. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  5.32 43  
Agreement  12.61 102 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  13.60 110  
Disagreement  34.98  283 
Strong, intense disagreement  33.50  271 
n=809 
 
18. Conflict over issues on the school board usually results in a clear solution to the 
problem. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  10.07 82  
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Agreement  49.14  400 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  26.78  218 
Disagreement  11.18  91 
Strong, intense disagreement  2.83  23 
n=814 
 
19. School board coalitions (two or more individual members joining forces) tend to form 
along predictable lines (e.g. political party, male/female, etc.) 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  8.12 66  
Agreement  21.65  176 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  20.42  166 
Disagreement  31.49  256 
Strong, intense disagreement  18.33  149 
n=813 
 
20. During board negotiations, prior conflicts often resurface. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  4.05 33  
Agreement  18.18  148 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  20.64  168 
Disagreement  37.96  309 
Strong, intense disagreement  19.16  156 
n=814 
 
21. The school board has a clear leader. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  17.86 145  
Agreement  39.78  323 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  25.37  206 
Disagreement  13.55  110 
Strong, intense disagreement  3.45  28 
n=812 
 
22.  The clear board leader is also the board president. 
 
  Pct. N 
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Strong, intense agreement  18.30 149  
Agreement  33.17  270 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  27.03  220 
Disagreement  16.22  132 
Strong, intense disagreement  5.28  43 
n=814 
 
23. The board is highly productive. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  23.51 190  
Agreement  49.50  400 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  17.57  142 
Disagreement  7.43  60 
Strong, intense disagreement  1.98  16 
n=808 
 
24. Board decisions are supported by all members once made. 
 
  Pct. N 
Strong, intense agreement  28.62 233  
Agreement  45.82 373 
Neutral, mixed agreement and 
disagreement  12.65 103 
Disagreement  10.07 82  
Strong, intense disagreement  2.83  23 
n=814 
 
25. How often do you meet as a board? 
 
  Pct. N 
Less than Once a Month  .12 1  
Once a Month  38.07 311 
2-3 Times a Month  57.53 470  
More than 3 Times a Month  4.28 35  
n=817 
 
26. Do you think your fellow board members share your definition of accountability as it 
relates to academic outcomes in your district? 
 
  Pct. N 
Yes  79.92 605 
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No  152 20.08  
n=757 
 
27. Please rank the following topics in order of your school board's priority. 
 
  
Mean 
Rank N 
Strategic Planning  3.44 762  
Setting Academic Standards  3.38 762  
Making Assessment Policies  5.44 762  
Making Student Behavior Policies  6.36 762 
Hiring the Superintendent  4.89 762  
Holding School Staff Accountable for District 
Performance  5.70 762  
Collaborating with Interest Groups  8.07 762  
Interacting with the Public  6.38 762  
Board Development  7.68 762  
Monitoring Fiscal Performance  3.67 762  
 
28. Which best describes the way in which your board governs? 
 
  Pct. N 
The board governs and oversees operations through committees 
established along functional lines (finance, human resources, 
programs) but delegates the management functions to the 
superintendent  3.39 27 
The board manages, governs and performs the work of the 
organization.  3.02 24 
The board governs through policies that establish organizational 
aims (ends), governance approaches, and management limitations. 
These policies also should define the relationship of the board with 
the superintendent.  The superintendent broad freedom to determine 
the means that will be used to achieve organizational aims.  54.15 431 
The board manages operations through functional committees that 
may or may not have a staff coordinator.  39.45 314  
n=796 
 
How much do the following statements describe the members of your 
board? 
 
29. Members take responsibility for past decisions. 
 
  Pct. N 
Very Little 2.98 24 
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Little 6.08  49  
Some 28.91   233 
Greatly 49.75   401 
Very Greatly 12.28   99 
n=806 
 
30. Members freely admit when they are wrong. 
 
  Pct. N 
Very Little  8.29  67 
Little  13.37  108 
Some  44.06  356 
Greatly  28.34  229 
Very Greatly  5.94  48 
n=808 
 
31. Members can take each other at their word 
 
  Pct. N 
Very Little  3.72 30  
Little  5.70 46 
Some  24.41 197 
Greatly  42.50 343  
Very Greatly  23.67 191 
n=807 
 
32. Members do what they say they will do. 
 
  Pct. N 
Very Little  2.72  22 
Little  3.84  31 
Some  23.51  190 
Greatly  51.86  419 
Very Greatly  18.07  146 
n=808 
 
33. Members willingly try new things without fear of ridicule. 
 
  Pct. N 
Very Little  4.60 37  
Little  9.32 75 
Some  35.03 282  
Greatly  38.88 313 
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Very Greatly  12.17 98  
n=805 
 
34. Members willingly try new things without fear of retribution. 
 
  Pct. N 
Very Little  3.97 32  
Little  9.05  73 
Some  31.35  252 
Greatly  41.26  333 
Very Greatly  14.37  116 
n=807 
 
35. Members are open about how they feel about other members’ preferences. 
 
  Pct. N 
Very Little  3.47 28  
Little  13.99 113 
Some  40.84  330 
Greatly  34.28  277 
Very Greatly  7.43  60 
n=808 
 
36. Members are open about their own preferences. 
 
  Pct. N 
Very Little  1.73 14 
Little  3.22 26 
Some  26.27 212 
Greatly  52.42 423 
Very Greatly  16.36 132 
n=807 
 
Please choose the extent to which each of these statements describes your 
board 
 
37. We do not regularly update our strategic plan. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  40.18 321  
Describes a little bit  19.65 157 
Somewhat describes  22.28 178  
Describes a great deal  12.02 96  
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Perfectly describes  5.88 47  
n=799 
 
38. We engage in planning when the academic and/or fiscal direction of the district needs 
to be changed. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  13.03 104  
Describes a little bit  12.78 102  
Somewhat describes 23.93  191  
Describes a great deal 38.35  306  
Perfectly describes 11.90  95  
n=798 
 
39. We engage in strategic planning at regular intervals, such as every five years or after 
each board election. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 20.91  166  
Describes a little bit 18.01 143  
Somewhat describes 27.58  219  
Describes a great deal 23.30  185  
Perfectly describes 10.20  81  
n=794 
 
40. We engage in continuous strategic planning, our plan is frequently updated 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 20.78  165  
Describes a little bit 17.00  135 
Somewhat describes 22.04  175  
Describes a great deal 24.81  197  
Perfectly describes 15.37  122  
n=794 
 
41. We use the academic standards set by the State Board of Education (or Department 
of Public Instruction). 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  2.27 18  
Describes a little bit  5.18  41 
Somewhat describes 19.44   154 
Describes a great deal 53.03  420 
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Perfectly describes 20.08  159 
n=792 
 
42. We set and tweak district academic standards in response to student needs. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  10.18  81 
Describes a little bit  11.93  95 
Somewhat describes  26.38  210 
Describes a great deal  38.82  309 
Perfectly describes  12.69  101 
n=796 
 
43. We set and update district academic standards at regular intervals, such as every five 
years or after each board election. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  25.98  206 
Describes a little bit  20.18  160 
Somewhat describes  23.83  189 
Describes a great deal  24.09  191 
Perfectly describes  5.93  47 
n=793 
 
44. We consistently set academic standards more rigorous than those required by the 
State Board of Education (or Department of Public Instruction). 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  15.45 123  
Describes a little bit  13.69 109 
Somewhat describes  25.75 205  
Describes a great deal  26.51 211  
Perfectly describes  18.59 148  
n=796 
 
45. We solely use standardized tests required by the State Board of Education (or 
Department of Public Instruction). 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  32.58 258 
Describes a little bit  17.68 140  
Somewhat describes  25.76 204 
Describes a great deal  17.42 138 
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Perfectly describes  6.57  52 
n=792 
 
46. We set and tweak district assessment policies in response to student needs. For 
example, if we see our students struggling in math we will increase the use of math 
assessments. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  9.13 72  
Describes a little bit  13.94  110 
Somewhat describes  29.15  230 
Describes a great deal  36.88  291 
Perfectly describes  10.90  86 
n=789 
 
47. We set and update district standardized assessment policies at regular intervals, such 
as every five years or after each board election. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 22.11 174  
Describes a little bit 21.22  167  
Somewhat describes 30.50  240  
Describes a great deal 22.36 176  
Perfectly describes 3.81  30  
n=787 
 
48. We consistently use standardized assessments that are more rigorous than those 
required by the State Board of Education (or Department of Public Instruction). We also 
use student portfolios and/or alternative ways to measure student performance. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  12.93 102  
Describes a little bit  16.98 134 
Somewhat describes  25.35 200  
Describes a great deal  29.40 232  
Perfectly describes  15.34 121  
n=789 
 
49. We use the behavior policies required by the State Board of Education (or 
Department of Public Instruction). 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  10.39 80  
Describes a little bit  17.53 135 
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Somewhat describes  31.04 239  
Describes a great deal  34.03 262  
Perfectly describes  7.01 54  
n=770 
 
50. We set and tweak district student behavior policies in response to incidents. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  9.92 77  
Describes a little bit  19.59 152 
Somewhat describes  32.09 249  
Describes a great deal  31.44 244 
Perfectly describes  6.96 54  
n=776 
 
51. We set and update district student behavior policies at regular intervals, such as 
every five years or after each board election. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 20.03  160  
Describes a little bit 16.93  130 
Somewhat describes 25.65  197  
Describes a great deal 28.12  216  
Perfectly describes 8.46  65  
n=768 
 
52. We set and consistently update student district behavior policies that are more 
rigorous than those required by the State Board of Education (or Department of Public 
Instruction). 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  12.48 96  
Describes a little bit  13.91 107 
Somewhat describes  27.96 215  
Describes a great deal  30.95 238  
Perfectly describes  14.69 113  
n=769 
 
53. We rarely change superintendents (or principal if a charter board). When we do we 
look for someone local. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 36.75  287  
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Describes a little bit 20.36  159  
Somewhat describes 21.00  164  
Describes a great deal 14.85  116  
Perfectly describes 7.04   55 
n=781 
 
54. We conduct a broad search for a superintendent (or principal if a charter board) with 
expertise on the pressing needs of our district. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 11.42  89  
Describes a little bit  8.86 69  
Somewhat describes  19.77 154  
Describes a great deal 36.33  283  
Perfectly describes 23.62  184  
n=779 
 
55. We tend to hire a new superintendent (or principal if a charter board) at regular 
intervals, such as once every five years of after a board election. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  81.84 640  
Describes a little bit  8.57  67 
Somewhat describes  5.75  45 
Describes a great deal  2.81  22 
Perfectly describes  1.02  8 
n=782 
 
56. We look for a superintendent (or principal if a charter board) that shares the values 
of, and is willing to be a collaborator with, the school board. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  6.92 54  
Describes a little bit  4.87  38 
Somewhat describes  13.72 107 
Describes a great deal  37.82 295  
Perfectly describes  36.67 286  
n=780 
 
57. We primarily support and defend the decisions of the Superintendent (or principal if a 
charter board). 
 
  Pct. N 
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Does not describe at all  1.53 12  
Describes a little bit  6.39 50 
Somewhat describes  15.71 123  
Describes a great deal  56.32 441 
Perfectly describes  20.05  157 
n=783 
 
58. We support and defend the decisions of the Superintendent (or principal if a charter 
board) until concerns with those decisions arise. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  16.18 127  
Describes a little bit  17.83 140 
Somewhat describes  20.64 162  
Describes a great deal  34.78 273  
Perfectly describes  10.57 83  
n=785 
 
59. We allow the Superintendent (or principal if a charter board) to manage the district 
as he or she sees fit, but regularly monitor and review his or her performance. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 4.83 38  
Describes a little bit 6.36  50  
Somewhat describes 15.01  118  
Describes a great deal 42.49  334  
Perfectly describes 31.30  246  
n=786 
 
60. We view the Superintendent (or principal if a charter board) as a full partner in the 
governing process. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 2.41   19 
Describes a little bit 6.59   52 
Somewhat describes 10.90   86 
Describes a great deal 39.80   314 
Perfectly describes 40.30   318 
n=789 
 
61. Organized interest groups have significant influence over board decisions. 
 
  Pct. N 
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Does not describe at all 45.34 355  
Describes a little bit 32.69  256  
Somewhat describes 13.03  102  
Describes a great deal 6.90  54  
Perfectly describes 2.04  16 
n=783 
 
62. We regularly listen to the ideas of organized interest groups and act on their input 
when we deem it appropriate. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  13.14 103 
Describes a little bit  24.49 192  
Somewhat describes  31.38 246  
Describes a great deal  24.87 195  
Perfectly describes  6.12 48  
n=784 
 
63. Organized interest groups are generally only active during board elections. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 49.43 387  
Describes a little bit 25.42  199  
Somewhat describes 14.56  114  
Describes a great deal 8.43  66  
Perfectly describes 2.17  17  
n=783 
 
64. We do not consider the input of organized interest groups when making board 
decisions. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  45.07 352  
Describes a little bit  24.71 193  
Somewhat describes  17.54 137  
Describes a great deal  9.22 72  
Perfectly describes  3.46  27 
n=781 
 
65. Community members have significant influence over board decisions. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  17.90 140  
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Describes a little bit  32.86 257 
Somewhat describes  32.35 253  
Describes a great deal  15.60 122  
Perfectly describes  1.28 10  
n=782 
 
66. We regularly listen to the ideas of community members and act on their input when 
we deem it appropriate. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 2.42  19  
Describes a little bit 11.73  92  
Somewhat describes 26.66  209  
Describes a great deal 48.60  381  
Perfectly describes 10.59  83  
n=784 
 
67. We do not consider the input of community members when making board decisions. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all  73.50 574  
Describes a little bit  15.49 121  
Somewhat describes  7.17 56  
Describes a great deal  3.07 24  
Perfectly describes  .77 6  
n=781 
 
68. We do not engage in any formal board development. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 45.47  356  
Describes a little bit 20.56  161  
Somewhat describes 19.28  151  
Describes a great deal 9.45  74  
Perfectly describes 5.24  41  
n=783 
 
69. We engage in board development activities when obvious dysfunction arises. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 39.95  310  
Describes a little bit 21.39  166  
Somewhat describes 23.84  185  
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Describes a great deal 11.98  93  
Perfectly describes 2.84  22  
n=776 
 
70. We engage in board development activities at regular intervals, such as every five 
years or after each board election. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 31.27  242  
Describes a little bit 20.16  156  
Somewhat describes 25.06  194  
Describes a great deal 17.31  134  
Perfectly describes 6.20  48  
n=774 
 
71. We frequently and consistently engage in board development activities. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 24.77  192  
Describes a little bit 18.19  141  
Somewhat describes 18.45  143  
Describes a great deal 21.55  167  
Perfectly describes 17.03  132  
n=775 
 
72. We follow the fiscal practices mandated by the State Board of Education (or 
Department of Public Instruction). 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 2.57  20  
Describes a little bit 4.89  38  
Somewhat describes 17.89  139  
Describes a great deal 48.13  374  
Perfectly describes 26.51  206  
n=777 
 
73. We set and tweak district fiscal practices in response to problems. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 5.78 45 
Describes a little bit 10.78  84 
Somewhat describes 23.75  185  
Describes a great deal 43.90  342  
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Perfectly describes 15.79  123  
n=779 
 
74. We set and update district fiscal policies at regular intervals, such as every five years 
or after each board election. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 25.06  194  
Describes a little bit 16.02  124  
Somewhat describes 23.51  182  
Describes a great deal 25.58  198  
Perfectly describes 9.82  76  
n=774 
 
75. We set and consistently update district fiscal policies that are more rigorous than 
those required by the State Board of Education (or Department of Public Instruction). 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 11.34  87  
Describes a little bit 12.78  98  
Somewhat describes 22.43  172  
Describes a great deal 35.59  273  
Perfectly describes 17.86  137  
n=767 
 
76. In the past five years our school board has had very little board member turnover. 
 
  Pct. N 
Does not describe at all 21.90  171  
Describes a little bit 16.52  129  
Somewhat describes 20.49  160  
Describes a great deal 21.77  170  
Perfectly describes 19.33  151  
n=781 
 
Which best describes how your board handles.... 
 
77. Financial Decisions 
 
  Pct. N 
The board as a whole deliberates and makes decisions  40.75 319  
The board makes decisions based on committee recommendations  30.40 238  
The board delegates decisions making authority to the  10.98 86  
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superintendent (or principal if a charter board) 
The board follows its established policies when making decisions  17.88 140  
n=783 
 
78. Personnel Decisions 
 
  Pct. N 
The board as a whole deliberates and makes decisions  12.63 99  
The board makes decisions based on committee recommendations  20.03  157 
The board delegates decisions making authority to the 
superintendent (or principal if a charter board)  48.60  381 
The board follows its established policies when making decisions  18.75  147 
n=784 
 
79. Decisions about the academic direction of the district 
 
  Pct. N 
The board as a whole deliberates and makes decisions  25.26 196  
The board makes decisions based on committee recommendations  26.68  207 
The board delegates decisions making authority to the 
superintendent (or principal if a charter board)  31.70  246 
The board follows its established policies when making decisions  16.37  127 
n=776 
 
80. Decisions regarding the public perception of the district 
 
  Pct. N 
The board as a whole deliberates and makes decisions  51.48 400  
The board makes decisions based on committee recommendations  15.19 118 
The board delegates decisions making authority to the 
superintendent (or principal if a charter board)  18.28 142  
The board follows its established policies when making decisions  15.06 117  
n=777 
 
81. Decisions regarding interactions with state government 
 
  Pct. N 
The board as a whole deliberates and makes decisions  29.65 231  
The board makes decisions based on committee recommendations  10.65 83  
The board delegates decisions making authority to the 
superintendent (or principal if a charter board)  42.11 328  
The board follows its established policies when making decisions  17.59 137  
n=779 
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82. Using the continuum below, indicate who bears responsibility for the following 
organizational functions, where: 
 
-5 means the Board is fully responsible for the function; 
 0 means the Board and Superintendent (or principal if a charter board) equally share 
responsibility for the function; and 
 5 means the Superintendent (or principal if a charter board) is fully responsible for the 
function. 
 
  Mean N 
Day-to-Day Operational 
Management  4.42  788 
On-Going Financial Management  2.23 662 
Strategic Planning  .39 580 
Stakeholder and Public Relations  .89 584  
Program Evaluation  2.45 683  
Public Advocacy  .34 565  
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Appendix B. 
Survey Solicitation Letter 
 
Dear School Board Member,   
We invite you to take part in a survey of decision-making on school boards in Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Michigan, Utah, Florida, and Nevada. You were selected due to your position 
as a school board member in one of these states.  While your participation is voluntary, 
we would greatly appreciate your assistance.  Included in the e-mail is a link to an online 
survey.  If you prefer to receive a paper survey, please e-mail Michael Ford at 
mford@uwm.edu with your address, and a paper survey will be mailed.   We are seeking 
to understand the experiences and characteristics of school board members. We recognize 
the sensitive nature of many of the questions we have asked. We want to assure you that 
your responses will remain strictly confidential.  No individual board or board member 
information will be released.  Also, given the complexity of the issues being addressed, 
the questionnaire may take you about twenty minutes to complete.    We are confident 
that you will find many of our questions interesting and will want to know what we have 
found out from all the school boards studied.  The deadline for completing the survey is 
important for our research.  Please complete and submit online by April 15, 2013. 
There are no known risks associated with your participating in this study, other than the 
discomfort you may experience when answering what may be awkward questions about 
board dynamics.  Possible benefits are that you will learn, from the results of this 
research, more about the decision-making processes used by other boards. PLEASE DO 
NOT INPUT YOUR NAME ANYWHERE ON THE SURVEY. 
 
If you have any questions about this research please contact Michael Ford using the 
information below: 
  
Michael Ford 
Doctoral Student, Urban Studies 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
3835 S. Herman Street 
Milwaukee, WI 53207 
414-803-2162 
mford@uwm.edu 
  
This study was received IRB approval on February 19, 2013, IRB# 13.275.  If you have 
any complaints about your experience as a participant in this study, please call or write: 
  
Melissa Spadanuda 
IRB Administrator 
University Safety and Assurances 
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee 
P.O. Box 413, Engelmann 270 
Milwaukee, WI  53201 
Phone: 414-229-3173 
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Fax: 414-229-6729 
www.irb.uwm.edu 
  
Although Ms. Spadanuda will ask your name, all complaints are kept in confidence. 
  
Thank you so much for your contribution to knowledge in this area. 
  
Sincerely, 
  
Michael Ford and Douglas Ihrke 
 
 University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee 
Consent to Participate in Online Survey Research 
  
Study Title:  The Impact of School Board Governance Behavior on Academic 
Achievement in Diverse States 
  
Person Responsible for Research: Douglas Ihrke and Michael Ford 
  
Study Description:  The purpose of this research study is to better understand how 
school board governance affects academic achievement in diverse policy 
environments.  Approximately 9,600 subjects will participate in this study.  If you agree 
to participate, you will be asked to complete an online survey that will take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete.  The questions will ask you about your 
background, your experiences as a school board member, and your relationships with 
other school board members and district personnel.  
  
Risks / Benefits:  Risks to participants are considered minimal.  Survey respondents may 
expect some psychological discomfort.  The questions contained in the survey instrument 
are of a sensitive nature in the sense that the subject matter is the relationships and 
interactions within groups of which the participants are all members.  Collection of data 
and survey responses using the internet involves the same risks that a person would 
encounter in everyday use of the internet (such as breach of confidentiality).  While the 
researchers have taken every reasonable step to protect your confidentiality, there is 
always the possibility of interception or hacking of the data by third parties that is not 
under the control of the research team. 
  
There will be no costs for participating. There are no benefits to you other than to further 
research. 
  
Limits to Confidentiality  
  
Identifying information such as your school district will be collected for purposes of 
linking your Reponses, and those of your colleagues to district financial and academic 
performance data.  Your responses will be treated as confidential and all reasonable 
efforts will be made so that no individual participant will be identified with his/her 
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answers.  Data will be retained on the Qualtrics website server for on year and will be 
deleted after this time.  However, data may exist on backups or server logs beyond the 
timeframe of this research project.  Data transferred from the survey site will be saved in 
an encrypted format indefinitely.  Only three people, the PI, student PI, and study staff 
will have access to the data collected by this study.  The research team will remove your 
identifying information after linking the data and all study results will be reported 
without identifying information so that no one viewing the results will ever be able to 
match you with your responses. 
  
Voluntary Participation:  Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You may 
choose to not answer any of the questions or withdraw from this study at any time 
without penalty.  Your decision will not change any present or future relationship with 
the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. 
  
Who do I contact for questions about the study:  For more information about the study 
or study procedures, contact Douglas Ihrke at dihrke@uwm.edu. 
  
Who do I contact for questions about my rights or complaints towards my 
treatment as a research subject?  Contact the UWM IRB at 414-229-3173 or 
irbinfo@uwm.edu.  This study was approved on February 19, 2013, IRB# 13.275. 
  
Research Subject’s Consent to Participate in Research:  
By entering this survey, you are indicating that you have read the consent form, you are 
age 18 or older and that you voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. 
  
Thank you! 
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